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Sherif Khattab, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2008
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a computer security problem that poses a serious challenge to
trustworthiness of services deployed over computer networks. The aim of DoS attacks is
to make services unavailable to legitimate users, and current network architectures allow
easy-to-launch, hard-to-stop DoS attacks. Particularly challenging are the service-level DoS
attacks, whereby the victim service is flooded with legitimate-like requests, and the jamming
attack, in which wireless communication is blocked by malicious radio interference. These
attacks are overwhelming even for massively-resourced services, and effective and efficient
defenses are highly needed.
This work contributes a novel defense framework, which I call dodging, against service-
level DoS and wireless jamming. Dodging has two components: (1) the careful assignment of
servers to clients to achieve accurate and quick identification of service-level DoS attackers
and (2) the continuous and unpredictable-to-attackers reconfiguration of the client-server
assignment and the radio-channel mapping to withstand service-level and jamming DoS
attacks. Dodging creates hard-to-evade baits, or traps, and dilutes the attack “fire power”.
The traps identify the attackers when they violate the mapping function and even when they
attack while correctly following the mapping function. Moreover, dodging keeps attackers
“in the dark”, trying to follow the unpredictably changing mapping. They may hit a few
times but lose “precious” time before they are identified and stopped.
Three dodging-based DoS defense algorithms are developed in this work. They are more
resource-efficient than state-of-the-art DoS detection and mitigation techniques. Honey-
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bees combines channel hopping and error-correcting codes to achieve bandwidth-efficient
and energy-efficient mitigation of jamming in multi-radio networks. In roaming honey-
pots, dodging enables the camouflaging of honeypots, or trap machines, as real servers,
making it hard for attackers to locate and avoid the traps. Furthermore, shuffling requests
over servers opens up windows of opportunity, during which legitimate requests are serviced.
Live baiting, efficiently identifies service-level DoS attackers by employing results from
the group-testing theory, discovering defective members in a population using the minimum
number of tests. The cost and benefit of the dodging algorithms are analyzed theoretically,
in simulation, and using prototype experiments.
Keywords Computer Networks, Network Security, Denial-of-Service Attack, Dodging, Hon-
eypots, Group Testing, Wireless Jamming, Sensor Networks, Multi-radio.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Computer networks, such as the Internet and wireless networks, have undoubtedly become
part of today’s infrastructure. For instance, thirty-six million American households used
Internet banking in 2004 [86], Internet shoppers spent $30.1 billion during the 2005 holiday
season [51], and physical infrastructure systems, such as the power grid, use the Internet
for remote access and coordination. On the wireless side, sensor networks have emerged
as a powerful networking paradigm with many civilian and military applications, such as
emergency response, surveillance, health applications, and habitat monitoring [9].
However, services deployed over computer networks are still far from being trustworthy.
Indeed, fighting Internet viruses is an everyday practice of computer system administrators.
A computer virus is not only a nuisance, but also a way to recruit an army of “zombies”,
virus-infected computers commandeered by the virus’s creator. Zombies are then used for
various types of malicious activity. In the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, the focus of this
work, they jointly bombard a target Internet site with a high volume of network traffic, such
that legitimate users’ traffic cannot go through, and the victim site’s services are thus denied.
The victim site can be a competitor’s website, an emergency command and control center, or
even (as has happened) www.whitehouse.gov [134]. The synchronized participation of many
attacking nodes can achieve high illegitimate traffic rate in a Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attack [37]. Although the mechanisms behind DoS attacks are relatively simple,
current technology falls short of a bulletproof defense.
In the wireless arena the situation is not much different. Wireless networks should not
be trusted in life- and mission-critical deployments until their security vulnerabilities are
adequately handled [66]. One such vulnerability is wireless jamming, in which attackers
induce radio interference in an attempt to block wireless communication [156]. Jamming is
1
a form of Denial-of-Service against wireless networks [151].
The main facilitator of DoS is that network-borne services have finite ability to process
traffic and little control over which traffic to receive [8]. A computer network, like any
common facility, needs to be regulated. However, regulation of open networks is difficult to
achieve. For instance, the Internet is not owned by a single authority; it is the joint forces of
many entities that maintain the Internet. Moreover, the Internet is a very large and complex
system connecting millions of machines worldwide. Similarly, the wireless medium is shared
and open to both benign interference (e.g., from wireless phones, microwaves, etc.) and
malicious jamming.
DoS is an attack on system’s resources. Network services are provided using a combina-
tion of resources at the hosts providing the services, at the clients requesting and receiving
the service, and at the network carrying service traffic. Examples of shared resources are
link bandwidth, router buffers, server memory, CPU cycles, and operating system struc-
tures. DoS attackers inject maliciously-designed packets into the network to deplete some
or all of these resources: either the resource gets exhausted (by driving utilization to reach
the resource capacity), destroyed (by forcing its capacity to zero), or captured (by acquiring
control over the resource). When a resource is captured, it can be used to launch attacks
against other resources or caused to behave unexpectedly in a stealthy way that is hard to
detect [91].
With the above considerations, a DoS defense system is mainly challenged with the
need to accurately and efficiently distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate traffic so
that only illegitimate traffic is regulated. Attacks which employ legitimate-like traffic, such
as reflector [111], and service-level [49] attacks, complicate accurate detection and limit the
efficacy of filtering rules that are based on simple traffic features. Resource-intensive defenses,
such as those based on stateful monitoring and heavy cryptography, are more complex and
more easily overwhelmed with illegitimate traffic, and thus, become DoS attack targets
themselves.
2
1.1 DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS)
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a major security problem in computer systems and networks
[47, 48]. The DoS threat started to materialize in the Internet with the massive attack
against the University of Minnesota in 1999 [37]. The access links of the university were
flooded by packets launched from many machines, the links were completely hogged up by
the attack packets, and legitimate (non-attack) packets were dropped. Since then, many
DoS attacks have been and continue to be launched [98].
Gligor defined DoS as follows [161]: “a group of otherwise-authorized users of a specific
service is said to deny service to another group of authorized users if the former group makes
the specified service unavailable to the latter group for a period of time which exceeds the in-
tended (and advertised) waiting time.” Some instances of service denial are enabled by unau-
thorized information disclosure (confidentiality problem), unauthorized deletion and modi-
fication of information objects (integrity problem), and benign faults (fault-tolerance prob-
lem) [161]. For example, some DoS attacks are launched from compromised machines [36]
(confidentiality breach), some use spoofed (forged) source addresses [20] (integrity breach),
and some result from failure of system components (fault-tolerance problem). DoS instances
that involve no violation of confidentiality or integrity nor traditional faults represent the
heart of the DoS problem and are fundamentally harder to defend against because they re-
quire non-traditional approaches. In this work, I focus on these DoS instances, illustrated
by the shaded area in Fig. 1.
In particular, I consider two DoS attack types, both falling in the resource-exhaustion
category [91]: service-level DoS attacks, which target server resources by issuing legitimate-
like service requests at a high rate to overwhelm the victim servers, and link-level DoS attacks,
particularly the radio jamming attack. Both attack types are challenging: Service-level DoS
attackers are hard to identify because they send seemingly legitimate traffic [49, 65], and
jamming is hard to mitigate, especially with limited node resources [151].
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Figure 1: Denial-of-Service vs. integrity, confidentiality, and fault tolerance. This work
focuses on the shaded area of the figure, not on the overlap with other fields.
1.2 DOS DEFENSE CHALLENGES
In general, four fundamental challenges contribute to the difficulty of the DoS problem.
• Hard prevention. Software bugs, misconfiguration, and human’s inherent vulnerability
to social engineering [96] all enable a remote attacker to cause a resource to be unavailable
to legitimate users. For instance, an attacker may exploit a bug in a packet queue
implementation that enables a specially crafted packet to set tail = head, effectively
rendering queue capacity to zero.
• Weak deterrents. Sending attack packets is almost free, user authentication in order
to identify attack sources is hard, and it is easy for the real attack perpetrators to hide
behind an army of unwitting zombies that launch the attack on their behalf.
• Difficult resource control. Effective resource management and protection ensures that
entities (e.g., users and processes) be allocated their resource shares and no entity can
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gain more than its share. A challenge here is the definition of entities. Entities can be
processes, sockets, IP addresses, user tokens, etc. The granularity of an entity determines
how much control is available and how much overhead is incurred. For instance, enforcing
fair resource allocation between open TCP sockets consumes less resources than enforcing
fair-sharing between IP addresses, because the number of open sockets is usually much
less than the IP address space. Controlling at the socket level, however, is vulnerable to
an attacker with a single IP address gaining all socket resources and leaving nothing for
other users. IP spoofing [46] and application-layer proxies [29] reduce the effectiveness of
using the IP address as an identifier. A finer-grain control (e.g., based on application-level
cookies) leads to a huge state overhead, especially in large services.
• Difficult attacker identification. It is hard to come up with a silver-bullet definition
of malicious entities to block their access to attacked resources. Many attempts have
been made to define characteristics of a malicious entity: sends one-way traffic [93],
sends more traffic than normal [90], sends more “heavy” requests than normal [120],
appears on system logs only during periods of attack [112], and is controlled by bots
(non-human agents controlling compromised machines) [64]. These attempts are either
specific to particular services or can be bypassed by new attacks. For instance, defense
systems that detect non-human bots are only suitable for Web services and other services
with “direct” human users. Also, defense systems that detect network-level anomalies are
bypassed by service-level attacks that target server resources without causing congestion
at the network level [49].
To overcome these challenges, the current techniques for DoS protection fall into three
main approaches: prevention, mitigation, and detection and recovery. Although success-
ful against some instances of the DoS problem, these approaches have limitations. DoS
prevention is generally impossible unless all users comply with a user agreement that de-
fines acceptable user behavior [161]. For instance, the notorious SYN flooding attack [126]
resulted from violating the user agreement (as established in the TCP protocol [139]) to
release a resource shortly after using it. When all users are trusted, the user agreement can
be safely assumed, but when some users are not trusted (e.g., in an open service deployed
over the Internet), the user agreement needs to be enforced by an external mechanism [50].
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Nevertheless, existing prevention mechanisms add a layer of complexity that is sometimes
ineffective or limits the scope of the service being protected. For instance, researchers have
proposed that service clients should exert “effort”, in terms of CPU cycles, memory accesses,
or network bandwidth, in order to get serviced [62,99,145,147,148,149,154]. This mechanism
provides only weak guarantees on service response-time [49]. Another DoS prevention exam-
ple is the CAPTCHA puzzles (e.g., [99]), which distinguish humans from bots but restrict
the protected service’s clients to human users.
DoS mitigation mechanisms (e.g., replication [30] and overlay-based systems [69,99,135])
allow services to sustain acceptable performance under attack. However, they require re-
source over-provisioning and consequently suffer from high overhead. DoS detection is com-
plicated by the fact that attackers tend to hide their traffic in such ways that make it look
legitimate, making it extremely hard to come up with accurate and “efficient” (low filter-
ing overhead) attack signatures. Identifying service-level DoS attackers, who send attack
requests that are indistinguishable from legitimate requests, is a challenging task [120]. An-
other example is the SYN flooding attack, in which it is hard to distinguish between an
attacker that intentionally keeps an entry in the TCP connection queue for a long time and
a legitimate user that intermittently experiences long network delays before its ACK packets
are received [126].
1.3 DODGING
As mentioned previously, the focus of this dissertation is on resource exhaustion attacks.
Such attacks can be mitigated by replication to increase the total resource capacity beyond
the attack resource consumption [69]. Resource-exhaustion attacks can also be detected and
evaded, whereby the system is reconfigured to remove the resource under attack from the
service path [41,136]. For instance, when a router queue is exhausted and legitimate packets
start getting dropped, moving the service to a different location that avoids traversing the
attacked router may lead to the attack being dodged.
This dissertation addresses the question whether replication and evasion can be combined
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in a synergistic way that brings about benefits not attainable using any of the schemes by
itself. The basic challenges in such a combination are how often should evasion be used, how
much replication should be used, and what benefits can be achieved by the combination. The
thesis of this dissertation provides a positive answer to this question: the replication-evasion
synergy can be achieved using a careful combination of the three DoS defense approaches,
namely prevention, mitigation, and detection-and-recovery.
This work puts forward the following thesis: a hybrid of the three DoS defense
approaches provides better protection than the individual approaches. The thesis
is supported by developing a novel hybrid DoS defense framework, which I call dodging. At
a glance, dodging is achieved by continuous, carefully designed system reconfigurations with
the two-fold goal of quickly identifying attackers and mitigating attacks. As will be shown
in this dissertation, dodging-based defense mechanisms are more resources-efficient than
pure mitigation mechanisms. Also, dodging leverages user agreements to allow for attacker
identification mechanisms that are more accurate and more efficient than pure detection
mechanisms.
Dodging is a hybrid of the three DoS defense approaches. First, dodging borrows the
notion of user agreement from DoS prevention, but with the goal of identifying violators
rather than enforcing the agreement. Second, dodging enables a novel approach for identify-
ing DoS attackers, which I call Primary-Effect-based Detection (PED). PED is inspired by
the observation that detecting DoS attacks is easier than identifying the attackers. Indeed,
DoS attacks result (by definition [48]) in an increased response time, which can be easily
detected. Meanwhile, identifying the attackers is challenging in general, especially when the
attack traffic closely resembles legitimate traffic, which is the case in service-level DoS at-
tacks, and when the attack is launched against a large service with huge client population [63].
Finally, dodging allows for mitigating the attack and sustaining service performance using a
careful combination of replication and attack evasion.
An interesting analogy of dodging in the physical world is the boxing strategy of Muham-
mad Ali, which he refers to as:
Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.—Muhammad Ali
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Ali used to move continuously, very quickly, and unpredictably to his opponent on the
boxing ring, causing his opponent to either (1) attack blindly and lose his strength chasing
Ali or (2) focus on predicting Ali’s moving pattern, miss and attack the wrong places, and
thus, become easy to knock off-guard.
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Figure 2: The components of the dodging framework.
Analogous to Ali’s techniques, dodging has two components (Fig. 2): dodging to escape
and dodging to bait. First, dodging causes attackers to dilute their “fire-power” trying to
follow the system reconfigurations, hitting a few times, but losing “precious” time attempting
to follow making it more probable that they are identified and filtered out. Second, dodging
creates hard-to-evade baits, or traps, for attackers. Particularly, when attackers access the
wrong configurations and even when they successfully follow the service reconfigurations,
they are identified. Dodging incurs an overhead, analogous to the physical effort exerted
by Ali in his continuous movement. However, this overhead is strategic, and it pays off by
mitigating the DoS attack.
The proposed dodging framework raises the following challenges:
• How to use dodging to create hard-to-evade traps, and how to use these traps to identify
attackers accurately, quickly, and efficiently?
• How to design a dodging strategy that has the best cost-benefit trade-off. This involves
the questions of how frequently to dodge and how many traps to use.
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• How to make dodging applicable to public services, such as google.com, which can be
accessed by any client, and there is no a priori difference between legitimate clients and
attackers. This is different from private services, in which legitimate clients are known a
priori.
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS
The two key contributions of this work are the formulation and analysis of dodging as a
practical and effective hybrid framework for mitigating denial-of-service and the
formulation of the Primary-Effect-based (PED) detection approach. Additionally,
three dodging-based algorithms are developed and evaluated. The application of dodging
through these algorithms yielded other contributions, which are described next.
1.4.1 Dodging Algorithms
Dodging is a dynamic mapping between clients and resources in an unpredictable way that
allows for attack mitigation and attacker identification. Three dodging algorithms are devel-
oped and analyzed. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the three algorithms together achieve the two
components of dodging, namely dodging to escape and dodging to bait. The first dodging
algorithm, namely honeybees [74,73] (Chapter 5), applies dodging in the wireless networks
arena, whereby dodging allows for energy-efficient and bandwidth-efficient mitigation of ra-
dio jamming in multi-radio wireless networks [15], where each node is equipped with mul-
tiple radio interfaces. Honeybees efficiently augments the redundancy of radio transceivers
in multi-radio devices with a layer of evasion by channel hopping [54, 100, 153, 155]. The
honeybees algorithm combines the software-based channel-hopping technique with Error-
Correcting Codes (ECC) (e.g., [118]). First, the best channel-hopping strategy (reactive or
proactive) is determined by formulating the jamming problem as a max-min game between
defense and attack, and through simulation the dependency of the game outcome on the
payoff function is illustrated. Reactive channel-hopping was found to provide better jam-
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ming tolerance when considering communication availability. However, both reactive and
proactive defenses had almost the same performance when energy consumption was consid-
ered. Reactive channel-hopping is further studied through theoretical modeling to aid in
understanding the inherent trade-offs between throughput and jamming-tolerance.
The contributions of the honeybees algorithm can be summarized as follows:
• The problem of maximizing goodput under jamming in multi-radio networks using a
combination of channel-hopping and ECC is formalized.
• Models for different combinations of defense and attack hopping strategies are developed
and validated using simulation. The models incorporate the effect of ECC redundancy
on communication availability.
The second algorithm, which I name roaming honeypots [77] (§6.1), significantly im-
proves the usage of honeypots [116] against directed (vs. random) DoS attacks by camouflag-
ing honeypots as servers [71, 72, 76,77,123,124]. The algorithm moves the protected service
among replicated servers continuously and unpredictably to attackers. Secure, distributed,
randomized, and adaptive algorithms for triggering the roaming and determining the active
servers are developed. Also, modifications to the state recovery process of existing TCP
connection-migration schemes [129, 141] to better suit roaming are proposed. Results from
simulation and prototype experiments show that the overhead, in terms of response time, of
roaming is small in the absence of attacks. Further, during an attack, roaming significantly
improves the response time. Shuffling requests over servers opens windows of opportunity
for legitimate connections to get serviced, allowing the service to sustain performance under
attack. Also, a good trade-off between costs and benefits of roaming is reached by care-
fully setting both the frequency of roaming and number of active servers. The algorithm is
presented and analyzed in §6.1.
The third algorithm, namely live baiting [70] (§6.2), identifies service-level DoS attack-
ers and scales to large services with millions of clients [70]. Live baiting requires low state
overhead, enabled by a novel leverage of the group-testing theory [42, 43, 57, 67, 102, 138],
which aims at detecting “defective” members in a population using the minimum number of
tests.
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The merits of the roaming honeypots and live baiting dodging algorithms are as follows.
• They quickly and efficiently identify DoS attackers and protect large services with large
client populations. In live baiting, identification of DoS attackers is done with manage-
able memory and computational overheads.
• They protect open services whose legitimate clients are not known a priori, and they are
not restricted to services with human clients who can solve puzzles, such as CAPTCHA
[49,144].
• Live baiting is the first work to apply group-testing theory to the DoS attack problem.
Moreover, live baiting can detect the actual number of attackers and adaptively adjust
its parameters. This adaptability is a novel contribution to group-testing theory.
• Both algorithms require no modifications inside the network and only require minor server
and client modifications, thus reducing the introduction or addition of vulnerabilities.
According to the two dodging components and the type of attackers, I divide the DoS
problem space into four parts shown in Fig. 3. Attacker compliance refers to whether or not
attackers follow the system reconfigurations introduced by the dodging algorithms (more de-
tails in §3.4). The defense algorithms presented in this work differ in the dodging component
they provide and the attack types they cover. As I will show throughout this dissertation, the
honeybees algorithm (Chapter 5) mitigates non-compliant attacks, and the roaming honey-
pots algorithm (§6.1) provides attack mitigation against both compliant and non-compliant
attackers. Roaming honeypots also identifies non-compliant attackers, and live baiting (§6.2)
identifies compliant attackers.
1.4.2 Primary-Effect-based Detection (PED)
Dodging enables a new approach for attacker identification, which advocates a departure
from the three main detection approaches, namely anomaly-based (e.g., PacketScore [7, 14]
and DDoS Shield [120]), misuse-based (e.g., the Snort Intrusion Detection System [4]), and
specification-based (e.g., RED-PD [89]). Although successful in many instances of the DoS
problem, the current detection approaches have limitations, which I discuss in §2.1.2.
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Figure 3: The DoS problem space is divided into four parts along the attacker-compliance
and dodging-component dimensions.
In the novel attacker detection approach enabled by dodging, which I name Primary-
Effect-based Detection (PED), DoS attackers are identified based merely on the unavailability
of the attacked resources, without the need to develop models of legitimate behavior, keep
track of attack signatures, or tightly specify legitimate behavior. The simplicity of the signals
used to identify attackers enables PED to overcome the limitations of current detection
approaches.
1.5 ROADMAP
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, background material
as well as state-of-the-art in DoS defense are presented. Chapter 3 describes system and
attack models. In chapter 4, the dodging approach, its components, and its properties are
presented. The three dodging algorithms, honeybees, roaming honeypots, and live baiting are
presented in Chapter 5, §6.1, and §6.2, respectively. The simulation study to determine the
best channel-hopping strategy (reactive or proactive) in the honeybees algorithm is presented
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in §5.1. §5.1 also presents a formulation of the jamming problem as max-min games between
defense and attack and an analysis of the game outcome using simulation. Models of reactive
channel-hopping are presented in §6.2.3, whereby the adaptive honeybees algorithm is also
described. Results from simulation and prototype experiments of the roaming honeypots
algorithm are presented in §6.1.4. Finally, the live baiting algorithms is analyzed theoretically
and through simulation in §6.2.5. Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions and describes their
foreseen impact.
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, dodging is qualitatively compared to the state-of-the-art in the three main
DoS protection approaches, namely prevention (§2.1.1), detection-and-recovery (§2.1.2), and
mitigation (§2.1.3). Dodging, as a hybrid of the three approaches, qualitatively outperforms
the detection and mitigation approaches individually. Then, a review of the background
material behind the dodging algorithms is presented. The roaming honeypots algorithm
employs TCP-connection migration (§2.2.1) and improves the usage of honeypots (§2.2.2)
against DoS attacks. Live baiting leverages results from group-testing theory (§2.3). Fi-
nally, the honeybees algorithm defends multi-radio networks (§2.4.4) against radio jamming
(§2.4.1) by combining channel-hopping (§2.4.2) and error-correcting codes (§2.4.3). Results
from game theory [106], max-min games in particular(§2.4.5), are used to model the honey-
bees strategies.
2.1 STATE-OF-THE-ART IN DOS DEFENSE
Gligor [47] defined the DoS problem and described its relationship with other security
and fault-tolerance problems. DoS defense approaches can be classified into prevention,
detection-and-recovery, and mitigation. Mirkovic et al. presented an extensive taxonomy
of DoS attack and defense techniques [94]. The relationship between dodging and state-of-
the-art DoS defense mechanisms, classified based on the network-stack layer they defend, is
summarized in Table 1, which indicates that dodging provides mitigation against link-layer
DoS and both detection and mitigation against service-level DoS. Although dodging bor-
rows the user-agreement concept from the prevention approach, dodging does not prevent
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attacks; as discussed earlier, prevention is impossible unless the user agreement can be en-
forced. Dodging does not attempt to enforce the agreement 1, but define it in a way that
allows easy identification of violators.
2.1.1 Prevention
Prevention mechanisms (if successful) provide strong guarantees on the service and network
availability even under attack. It has been shown that prevention is impossible in general un-
less a user agreement that defines acceptable user behavior is defined and externally enforced
[161]. Recently, some prevention mechanisms achieved strong guarantees that depend on at-
tack parameters, in particular the number of attack machines [109]. Examples of the user
agreements include exerting an “effort” before getting serviced [62,99,145,147,148,149,154],
making a reservation prior to accessing the service [110,49], and paying for the service [24].
Some mechanisms have focused on preventing particular attack methods, such as anti-
spoofing mechanisms [23,46,68,88,93,108,148,154] and physical-layer anti-jamming [103,114],
by enforcing rules that make these attack methods impossible or at least hard to launch.
Client puzzles [62,99,145,147,148,149,154] and ticket-based systems (e.g., [110] and the
rate-control service [49]) are indeed effective against many DoS instances but fall short of
preventing service-level DoS attacks in general. For instance, the client puzzles approach
assumes that an attacker does not have enough resources to solve hard puzzles at a high
rate or is not willing to perform a hard computational problem on a compromised machine
in order to remain undetected to the machine’s user. However, a legitimate client is also
required to perform the same heavy computation, and users of compromised machines may
not easily distinguish between high CPU utilization due to legitimate requests and due
to attack requests launched from their machines. Furthermore, some of these techniques
require human intervention in sending the requests (e.g., solving CAPTCHA puzzles in [99])
or assume trusted hardware (e.g., [49]).
Wide deployment of spoofing-prevention mechanisms (e.g., [23,46,68,88,93,108,148,154])
does not prevent DoS attacks at the service level and does not stop non-spoofing attacks.
1Enforcing user agreements can be very hard in open systems, such as the Internet, where some users are
not trusted.
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Table 1: Dodging and state-of-the-art in DoS defense
Prevention Detection Mitigation
and Recovery
link-level Directional (sectored) Channel Surfing [155]; Worm-holes [26];
DoS (jamming) antennas [103]; Spatial Retreats [157]; Proactive
Spread-spectrum [114]; JAM [152]; Channel-Hopping
Data blurting and [54, 100,153];
schedule switching [82,10]; Agility [104,87];
Dodging Dodging
network-level Network-level PacketScore [7]; Replication [30];
DoS Puzzles [145] RED-PD [89]; Overlay-based
[149,154] Heavy-hitter [12,69,99,135]
detection [44];
DCAP [34];
Pushback [90];
MOVE [136];
Capabilities [13,158];
IP Hopping [61]
service-level Application-level DDoS Shield [120]; Replication [30];
DoS Puzzles [62] Shadow Honeypots [11]; Dodging
[99, 147,148]; Kill-Bots [64];
Reservation-based Dodging
[49, 110]
(Non-spoofing attacks at the service-level are addressed by this dissertation.) For instance,
Liu et al. propose to append a secure source identifier, which they call passport, to the IP
packet header. Packet passports are hard to forge and are checked by intermediate routers
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to drop invalid ones [88]. D-WARD [93] and ingress filtering [46] are designed to filter out
one-way, spoofing, flooding attacks.
Brustoloni proposed the VIPnets architecture, which uses QoS mechanisms to protect
traffic from paying users of e-business websites [24]. These mechanisms are designed to
be effective against particular attack methods or in particular service models, but their
effectiveness against other attack methods and service models is limited.
2.1.2 Detection and Recovery
The three main approaches for identifying attack packets are anomaly-based, misuse-based,
and specification-based [21]. Anomaly-based mechanisms identify attackers when their be-
havior deviates from normal behaviors that are learned at peace (no-attack) time. Examples
are the DDoS Shield [120] and PacketScore [7] systems. However, the anomaly-based ap-
proach is highly susceptible to errors if its learning phase gets manipulated by attackers to
learn false behavior [101]. Also, attacks with behavior similar to legitimate behavior pose
a problem to the anomaly-based approach. Misuse-based mechanisms (e.g., the Snort sys-
tem [4]) identify attackers when their behavior matches pre-known attack patterns. However,
this approach is not effective against attackers that mimic legitimate behavior and against
attack mechanisms that are previously unknown. Finally, specification-based mechanisms
(e.g., RED-PD [89]) identify attackers when their behavior deviates from a specification
of legitimate behavior. Again, this approach cannot identify attackers with legitimate-like
behavior. Moreover, in many cases attackers can cause damage while complying with speci-
fications, because of the difficulty of developing “tight” specification of legitimate behavior.
In what follows I discuss examples of each detection approach that are most relevant to
dodging.
Anomaly-based detection. Ranjan et al. propose a scheme to mitigate service-level
DoS attacks in an open Web service, making it most relevant to the work presented in this
dissertation. They enumerate a set of abnormal request behaviors that DDoS attackers use
and propose a session scheduling algorithm based on suspicion level that needs to keep state
for each session [120]. The live baiting algorithm presented in §6.2 scales to the number of
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sessions by using an amount of state proportional only to the number of attackers, and it
does not require models of legitimate sessions.
Misuse-based detection. Kandula et al. has improved CAPTCHA-based defenses
by identifying attackers that keep sending wrong solutions at a high rate [64]. Hussain et
al. developed a detection algorithm based on spectral analysis to detect repeated attacks,
e.g., attacks from the same set of attackers [56]. Jin et al. proposed the hop-count filter to
detect and block packets with spoofed source addresses [60]. Estan and Varghese proposed
an elegant algorithm that requires low memory overhead to detect “heavy-hitter” network
flows, making it suitable for in-router implementation [44]. Their sample-and-hold technique
is proposed for network-level detection and requires operators to set a threshold to define
heavy-hitters. For instance, a heavy hitter may be defined as any flow that uses 10% or
more of link capacity. In the live baiting algorithm (§6.2), a heavy hitter corresponds to a
service-level DoS attacker, and although a threshold, in terms of number of request drops, is
required in live baiting, this threshold is easier to design than sample-and-hold thresholds in
the context of DoS detection. This relative ease is because in a well-provisioned server, there
are typically very few request drops under no attack, so the live baiting threshold can be
set to a small number once and for many services, while a sample-and-hold threshold would
require knowledge about legitimate client behavior for each service (more details in §6.2).
Specification-based detection. Chuah et al. [34] proposed an
√
N distributed al-
gorithm for detecting flows that deviate from traffic specifications. The RED-PD mecha-
nism [89] identifies misbehaving flows when their bandwidth utilization exceeds the band-
width obtained by a reference TCP flow. Preferential packet dropping is then applied to the
identified flows.
The location of the detection system varies. For instance, Sekar et al. developed a trig-
gered, multi-staged automatic DDoS detection system for a large ISP to accurately identify
customers under attack [127].
It has been shown that in multi-source DoS attacks, the attack rate, as observed at the
victim, exhibit a ramp-up behavior, that may take from 200 ms to 14 seconds [55]. This
behavior is mainly caused by the staggered starting times of attack zombies and makes
roaming honeypots and live baiting very suitable to effectively detect and filter out zombies
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and throttle the attack traffic before reaching its peak rate.
Recovery schemes depend on the accuracy of attack detection. For instance, in-network
filtering schemes (e.g., Pushback [90] and Max-min-fair throttling [160]) do not distinguish
normal-rate DDoS attackers from legitimate clients and thus propagate filters to block traffic
from both [90].
In capability-based schemes, such as [158, 13], attack victims recover by revoking access
from detected attackers. For instance, Kreibich et al. proposed a scheme in which a victim
server can implicitly block traffic from detected attackers by simply not replying to the attack
traffic; in their scheme, in-network filters, which enforce packet symmetry of passing flows,
will drop the attack traffic [79].
Migrating the service to a new location has also been proposed as a recovery mechanism
for private services from DoS attacks [40, 136]. However, service migration provides limited
protection if the attacker can quickly discover the new service location.
Another approach to recover from spoofing attacks is to trace the detected attack packets
back to their sources (e.g., [125, 19, 133, 107, 38, 159, 132, 85, 140, 25, 122, 105, 90]). Traceback
schemes can be classified into packet marking schemes and hop-by-hop schemes.
Packet marking schemes (e.g., [125, 133, 107, 38, 159, 105]) construct attack paths locally
at the victim by collecting markings stamped into packets by intermediate routers. However,
these schemes are vulnerable to compromised routers, which can inject forged markings to
increase the number of false positives [133]. Authentication schemes have been proposed
to solve this problem [133], but they require high computational overhead at the routers
and high storage overhead at the victims to maintain router keys. The Path Identifier (Pi)
is a deterministic packet marking scheme that approximately identifies the path took by a
packet. The attack victim uses the Pi mark to filter out malicious packets on a per-packet
basis.
Hop-by-hop traceback: The basic idea of hop-by-hop schemes is that traceback starts at
the router next to the attack victim, where neighboring routers upstream on the attack paths
are identified using a signature of attack packets. This process continues until the attack
machines are reached. CenterTrack uses an overlay network to determine ingress points of
attack traffic into a network cloud (an AS for instance) [140], and controlled flooding injects
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packet floods into the network and detects attack paths based on traffic perturbations [25].
Pushback automates the hop-by-hop traceback process, whereby aggregate-based, rate-
limiting filters are propagated upstream from congested routers [59]. Both detection of
misbehaving aggregates and assignment of rate limits are done using the Aggregate-based
Congestion Control (ACC) mechanism [90]. The honeypot back-propagation scheme [72]
can be viewed as a realization of this feature; when a server takes the role of a honeypot,
the server’s destination address defines the malicious aggregate.
Hop-by-hop schemes are less vulnerable to false positives caused by compromised routers
than packet-marking schemes; if a compromised router maliciously drives the traceback
process into an upstream router not on the attack path, traceback will stop at that router
because the attack signature will not be matched by any packets. Hop-by-hop schemes,
however, require the identification of an accurate attack signature, that is, one that leads
only to attack sources and that remains unchanged until the attack sources are reached. An
exception is the single-packet traceback scheme [132,85], which can use a single attack packet
as the signature. However, it requires high storage overhead at routers or high bandwidth
overhead. Hop-by-hop schemes require cooperation of many ISPs as well. Honeypot back-
propagation is an efficient hop-by-hop scheme that extracts accurate attack signatures and
provides deployment incentives for ISPs [72].
Most traceback schemes take a long time to collect the number of packets needed to
accurately construct each attack path. Consequently, they produce a large number of false
positives if a large number of low-rate attackers launch an on-off attack with short bursts (e.g.,
the shrew attack [81]). To address this limitation, progressive honeypot back-propagation
can trace back to low-rate attackers within a reasonable time and with a low false positive
rate [72].
IP hopping is another recovery mechanism that can protect a public server, whose clients
use DNS to look up its IP address, against specific DoS attacks that use hard-coded IP ad-
dresses to locate their targets [61]. IP hopping can be triggered reactively, whereby the
server changes its IP address after detecting that it is under attack, or proactively in an-
ticipation of attacks. In either case, the service does not change its physical location. All
packets destined to the old IP address are filtered at the network perimeter by a firewall.
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To avoid continuous server reconfiguration, a NAT (Network Address Translation) gateway
can be used. One limitation of this mechanism is that during the period of time in which
the DNS entry of the old IP address is cached, all legitimate client requests using that entry
are filtered out. Also, IP hopping does not block a persistent attacker that looks up the new
IP address using DNS. Moreover, illegitimate packets will still go to the same network after
the address is changed, potentially congesting upstream routers. Finally, the service is still
vulnerable to malicious state entries possibly implanted in the server during the attack. By
physically moving the service from one server to another and cleaning the state of the old
servers, the roaming honeypots algorithm, presented in §6.1, avoids the limitations of logical
roaming schemes, such as IP hopping.
2.1.3 Mitigation
Mitigation-oriented defense mechanisms aim at maintaining acceptable system performance
under attack. Redundancy is a common mitigation strategy against DoS attacks. Two ways
to use redundancy are the addition of extra service replicas and standby sparing. Whereas
service replication can distribute the DoS attack load over the replicas, its inability to distin-
guish between legitimate and illegitimate requests makes it prone to failure under heavy-load
attacks that target all replicas simultaneously. Even with a smaller number of packets, some
DoS attacks can bring down all replicas almost simultaneously [31]. Spare servers have been
suggested as a mechanism to mitigate DoS attacks [30], whereby a spare takes over the func-
tionalities of an active server when the latter comes under attack. However, the effectiveness
of this scheme is strongly limited against fast-building, heavy-load attacks that leave very
little time to transition successfully to the spare server. It is also the case that the spare
itself can come under attack.
Another form of redundancy is the overlay-based systems, such as SOS [69, 99, 135],
Mayday [12], and DAM [35], which are effective in protecting private services, with pre-
known clients, and services that require human intervention, such as the Web. Vasudevan et
al. has proposed a framework for automatic, on-line evaluation of the effects of DDoS defense
mechanisms, such as black-holing (directing attack traffic away from the paths of legitimate
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traffic through routing updates) and traffic scrubbing (deep inspection of suspicious network
flows to identify attacking flows) [143].
Kargl et al. proposed a defense scheme based on class-based queuing and traffic moni-
toring to protect Web servers from DDoS attacks [65]. Their results (along with results from
other researchers) highlight the challenges introduced by service-level attacks, which target
the CPU, and are harder to detect because they do not trigger any network-traffic alarms.
TDMA-based protocols and multi-frequency link-layer protocols, both static [162] and
dynamic [16], provide jamming mitigation as long as the TDMA schedule is secure. To mit-
igate schedule compromise, data blurting with schedule switching [82] and data exfiltration
(by time-multiplexing redundant data over multiple channels) [10] have been proposed.
2.2 ROAMING HONEYPOTS BACKGROUND
2.2.1 Connection Migration
Several schemes have been proposed to support TCP connection migration. Most of these
schemes are designed to operate in a wireless, mobile environment and focus primarily on
supporting mobility [130] or achieving high tolerance to faults and attacks [129,142].
Two well-known TCP-connection migration mechanisms are the TCP-Migrate [129], de-
veloped at MIT, and the Migratory-TCP [142], developed at Rutgers University. Both
attempts provide the framework for moving one end point of a live TCP connection from
one location and reincarnating it at another location having a different IP address and/or a
different port number. Both mechanisms deal with four issues in a slightly different way: (1)
how the TCP connection is continued between the new end points; (2) impact on the network
stack and application layer in both the server and the client sides; (3) how to recover both
TCP and application states; and (4) when to trigger the migration mechanism. The last two
issues are considered independent of the actual migration framework and are presented as
examples of possible usage of the mechanism.
In MIT’s TCP-Migrate, during connection establishment, the migration feature is re-
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quested through a TCP option (Migrate-Enabled). By the means of a handshaking protocol,
a shared key is established between the two connection end points. As per a migration request
from one end point, represented by another TCP option (Migrate), the TCP control block
at the fixed end point is updated to reflect the new location of its peer. To protect against
connection hijacking, the secret key agreed upon during the connection establishment should
accompany the migration request. As an application of the TCP-Migrate mechanism in a
fine-grained fail-over scheme [129], state recovery in the new server is achieved via periodic
state updates from the old server to the server pool. A widget implementation is responsible
for extracting HTTP state from TCP packets. The migration request is issued by a new
server and triggered by an overload at the old server, detected by a health monitor. Imple-
mentations at both the transport, whereby the TCP-layer in both the server and the client
needs to be changed, and session layers are available. However, no application layer updates
are necessary, although the widget implementation is already application-dependent.
During connection establishment between two Migratory-TCP-enabled peers, a list of
available servers, along with a certificate for each server, are passed from the server to
the client. A migration request, also implemented as a TCP option, consists of both the
certificate of the new server and the connection identifier (client IP address, client port,
old server IP address, old server port) of the migrating connection. However, no security
measures are implemented to protect the migration process. State recovery at the new server
is achieved either on-demand, that is, when the client sends the migration request to the
new server, or through periodic state updates. Triggered by an internal QoS monitor in
its kernel, a client can issue a migration request to any server in the server list which the
client receives in the connection establishment phase. Both the server and the client TCP
layers should be changed and the server application layer should also be modified to allow for
application-layer state snapshots and for state recovery at the new server. It should be noted
that the limitation of the on-demand state update in the case of old server’s failure or crash
due to an attack was mentioned briefly in [142]. As an alternative, it was proposed to send
state check-points to the client and use this client-stored state to recover the connection at
the new server. An approach similar to [141,131] has been adopted in the roaming honeypots
algorithm (§6.1).
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Client and server transparency, whereby client and server software does not need to
be changed, is a favorable property to ease deployment burden. Although the techniques
proposed in [6] achieve client and server transparency, they require that both the primary
and backup servers share a broadcast medium. As such, these techniques are not adequate
to handle connection migration in wide-area network environments.
2.2.2 Honeypots
Baiting, or setting traps for malicious users, has been successfully used as a detection mecha-
nism against specific types of DoS attackers [11,72,77,80,83,116,117,150]. The more hidden
the traps, the harder they can be evaded by attackers.
Honeypots [116], or decoy systems deployed in unused IP address ranges, have been
successfully used as traps for many types of malicious traffic, such as random-scanning
worms [150, 83, 117, 80]. Physical honeypots run full versions of services, and “toned down”
versions are typically run by virtual honeypots (e.g., Honeyd [117]). The effectiveness of
honeypots against DoS attack traffic is limited, however, because they can be easily detected
and consequently avoided by DoS attackers. This ease of detection stems from typical
honeypot deployment at fixed addresses, particularly unused IP address ranges, and on
machines that act exclusively as honeypots. In a sense, honeypots represent “dead baits”
that are easy to detect by attackers. The roaming honeypots algorithm (§6.1) camouflages
the honeypots as servers to increase their ability to trap DoS attackers.
In shadow honeypots, suspected requests are sent to specially instrumented servers to
detect attacker attempts to exploit vulnerabilities [11]. This helps reduce the false alarm
rate of intrusion detection systems. Finally, in the live baiting algorithm (§6.2), the service
itself is the trap, or a “live bait”, and, thus, the trap is more attractive to attackers and
hard to evade.
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2.3 GROUP TESTING THEORY
The first application of group testing [138, 42] was during WWI; instead of testing every
blood sample individually, groups of samples were pooled together and tested collectively
[138], whereby if the outcome of the group test is negative, all samples in the group are
considered to be good (disease-free). Although group testing has been used in many security
and networking applications, such as data forensics [52], cryptography [33], multiple-access
channels [22], and broadcast security against jamming [39], this work is the first to apply
this powerful theory to the DoS attack problem.
Group testing aims mainly at identifying the defective (special) members of a population
with as few tests as possible. There are two classes of group-testing mechanisms [102]: Non-
adaptive, or single-stage, techniques conduct all tests simultaneously with no feedback from
previous test results, whereas adaptive (multi-stage) techniques use previous test results to
determine subsequent tests. This work uses a simple non-adaptive group-testing scheme as
a proof-of-concept, but adaptive schemes can be used as well.
Non-adaptive group testing uses a nt × nc matrix to specify tests [102], where nc is the
total number of members and nt the number of tests. The matrix rows represent tests and
columns represent group members. When a matrix element (i, j) is set to 1, this means that
member j participates in test i. An example of a group testing matrix for a population of
10 members with 4 tests is shown in Fig. 4.
Members Test
(defectives underlined) Results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T
es
ts
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Figure 4: An example of a group-testing matrix.
Test results are represented as a vector with an element for each test. For simplicity,
binary test results are assumed in this dissertation. So, a test result is set to 1 if the
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corresponding test returns positive, that is, if the test was applied to a group with at least
one defective member. In the example shown in Fig. 4, the 2nd, 6th, and 8th members are
defective, and consequently, only the first and third tests have positive results.
Detection of defective members. The detection algorithm discovers the defective
members using the result vector and the matrix. The algorithm adopted in this work starts
with all members in a suspect list and excludes members from the list if they participate
in a “large enough” number of tests that have negative results. For instance, consider that
a member has to participate in only one negative test to be excluded, then in the above
example, members 1, 3, 7, 9, and 10 are excluded because they participated in the second
tests, which has a negative result. Similarly, members 4 and 5 are excluded because of their
participation in the fourth test. Thus, only the (defective) members 2, 6, and 8 are left as
suspects. In this specific example, all defective elements are detected, and all non-defective
members are cleared.
Matrix construction. Many matrix construction algorithms have been proposed, such
as the deterministic construction by Hwang and So´s and the randomized construction by
Dyachkov and Sebo [102, 43]. The constant-weight matrices, d-disjunct matrices, and su-
perimposed codes are all examples of matrices that can be used in the non-adaptive group
testing [43]. For simplicity, this work employs a randomized construction method [52, 102],
in which each bit in the matrix is set to 1 with a fixed probability p. As will be discussed
later, the value of p is derived to maximize the detection accuracy.
False Positive and False Negative Probabilities. A false positive is when a non-
defective member gets falsely identified as defective, whereas a false negative is when a
defective member ends up not detected. In the example in Fig. 4, both the false positive
probability and the false negative probability are 0. In general, Goodrich et al [52] showed
that the simple detection algorithm discussed above detects all defective members with
the false positive probability FP = [1 − p(1 − p)d]nt , where d is the number of defective
members in the group and T is the number of tests used to detect defective members. By
differentiating the above equation with respect to p, the optimal value of p, the value that
yields the minimum false positive probability, is 1
d+1
[52]. Thus, the minimum false positive
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probability for a given number of tests nt is:
FP = [1− 1
d+ 1
(1− 1
d+ 1
)d]nt (2.1)
Finally, from Eqn. 2.1 the number of tests, nfpt , required to achieve a target false positive
probability fp can be derived as:
nfpt =
log(fp)
log(1− 1
d+1
(1− 1
d+1
)d)
(2.2)
As will be shown in §6.2, nfpt is O(d) for a given target fp, that is, the number of tests
is in the order of number of defective members (attackers) not the total number of members
for a given target false positive probability. This observation is key to the scalability of the
live baiting algorithm.
The above equations assume that an estimate of the number of defective members (d)
is known a priori. It is also assumed that if a defective member participates in a test,
the test result is always negative, that is, test results are reliable and a defective member
cannot arbitrarily alter the result of a test. These assumptions may not hold in DoS attacker
detection. First, it may be hard to estimate a priori the number of attackers. Second, DoS
attackers want to avoid detection and may maliciously alter the results of tests (the meaning
of tests in the DoS attack domain and the mapping from group-testing domain to DoS
attack domain are presented in §6.2.1) to obscure their presence. Both these assumptions
are relaxed in §6.2.3 and 6.2.4, respectively.
2.4 JAMMING MITIGATION IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
2.4.1 Radio Jamming
Radio jamming is a DoS attack targeting physical and link layers of wireless networks [151,
156]. Radio jamming aims at preventing sender nodes from accessing the shared wireless
medium by keeping the medium busy or from successful reception by causing high radio
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interference at the receiver. Many anti-jamming techniques have been proposed, spanning
many layers in the network stack.
Physical-layer defenses: Physical-layer anti-jamming techniques, such as directional
(sectored) antennas [103] and spread-spectrum [114], create hard-to-jam “virtual channels”
or “wormholes” within the shared wireless medium [26, 53, 146]. Sectored antennas are po-
tentially effective but not widely deployed. Nodes equipped with spread-spectrum radio
chips [32,84,115] are still vulnerable to jamming from nodes with similar radios [153]. More-
over, the recent 802.11a and g standards have replaced frequency hopping, which tolerates
jamming but has low bandwidth, with high-bandwidth channel coding schemes (OFDM),
which are vulnerable to jamming [100].
Link-layer defenses: At the link layer, channel hopping improves jamming resiliency
in both 802.11 [54,100] and sensor networks [155,153]. Channel hopping will be discussed in
detail in the next section. TDMA-based protocols and multi-frequency link-layer protocols,
both static [162] and dynamic [16], mitigate low-power, selective jamming as long as the
TDMA and frequency-switching schedules are secure. To mitigate schedule compromise, data
blurting with schedule switching [82] and data exfiltration (by time-multiplexing redundant
data over multiple channels) [10] have been proposed.
Network-layer defenses: The Jammed-Area Mapping (JAM) scheme [152] identifies
regions of jammed sensors to be avoided by routing protocols. Jammed sensors “sleep”
to outlast jammers. However, intelligent jammers can detect the communication silence
and adjust their power consumption accordingly. In spatial retreats, jammed mobile nodes
change their physical locations away from jammed areas [157]. This work differs in that the
goal is to allow jammed nodes to communicate while the jamming attack is on.
All previous work studies jamming in the context of single-radio networks. This work
investigates jamming mitigation in the multi-radio context as well, whereby multiple radios
cooperate to deliver the data and multiple jammers conspire as well to cause maximum
damage.
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2.4.2 Channel Hopping
Channel hopping, whereby channel switching is controlled at the software-level, has been
proposed to mitigate jamming in single-interface wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and 802.11
networks [54, 100, 153, 155]. Channel hopping utilizes the fact that there is a number of
orthogonal radio channels in many of today’s wireless standards. The 802.11a standard
has been reported to have 12 orthogonal channels [100], 802.15.4 (e.g., CC2420 radio in
MICAz motes) has 16 channels [153], and even the older CC1000 radio in Mica2 motes
has been reported to allow up to 32 orthogonal channels in the 900MHz band [155]. I
have experimented with 4 orthogonal channels on the Mica2 motes in the 433MHz band, 3
channels on 802.11b/g, and 13 channels on 802.11a. In all these standards, a radio cannot
transmit or receive while switching channels.
Different values of the channel-residence time between hoppings have been used to serve
different purposes. Whether channel hopping is implemented at the driver or user levels has
an effect on the attainable granularity of the channel-hopping frequency. Channel hopping
has been implemented to occur every few microseconds [153], enough to send a small packet
fragment, every few milli-seconds [16, 54], every hundred milli-seconds [100], and every few
seconds [95]. Wood et al. show that the packet fragment time should be small (in the order
of the delay needed to switch channels) to prevent a fast-switching attacker from disrupting
communication on all channels [153]. This work follows their recommendation and uses short
packets (in the same order as channel-switching delay).
Two variations of channel hopping have been proposed. Proactive channel-hopping
has been shown to improve resiliency to jamming in both 802.11 [54, 100] and sensor net-
works [153]. Against static and scanning attackers, channel hopping was enough to improve
throughput in 802.11a and 802.11b networks [54, 100]. However, against fast-switching at-
tackers, channel hopping was not enough; packet fragmentation and redundant encoding
were needed to defend against this type of jamming [153]. Channel hopping is coordinated
synchronously [54, 100, 153] assuming loose clock synchronization. Asynchronous channel
hopping has also been proposed but only for low-bandwidth message delivery [26]. Reactive
channel-hopping, or channel surfing, occurs after radio jamming is detected and causes the
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entire network or only the jammed region to switch to a different radio channel [155].
Again, previous channel-hopping research has only considered channel hopping in single-
radio networks. This work generalizes the channel-hopping technique to multi-radio networks
and studies its interaction with data redundancy using error-correcting codes.
2.4.3 Error-correcting Codes (ECC)
Error-correcting codes (ECC) and cryptographic bit interleaving have been proposed to
mitigate low-power jamming attacks against data networks [104]. Alone, these techniques
are not effective against high power or link-layer jammers. They also incur unnecessarily
high communication and processing overhead if ECC parameters are not carefully selected.
This work introduces the problem of optimizing communication goodput by combining ECC
and channel-hopping.
In an ECC scheme, the piece of data to be transmitted reliably is augmented with
carefully-designed redundancy. The augmented data piece is then divided into a number,
n, of smaller pieces, which then get transmitted over the unreliable communication channel.
Finally, the original piece of data can be recovered from any combination of m out of the n
pieces. The ECC is usually described as a tuple (n,m). The goodput of the communication
channel is reduced by the amount of redundancy. In particular, in the Information Dispersal
Algorithm (IDA), goodput is m
n
of the channel throughput [118].
2.4.4 Multi-Radio Wireless Networks
Multi-radio wireless networks have been proposed to increase overall network capacity by ex-
ploiting channel diversity [15]. For instance, multi-radio 802.11 mesh nodes [2] are equipped
with multiple radio interfaces operating at orthogonal channels to decrease interference be-
tween parallel streams of data at different radio channels. Also, sensors equipped with
multiple radio chips [3] are used to increase throughput and/or reliability.
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Table 2: An example payoff function for a max-min game.
y1 y2 y3
x1 4 7 2
x2 5 6 8
2.4.5 Max-min Games
A max-min game (also known as a zero-sum game) [106] involves two players with each
player’s gain maximized when the gain of the other player is minimum. Each player has a
set of actions, and a payoff function is defined over the action pairs. The payoff of one player
can be viewed as the negative of the other’s. An example of a payoff function is shown in
Table 2. Player 1 has two actions: x1 and x2. Player 2 has three actions: y1, y2, and y3. The
values shown in the table are those of player 1 (payoff for player 2 is the negative of these
values).
The steady state of a max-min game is when each player cannot get a higher payoff by
acting unilaterally. The Nash equilibrium [106] represents this state. An action pair (x∗, y∗)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if each of the actions x∗ and y∗ is a maxminimizer [106].
That is,
miny∈A2u1(x
∗, y) ≥ miny∈A2u1(x, y) for all x ∈ A1, and
minx∈A1u2(x, y
∗) ≥ minx∈A1u2(x, y) for all y ∈ A2.
where ui() and Ai are the payoff function and the set of actions for player i.
In other words, a maxminimizer is an action that maximizes the payoff that the player
can guarantee, taking into consideration that the other player wants to cause the maximum
damage [106]. The maxminimizer of player 1 solves the problem maxxminyu1(x, y). The
maxminimizer of player 2 solves the problem maxyminxu2(x, y).
In the game in Table 2, the Nash equilibrium is the action pair (x2, y1). Both players
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cannot get higher payoff by choosing a different action alone. For instance, if player 1 chooses
action x1 instead, he will get a lower payoff (4 instead of 5). Although the example has only
one solution, there may be, in general, more than one Nash equilibrium.
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3.0 SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELS
This chapter describes and models the service-level DoS attack against Internet services
(§3.1) and the radio-jamming DoS attack in multi-radio wireless networks (§3.2). An ab-
straction of system and attack models encompassing both the Internet and the wireless
networks domains is then presented in §3.3 and §3.4 and used to define dodging in the next
chapter.
3.1 THE SERVICE-LEVEL DOS ATTACK IN THE INTERNET
The Internet service (e.g., Web and FTP) to be protected is an open, public service, where
any host can access the service at any time from anywhere in the Internet. The service has
a request-processing capacity of ρ requests per second, provided by a server cluster of ns
homogeneous servers spread over multiple mirror sites, as illustrated in Fig. 5, which depicts
a Web service as an example. The edge router of each site has a packet-filtering firewall at
each of its input interfaces to block requests from detected attacker addresses. A legitimate
client sends requests at an average rate of r requests per second. The service provides each
client with a unique, un-spoofable identifier. For instance, this identifier can be stored in
a “cookie” in Web applications. In general, the client identifier is provided to the client in
an initial handshake.
A number, nx, of attackers issue legitimate-like service requests at a high rate, pushing
the aggregate request arrival rate beyond the service capacity and overwhelming the servers.
In other words, attackers are misbehaving clients that send requests at a high rate of rattacker
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requests per second, which is higher than the legitimate rate of r requests per second1.
Three service-level DoS attack classes are considered. In the massive attack, attackers
flood all the servers continuously and simultaneously. In the follow attack [76], attackers
try to target only the active servers in the current configuration. Attackers can discover
the active servers (e.g., by monitoring server load or snooping on legitimate client traffic)
but take some time to detect server activity and to redirect attack traffic every time the set
of active servers changes. This time is called the follow delay. Finally, in the compliant
attack, attackers attack only active servers with zero follow delay.
Server
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Figure 5: Internet Service Model. A Web service is presented as an example.
3.2 THE JAMMING ATTACK IN MULTI-RADIO WIRELESS
NETWORKS
In multi-radio wireless networks, nodes are equipped with a number, nf , of identical radio
interfaces, each being able to transmit on any of nh different channels. Each piece of data to
1It should be noted that knowing the exact values of r and rattacker is not necessary for the operation of
the algorithms presented in this work.
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be transmitted is encoded using an (nf ,m) IDA ECC (any combination of at least m pieces
can be used to reconstruct the ECC-encoded data) [118]; because the number of encoded
data pieces is the same as the number of radios, each piece of the encoded data is then
transmitted over a different radio interface. A data piece is lost if more than nf −m radios
are jammed, because there would not be enough non-faulty pieces to recover the data.
Fig. 6 depicts the architecture of an example multi-radio wireless sensor network. In this
example, multi-radio sensors have 5 radios each. Radios in each sensor send encoded data
pieces to the base-station over orthogonal channels. As described in §2.4.2, many wireless
standards support multiple orthogonal channels. A number, nh, of orthogonal channels is
assumed. The base-station has as many wireless transceivers as the orthogonal channels.
Medium access is scheduled between sensors using TDMA, for instance. For simplicity of
presentation, in what follows only one sensor is considered. Radios hop among the channels
according to the defense strategy in effect. Channel hopping takes a delay of τ time units,
which is in the range of tens of microseconds (80µs in [16]).
The jamming attack is launched by a number of attack radios, nx, and each attack radio
can jam one channel at a time. If a channel is jammed, no data can be communicated on that
channel. Jamming radios override the MAC-protocol and send packets continuously (low-
power attack methods are also feasible [156]). I assume that Spread Spectrum (SS) [114] by
itself cannot prevent this jamming attack, as the jammers may use the same SS hardware as
the attacked radios. As a result of the jamming attack, communication is blocked on some
channels. Let Pb represent the jamming-induced blocking probability, or the probability
that more than nf −m radios are jammed at the same time, resulting in data loss.
Two main attack strategies are considered, namely scanning and sweeping attacks,
which span a wide spectrum of possible strategies. In both strategies, attackers hop between
channels so that the set of jammed channels change over time. The two attack strategies
differ in the activity-sensing capability of attackers as follow.
Scanning attackers sense legitimate channel activity to determine if the channel they
jam is being used or not. Each attack radio keeps hopping until it finds a channel that has
legitimate activity, and it stays there until it detects lack of activity. It takes an attack
radio a channel-sensing time to determine channel activity or lack thereof. For simplicity of
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Figure 6: An example multi-radio wireless network. Radios in multi-radio sensors commu-
nicate with the base-station over orthogonal channels. The figure depicts four sensors with
five radios in each sensor (nf = 5) and a total of ten channels (nh = 10). The base-station
is equipped with ten wireless transceivers to cover the full spectrum.
analysis, the channel-sensing time is assumed to be a multiple of the channel-hopping delay,
that is, δxτ . This delay depends on the legitimate traffic rate and on how frequently the
attack radio stops jamming to sense the medium activity. After this delay, the jammer radio
selects the next channel to jam uniformly at random.
It should be noted that the attack radio has two possibilities in selecting the next channel.
First, the jamming radio selects its next channel from all channels. Second, the jamming
radio keeps history of the channels it visits and chooses its next channel from only the
channels it has not visited since its last encounter with an active channel. The second
option is more effective if the communication radio would stay put at its channel until being
“caught” by the jammer. This is guaranteed to happen only if the defense strategy is reactive
and there is only one jamming radio. Therefore, scanning attackers in this work choose their
next channels out of all the channels, because even if there is only one jamming radio, the
defense strategy may be unknown. This assumption of unknown defense strategy is relaxed
in the analysis in §5.1.1. In either option, scanning attackers make sure that a channel is
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not jammed by more than one jamming radio.
Sweeping attackers periodically switch channels all at once irrespective of channel ac-
tivity, and they jam their channels until the next period. For simplicity of analysis, the
sweeping attack period is assumed to be a multiple of the channel-hopping delay, that is,
sxτ . In other words, each radio in the sweeping attack jams a channel for (sx−1)τ time units
and changes the jammed channel every sxτ time units. It selects the next channel uniformly
at random from the n channels. Two variations are considered: the fast-sweeping attack,
where attackers switch every packet-time2, and slow-sweeping, where the period length is a
multiple of the packet-time.
3.3 MAPPING CLIENTS TO RESOURCES
In this section and the next, I develop an abstraction of the system and attack models
presented in the previous two sections. This abstraction will be used to define dodging
in the next chapter. Generally, service provision involves assigning system resources to
resource consumers, or clients, and a DoS attack aims at exhausting or destroying some or
all system resources [91]. A set, C, of nc clients are authorized to access the service under
consideration, whereby the set C includes legitimate clients and attackers, and a set, R, of nr
homogeneous (identical) resources, such as servers, provide the service with a total capacity
of ρ “requests” per second, where a request can be simply a packet or a complete service
request. A legitimate client uses its assigned resources at an average rate of r “requests” per
second. Each client request is sent to one of its assigned resources.
The set of resources may include physical or virtual resources. Virtualization allows a
single physical resource to appear as many virtual ones. The virtual resources are isolated
from each other (i.e., an attack on one virtual resource has no effect on the other virtual
resources). Virtualization technology has enabled efficient multiplexing of physical resources
among many virtual machines with an adequate level of resource isolation (see for instance
2 The packet-time is the time to transmit one packet. If this is the case, in order for defenses to mitigate
jamming, the packet-time has to be close to the channel-hopping delay [153].
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the Xen virtual machine monitor [18]). This work uses a toned-down version of virtualization,
wherein the server queue is divided into a number of isolated sub-queues (called buckets in
§6.2) that are scheduled using a fair queuing paradigm (e.g., Deficit Round Robin (DRR)
[128]).
Clients are assigned system resources according to different criteria, such as resource load
and resource and client locations. To enforce resource assignment in the proposed dodging
framework, each client is assigned a set of hard-to-guess tokens containing IDs of its assigned
resources. The client then attaches a token to each request, which in turn is directed to the
assigned resource based on the attached token.
To model client-resource assignment, a mapping function, µ, is assumed to be defined by
the service or the underlying communications network. In what follows, time is discretized
into equal-length time slots, for which the mapping function is constant. In other words, the
mapping function is time-dependent and is defined as follows.
µ : C × TimeSlot→ 2R
where C is the set of clients, R the set of resources, and 2R the power set of R, that is, the
set of all subsets of R. Each client c is assigned the set of resources µ(c, t) during time slot
t. The set of resources to which at least one client is mapped during time slot t is called the
set of active resources at t, or RtA =
⋃
c∈C µ(c, t), and the set R
t
I = R − RtA is called the set
of idle resources at t. Note that we imply no order of priority among resources in the set
RtA.
To clarify, consider the following examples of the mapping function. As a first example,
regular DNS lookup in the Internet can be modeled as if every client is mapped to all servers
of the looked-up service (∀c1, c2, µ(c1, t) = µ(c2, t) = RtA = R). In this example, µ is
time-independent, that is, ∀t1, t2, c ∈ C, µ(c, t1) = µ(c, t2). A second example is content
distribution networks (e.g., Akamai [1]), where clients are mapped to servers with some
selection criteria such as geographic location or server load. In this example, the function
µ is both client- and time-dependent, because the assigned server depends on the client’s
location and varies with time as the server loads change. A third example is the token-
based service-access model (e.g., Kerberos [137]), in which clients acquire tokens before they
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access servers. In this example, the mapping function µ is the composition of two mapping
functions: from clients to tokens and from tokens to servers. In the first function, the set
of possible token values serves as the set of resources, R. If the token is of length bt bits,
then the set of tokens is the set of binary numbers with length bt and its cardinality is 2
bt .
The active resources are the valid tokens. The client-token mapping is one-to-one and time-
dependent, because each client has its own unique token that changes with time to improve
security, and the token-server mapping is many-to-many and time-independent, because any
valid token is accepted by all servers.
3.4 MAPPING FROM ATTACKERS TO RESOURCES
The DoS attack is launched from a set X ⊂ C of nx < nc attackers. Attackers aim at
exhausting system resources by creating a request load that exceeds the system capacity.
Each attacker uses its assigned resources at a rate rattacker > r, that is, each attacker sends
requests at a rate higher than normal.
A mapping function, µX , that maps attackers into resources to attack is defined as
follows:
µX : X × TimeSlot→ 2R
where X is the set of attackers. Each attacker x sends attack requests to the resources
µX(x, t) on time slot t. The set of resources assigned to attackers on time slot t is referred
to as the set of attacked resources at t or RtX , that is, R
t
X =
⋃
x∈X µX(x, t). Although the
function µX may be unknown to the system, it is used for reasoning only to help define the
attack types as will be presented shortly.
Whereas the client-resource mapping functions µ is defined by the defense system, the
function µX is defined by the attackers. Consequently, these functions may differ, that is,
µX 6= µ. An attacker x is compliant with the client-resource mapping function defined by
the system, µ, if and only if the set of resources assigned by µX to the attacker is the same as
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the set assigned by µ for all time slots. That is, x is compliant ⇐⇒ ∀t µX(x, t) = µ(x, t).
The attacker is non-compliant otherwise.
The system and attack mapping functions are depicted in Fig. 7. Clients assigned to the
resources at the intersection between active and attacked resources are assumed to receive no
service from the attacked resources. The aim of the attackers is to focus their attack always
on active resources. That is, to make the intersection between the active and attacked sets
as large as possible and to make the intersection between the idle and attacked sets as small
as possible.
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Figure 7: The system and attack mapping functions during one time slot. The sets of active
and attacked resources change over time.
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3.5 ATTACK TYPES
This section redefines the attack types, which are presented in §3.1 and §3.2, in terms of the
client-resource (µ) and attacker-resource (µX) mapping functions. The follow and scanning
attacks are merged into one type because scanning attack is an example of follow attack.
Follow Attack. An interesting case of non-compliant attack arises when attackers
manage to track the active resources but with a delay caused by the time they need to
detect resource activity. In other words, the attack mapping function follows the system
mapping function with a delay δX , that is, R
t
X = R
t−δX
A . An example of the follow attack
is the scanning attack, in which attackers have the capability of sensing resource activity
(e.g., by sensing radio activity on a wireless channel), and they search for active resources
simply by iterating through resources and checking for signs of activity.
Massive Attack. Another case of non-compliant attack is when all the resources are
attacked simultaneously and continuously. That is, RtX = R. This powerful attack renders
a defense based on replication alone or on evasion alone ineffective.
Sweeping Attack. The sweeping attack is a non-compliant attack in which attackers
focus their attack on a subset of the resources, and they periodically change the set of
attacked resources regardless of resource activity. That is, RtX 6= Rt+sxτX , where sxτ is the
sweeping period and both RtX and R
t+sxτ
X are strict subsets of R.
Compliant Attack. In the compliant attack, each attacker x attacks only the resources
assigned to it by the system-assigned mapping function µ. That is, µX(x, t) = µ(x, t).
Consequently, the set of attacked resources is a subset of active resources for all time slots.
That is, ∀t RtX ⊆ RtA.
As summarized in Fig. 8, the follow attack is addressed by the Honeybees (§5) and
the roaming honeypots (§6.1) algorithms, whereby the attack impact is mitigated. Massive
service-level attacks are mitigated and their attackers identified by the roaming honeypots
algorithm. This dissertation does not address massive nor compliant wireless jamming at-
tacks, in which all possible (active) channels are jammed, because such attacks are impossible
to defend against. Instead, the sweeping attack, a toned down version of the massive attack,
is studied. The roaming honeypots algorithm mitigates compliant attacks, and finally, the
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live baiting algorithm (§6.2) is designed only to identify compliant attackers.
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4.0 THE DODGING FRAMEWORK
The client-resource mapping function, introduced in the previous chapter, abstracts the
relationship between resources (e.g., servers and radio channels) and clients (e.g., service
users and radio transceivers) of a service. This chapter defines the dodging framework, which
addresses the problem of how to define the client-resource mapping function to identify DoS
attackers and to mitigate their attack.
Two components contribute to build the dodging framework. The first component is the
careful combination of replication and evasion to achieve elusiveness of the protected service
and allow for attack mitigation. The second component, namely the Primary-Effect-based
Detection (PED), is a novel approach for identifying DoS attackers using simple detection
signals.
The two components of the dodging framework, namely attack mitigation and attacker
identification, are defined in terms of properties of the mapping function. These properties
are first introduced in §4.1 followed by the definition of the attack mitigation (§4.2) and
attacker identification (§4.3) components.
4.1 DODGING PROPERTIES
First, I present a set of properties of the mapping function to be used in the definition of
the dodging components.
• Non-blocking. The mapping function µ is non-blocking when client requests are always
assigned to resources. That is, ∀t, c ∈ C µ(c, t) 6= φ.
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• Uniform. The mapping function µ is uniform when it distributes the request load
uniformly over the active resources. A resource η gets a fraction of the requests sent by
each client c assigned to it, which depends on how many other resources are assigned to
c. The mapping function is uniform if for any two resources η1 and η2 on any time slot
t, the total client shares assigned to each of the two resources is roughly the same. Let
C1(t) = {c1|µ(c1, t) = η1} denote the set of all clients assigned to resource η1 at time
t. C2(t) is similarly defined. Also, assume that clients issue requests at the same rate
and distribute their requests uniformly over their assigned resources. Then, the mapping
function is uniform if and only if |∑c1∈C1(t) 1|µ(c1,t)| −∑c2∈C2(t) 1|µ(c2,t)| | < ².
• Dynamic. The mapping function µ is dynamic when the set of active resources changes
over time. The change frequency is a design parameter, and its effect is studied in §6.1.
• Loose. The mapping function is loose when the set of idle resources is never empty on
any time slot, that is, ∀t RtI 6= φ, and the set of active resources contain more than one
element, that is, ∀t |RtA| > 1.
• Unpredictable. The mapping function is unpredictable when it is difficult for a non-
compliant attacker x to keep attacking only active resources for a long time period, T ,
with increasing level of difficulty as the length of T increases. That is, for any non-
compliant attacker x and any period T of length > 0, the probability that at some point
of time in T the attacker will hit an idle resource, Pr{∃t ∈ T s.t. µX(x, t)
⋂
RtI 6= φ}, is
> 0. Moreover, this probability increases as the length of T increases.
• d-unique. The client-resource mapping function µ is d-unique if the membership of any
client in any client group of cardinality at most d can be discovered based on the sets of
resources assigned to the client and to the group on any time slot. More specifically,
∀c, C1 c ∈ C and |C1| ≤ d and c 6∈ C1 ⇒ ∀t µ(c, t) 6=
⋃
c1∈C1
µ(c1, t).
The parameter d should be an estimate of the number of attackers. This property is
borrowed from d-disjunct codes, which are used in building non-adaptive group-testing
matrices [43]. More on this property will be discussed in the live baiting algorithm in
§6.2.
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As previously mentioned, the above properties are used to define the dodging frame-
work and its components. Fig. 9 depicts the relationship between the properties and the
components of the dodging framework. It shows that the non-blocking, uniform, dynamic,
and loose properties form the core of the dodging framework. These properties ensure that
dodging has a low impact on the performance of the service being protected and create the
controlled dynamic nature that allows dodging to efficiently achieve attack mitigation and
attacker identification, as will be described in the next two sections.
4.2 ATTACK MITIGATION BY COMBINING REPLICATION AND
EVASION
The first dodging component achieves attack mitigation by a careful combination of repli-
cation and evasion. This component enables the protected service to sustain acceptable
performance under attack. Attack mitigation is particularly useful when it is hard to filter
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out attacks, which is the case in the radio jamming attack in wireless networks.
The dodging framework adopts the approach of combining replication and evasion to
achieve attack mitigation. The set of active resources contains multiple, replicated resources,
which evade attacks by switching to the never-empty set of idle resources. As depicted in
Fig. 9, the mitigation component utilizes the looseness and dynamic properties of the client-
resource mapping function. These properties allow requests from legitimate clients to get
serviced even under attack, because when resources switch from idle to active, they start
“fresh”, that is, with empty service queues, and hence attackers take some time to discover
and exhaust the newly-activated resources. During these transient intervals, which I call
windows of opportunity, the legitimate requests have a chance to get serviced. In par-
ticular, the looseness and dynamic properties guarantee that these windows of opportunity
are created at every reconfiguration of the set of active (idle) resources.
To further illustrate the usefulness of the dynamic and loose properties, consider two
mitigation schemes, namely plain replication [30] and plain evasion [54, 136, 155], that lack
these two properties, respectively. The following qualitatively shows that dodging outper-
forms these two schemes. Moreover, a quantitative comparison is presented in §5.1.2 (against
plain evasion) and §6.1.4 (against plain replication).
Dodging vs. plain replication. In the plain replication scheme, all resources are
always active, that is, RtA = R. At its extreme, a unique resource (physical or virtual) is
assigned to each client, and each resource is isolated from other resources, in which case
attacks can be mitigated because the attack impact is limited to only the resources assigned
to the attackers. Plain replication, however, has two drawbacks: First, it ungracefully
degrades to massive attacks that overwhelm all the resources. Second, plain replication
is too expensive in terms of energy (if active resources consume more energy than idle
ones, which is typically the case in wireless environments) or in terms of state and control
overhead to maintain the active resources (even virtualization comes at the cost of state and
control overhead to maintain the virtual resources). Dodging allows an efficient usage of
the replicated resources by enabling resources to evade attacks and to create the windows
of opportunity mentioned above, resulting in more graceful degradation to attack intensity
(see, for instance, Fig. 25 and Fig. 37).
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Dodging vs. plain evasion. In the plain evasion scheme, only one resource is always
active (i.e., |RtA| = 1), and the active resource changes within the resource pool to escape
from attacks (e.g., by relocating the service away from attacked servers). Clients are then
directed to the new active resource, for instance by purging old DNS records and pushing
records with the new server addresses instead. Application-layer redirection (e.g., HTTP
redirection) can also be used as a vehicle to achieve seamless migration to the new server.
Evasion can be triggered reactively (in response to attack detection) [136, 155] or proac-
tively [54]. Plain evasion, however, has limited effectiveness when attackers can discover
the newly activated resources. Because in dodging there are more than one active resource,
it takes attackers a longer time to discover all their locations. In the honeybees algorithm
(Chapter 5), both reactive and proactive evasion strategies are studied and their relative
performance is compared under different system and attack scenarios.
The following definition formulates the mitigation component in terms of properties of
the client-resource mapping function.
Mitigation Component. The mitigation component defines the client-resource map-
ping function to be non-blocking, uniform, dynamic, and loose.
4.3 ATTACKER IDENTIFICATION BY PRIMARY-EFFECT-BASED
DETECTION (PED)
The second component of dodging identifies attackers within a short time interval, with
high accuracy, and with small overhead. The ability of dodging to achieve low overhead
is particularly important in scenarios that require scalability of the detection system, such
as when the system is to be deployed at an ISP to protect many of its customers at once.
Although each customer can keep the state of and monitor its own clients, the total number
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of clients over all customers may be huge and beyond the capacity of the ISP to monitor.
Therefore, the per-client monitoring approach (e.g., [120]), which requires state that grows
linearly with the total number of clients, can be prohibitively expensive, although it may
provide the most accurate DoS detection with the smallest detection time. As will be shown
in the live baiting algorithm in §6.2, dodging enables a detection algorithm that maintains
O(nx) state, that is, state in the order of the number of attackers not the number of clients.
This is a big saving in state because service clients may be in the order of millions, whereas
botnet sizes have been recently reported to be in the order of thousands of zombies [119].
Attacker identification is addressed for two attack cases separately: identification of
compliant attackers and identification of non-compliant attackers. As depicted in Fig. 9, the
attacker identification component utilizes the unpredictability and d-uniqueness properties of
the client-resource mapping function. Unpredictability guarantees that any non-compliant
attacker attacks an idle resource with a probability that increases as the length of the attack
period increases. Once an attacker attacks an idle resource, it can be identified, because
legitimate clients do not access idle resources by design of the mapping function. In §6.1,
this property is used to identify non-compliant service-level attackers.
The d-uniqueness property allows dodging to identify compliant attackers (as long as
their number is at most d) merely using the set of attacked resources1. This is because
the d-uniqueness property guarantees that any client, c, outside the attacker group, C1, is
assigned to at least one resource that is not attacked (see the definition of d-uniqueness in
§4.1), and thus, all legitimate clients can be excluded using a detection algorithm similar to
the one used in group testing (see §2.3 for more details). In §6.2, the d-uniqueness property
is approximated using a randomized technique, and thus, false positives and false negatives
may occur.
The above discussion shows that dodging can identify attackers using basic signals, the
set of attacked (idle and active) resources, without requiring any complex models of normal
or attack traffic. I call this novel approach of attacker identification the Primary-Effect-
based Detection (PED), which is a departure from traditional detection approaches, namely
1Note that the attacked resources are active resources in this case, because the attackers are compliant,
and thus, they never access idle resources.
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anomaly-based (e.g., PacketScore [7, 14] and DDoS Shield [120]), misuse-based (e.g., the
Snort Intrusion Detection System [4]), and specification-based (e.g., RED-PD [89]). As will
be shown in §6.2, PED is also scalable, and its scalability stems from its reliance on the most
basic signals to identify attackers.
To appreciate the PED approach, the following discussion contrasts its underlying phi-
losophy to the common philosophy behind traditional detection approaches. The latter is
two-fold. First, in many security problems, detecting the attacker actions is easier than
detecting the security violation or the damage caused by the attack. This relative ease is
true in confidentiality and integrity, for instance, whereby attackers, if left undetected, can
cover their tracks and make it extremely hard to detect that a piece of data has been read or
altered by them [21]. Second, waiting until security is violated is undesirable in cases that
involve damage that cannot be easily recovered (e.g., stolen data), and in such cases it is
crucial to detect and stop the attack before it materializes as a violation.
Denial of service is different. The attack damage can always be detected [47], and in many
cases detection is easy. For instance, the flooding DoS attack results in a high, sustained
packet drop rate at bottleneck routers [90], which can be easily detected. Moreover, the
damage is in most cases readily recoverable once the attack is stopped.
In PED, DoS attackers are detected based merely on the unavailability of the attacked
resources, without the need to develop models of legitimate behavior, keep track of attack
signatures, or tightly specify legitimate behavior2. Consequently, the dodging-enabled detec-
tion overcomes the limitations of current detection approaches. The attacker identification
problem in the PED approach is defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (The PED problem). The PED problem is that of identifying the attackers
given (1) a function ∆(σ, τ), which indicates whether resource σ is under attack (i.e., its
response time is longer than predicted or contracted [47]) at any time instant τ ; (2) the list
of clients assigned to resource σ at τ , that is, {c|µ(c, τ) = σ}; and (3) the list of clients
accessing σ at τ .
2Although this work assumes that service-level attackers have a higher than normal request rate (§3.1),
this assumption is only for concreteness; any other attack model can be identified by the schemes presented
in this work as long as attackers attack all the resources assigned to them.
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The function ∆ in the above definition can be thought of as an oracle that answers
attacked or not attacked questions for any resource at any time instant. Chapter 6 presents
approximations of ∆ that provide partial (yet effective) information.
One possible solution of the PED problem is a one-to-one mapping between clients and
virtual resources, whereby each client is restricted to access its assigned resource only, and
the virtual resources are isolated from each other (i.e., an attack on one resource has no
effect on the other resources). In this case, it is straightforward to identify the attackers
using the set of attacked resources; the attackers are the clients whose assigned resources are
attacked. Another solution is to assign a virtual resource for each client group. An example
of this many-to-one mapping between clients and virtual resources is depicted in Fig. 10.
Consequently, when some resources become under attack, the attackers must be among the
clients assigned to the attacked virtual resources.
Along this line, the live baiting algorithm (§6.2) uses results from the theory of group
testing [42,43,57,67,102,138] to design the client-resource mapping to achieve a good trade-
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off between the number of virtual resources (the system state), the false positive probability,
and the false negative probability [70]. Live baiting uses a many-to-many mapping between
clients and virtual resources as depicted in Fig. 11 [70], whereby each client is assigned a
number of resources, and each resource is assigned to more than one client.
The following two definitions formalize the attacker identification component against
both compliant and non-compliant attackers in terms of properties of the client-resource
mapping function.
Non-compliant Identification Component. The non-compliant attacker identifica-
tion component defines the client-resource mapping function to be non-blocking, uniform,
dynamic, loose, and unpredictable.
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Compliant Identification Component. The compliant attacker identification com-
ponent defines the client-resource mapping function to be non-blocking, uniform, dynamic,
loose, unpredictable, and d-unique.
As I will show throughout the rest of the dissertation, the roaming honeypots algorithm
(§6.1) and the honeybees algorithm (Chapter 5) provide attack mitigation against both
compliant and non-compliant attackers. Roaming honeypots also identifies non-compliant
attackers, and live baiting (§6.2) identifies compliant attackers.
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5.0 MITIGATION OF JAMMING ATTACKS IN MULTI-RADIO
WIRELESS NETWORKS
In the previous chapter, the two components of dodging were introduced: to mitigate at-
tacks and to identify attackers. In this chapter, the mitigation component is presented and
evaluated against the wireless jamming attack. As illustrated in Fig. 12, the honeybees
algorithm presented in this chapter is an energy-efficient, bandwidth-efficient defense that
achieves attack mitigation against non-compliant radio jammers [73,74].
Advances in radio technology have enabled the paradigm ofmulti-radio wireless networks,
which have been proposed to increase overall network capacity by exploiting channel diversity
[15]. For instance, multi-radio 802.11 nodes are equipped with multiple radio interfaces
operating at orthogonal channels. Honeybees protects single-hop communication between
multi-radio nodes by combining two jamming countermeasures that have been proposed
elsewhere, namely software-based channel hopping [54,100,153,155] and error-correcting codes
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Figure 12: The part of the DoS problem space addressed by the honeybees algorithm.
Honeybees provides mitigation against non-compliant attackers.
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(e.g., [118]). Channel hopping, whereby the used radio channels are switched at the software-
level, is an effective mechanism to mitigate jamming in wireless sensor networks and 802.11
networks. It has been proposed and evaluated in the context of single-radio networks, where
each wireless node is equipped with a single radio interface [54,100,153,155]. In multi-radio
networks, the multiple radio interfaces can be used to increase communication reliability
against benign errors and malicious radio interference by sending redundant data: either
same data on different channels or encoding data and sending it in parallel through all
channels. Clearly, reliability comes at the expense of reduced goodput. Understanding
the trade-off between goodput and reliability is essential to make optimal utilization of the
multiple radios. This chapter addresses the problem of maximizing network goodput under
jamming attacks using a combination of channel hopping and error-correction coding.
In §5.1, the solution space of channel-hopping strategies is first analyzed by present-
ing two channel-hopping strategies, namely reactive and proactive, and comparing the two
against different attack strategies. The question “which of the two channel-hopping strate-
gies provides better jamming resiliency than the other?” is addressed in the context of the
typical single-radio wireless devices and in the context of multi-radio devices equipped with
multiple radio interfaces. The reactive and proactive defense strategies are studied against
two attack strategies: scanning and sweeping attacks defined in §3.2. Fig. 13 illustrates the
analysis components. In the single-radio context, theoretical models are developed to ana-
lyze the blocking probability under each combination of defense and attack strategies. In
the multi-radio setting, due to intractability of the theoretical analysis, simulation is used
instead to address the interaction between the defense and attack strategies. The jamming
problem is then formulated as a max-min game between defense and attack, and through
simulation the game outcome is shown to depend on the payoff function. Both analytical
and simulation results show that the reactive defense provides better jamming tolerance than
proactive when considering communication availability. Simulation results also show that
the scanning attack causes more damage than the sweeping attack. Therefore, the reactive
defense against scanning attack combination is further studied in §5.2.
In §5.2, the integration of ECC and reactive channel-hopping is analyzed, and its effec-
tiveness in defending against scanning attack is evaluated. Specifically, the reactive defense
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and the scanning attack are modeled by a Markov chain that incorporates the ECC pa-
rameters. The model is then validated using simulation experiments. Finally, an adaptive
algorithm, namely honeybees, is devised based on the model and is shown to improve the
resiliency of multi-radio networks against jamming.
In honeybees, channel-hopping defines the mapping function µ between the radio trans-
ceivers and the radio channels, whereby dodging is achieved by switching the radio trans-
ceivers among radio channels. The mapping function in honeybees satisfies the properties of
the mitigation component (§4.2): (non-blocking) all radio transceivers are always assigned
active radio channels, (uniform) radios are distributed evenly over the active channels, (dy-
namic) the set of active channels changes over time, (loose) there are always some unused
channels, and (unpredictable) the set of active channels is hard to predict by attackers.
The honeybees scheme achieves attack mitigation because with each reconfiguration,
jammers incur a delay until they find the newly activated radio channels. During these op-
portunity time-windows, communication is not blocked. These opportunity windows happen
when radio channels switch from idle into active and start “afresh”.
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5.1 CHANNEL-HOPPING STRATEGIES
Current research in jamming defense in single-radio networks has a bias towards proactive
channel-hopping as opposed to reactive channel-hopping. This is due in part to the im-
plementation simplicity of the proactive channel-hopping and the overhead and difficulty
of jamming detection [54, 100, 153, 156]. However, these factors are closely related to the
wireless technology and may be affected by new generations of wireless networks. One of the
emerging wireless network paradigms is the multi-radio networks. An important question
arises in the context of jamming mitigation in both single- and multi-radio networks: which
channel-hopping strategy, reactive or proactive, achieves the best jamming resiliency?
This section addresses this question by studying how channel hopping is affected by (a)
jamming strategies and (b) system parameters. More specifically, two jamming strategies are
studied: scanning and sweeping, whereby scanning jammers have and use the capability of
sensing channel activity, whereas sweeping attackers lack (or do not use) this capability and
resort to jamming each channel for a fixed amount of time before moving on to other channels
(see §3.2 for more details). The effect of the system parameters, such as the number of radios
per node, the number of channels, and the delay of jamming detection, is also considered in
all four defense-attack combinations.
The reactive-or-proactive question is decomposed into two subquestions: (1) under a
given system and attack scenario which of the two defense strategies provides better jamming
resiliency? and, because the attack strategy may be unknown, (2) which attack strategy is
more reasonable for attackers to choose and which defense strategy achieves better protection
against the best attack strategy?
To address the first subquestion, models of defense and jamming strategies are developed
and the interaction between the four combinations of defense and attack strategies is ana-
lyzed: theoretically for the single radio case and through simulation for the multiple radio
case due to intractability of theoretical analysis in the multi-radio setting. Communication
blocking probability and energy efficiency are the performance metrics in this study.
To address the second subquestion, jamming is modeled as a max-min game between
defense and attack. Specifically, two games are defined, and they differ in the optimization
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metric, or the payoff function. The availability game considers availability of the commu-
nication channel, whereby the defense aims at maximizing availability, and the jamming
attack aims at minimizing it. In the efficiency game, energy consumption is considered by
both defense and attack. The availability game is relevant in scenarios where jammers want
to disable network functioning for a focused, short period of time, such as in emergency-
alarm networks. The efficiency game, on the other hand, can be used to model scenarios
where jamming for extended periods aims at depleting the network’s energy resources, and
attackers are energy-limited as well. The outcomes of the two games are studied through
simulation.
The main results can be summarized as follows:
• In single-radio networks, reactive channel-hopping is provably better than proactive
against the fast-sweeping attack. Against other attacks, formulas are derived to decide
which defense strategy is better under different system and attack scenarios.
• In multi-radio networks, reactive channel-hopping achieves better jamming tolerance
than proactive hopping under the availability game. Under the efficiency game, however,
both strategies perform almost the same. Therefore, it can be concluded that reactive
hopping is a more plausible strategy than proactive in multi-radio networks.
As mentioned previously, channel-hopping defines a dynamic mapping between radios
and channels. This mapping is changed either periodically (proactive hopping) or triggered
by attacks (reactive hopping). In both the reactive and proactive strategies, a radio cannot
transmit or receive while switching channels. However, the two strategies differ based on the
jamming detection capabilities in the wireless nodes as follows.
Reactive channel-hopping. In the reactive channel-hopping strategy, each radio stays
at its current radio channel as long as no jamming is detected. Once it detects jamming, it
switches to a different channel. Jamming may keep the wireless medium busy, resulting in a
long waiting-time to access the channel, or may corrupt packets by causing high interference
at the receiver, resulting in excessive retransmissions. Only the sender has to detect jamming
and decide to switch channels. The receiver (or the base-station in §3.2) does not need to
be informed explicitly with the channel-switching decisions as it is already listening on all
57
the channels. A simple jamming detection algorithm is used: if the waiting-time for a free
channel or for a successful transmission exceeds a threshold, δdτ , jamming is assumed and
the radio hops to a different channel selected uniformly at random using a securely seeded
random-number generator.
It should be noted that the jamming-detection threshold is usually much longer than the
channel-hopping delay, that is, the time taken by the radio to switch channels. Channel-
switching times of tens of micro-seconds have been reported (e.g., [16, 153]), whereas the
jamming detection can take up to seconds [156]. Based on this large gap, the hopping
overhead is assumed to be zero in the models presented in §5.2.2, and the jamming-detection
and attack channel-sensing delays are set to one time-slot each. In the simulation study in
§5.2.3, more realistic delay values are used.
Proactive channel-hopping. In the proactive defense strategy, radios switch channels
periodically and simultaneously according to a pseudo-random schedule. For simplicity of
analysis, the channel-hopping period is a multiple of the channel-hopping delay, τ . Every
sdτ time units, all radios switch channels, and they reside at their channels for (sd−1)τ time
units. The proactive strategy is oblivious to jamming status, so unjammed radios may be
triggered to switch and jammed ones may be kept. Clock-synchronization is a requirement of
the proactive strategy. However, loose clock synchronization is not difficult to achieve among
radios on the same device (synchronization between sender and receiver is not needed because
the base-station has enough transceivers to cover all channels).
5.1.1 Channel-hopping in Single-radio Networks
In single-radio networks, channel hopping has been studied with a focus on proactive (peri-
odic) channel-hopping [54,100,153,155]. In this section, jamming in single-radio networks is
analyzed by comparing proactive and reactive channel-hopping under the two attack strate-
gies, namely scanning and sweeping. The goal is to answer the following question: under a
given system and attack scenario which defense strategy provides better jamming resiliency?
In what follows, it is assumed for ease of presentation that time variables are measured in
units of τ , the channel-hopping delay.
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5.1.1.1 Sweeping Attack First, the blocking probability (defined in §3.2) of both re-
active and proactive defense is studied against the sweeping attack.
Lemma 5.1. In single-radio networks, the blocking probability of reactive channel-hopping
against sweeping attack is
P reactive−sweepingb =

1+δd
nhsx
when (sx − 1) ≥ δd;
sx−1
nhsx
otherwise.
where δd is the jamming detection delay, nh the number of channels, and sx the period of the
sweeping jammer.
Proof. Every sweeping period, the sweeping attacker selects a channel uniformly at random,
and thus, it hits the channel used by the communication radio with a probability 1
nh
, where
nh is the total number of channels. Consider two cases.
(1) the attack channel-residence time is longer than the jamming detection delay, or
(sx− 1) ≥ δd: The radio detects jamming and hops to another channel. Therefore, the radio
stays blocked for δd+1 if hit by the jammer, where δd is the time it takes the radio to detect
jamming and 1 is the channel-hopping delay during which the radio cannot communicate as
well. Hence, the expected blockage time in each attack period is 1+δd
nh
, resulting in a blocking
probability of 1+δd
nhsx
.
(2) (sx− 1) < δd: The radio cannot detect that it is being jammed and will stay blocked
for the whole attack residence time, sx − 1, if hit by the jammer, resulting in a blocking
probability of sx−1
nhsx
.
The blocking probability of proactive defense against sweeping attack is then de-
rived. To give an intuition, the example illustrated in Fig. 14 is used. In the figure, the
defense period is 3 time units, the attack period is 2 time units, and the least common mul-
tiple (hyperperiod) of the two periods LCM = 6 time units. Note that the radio is readily
blocked for 2 = LCM
3
time units, during which it is hopping channels. Also, the radio is
free for 2 = 6
2
− 1 time units due to the attacker hopping channels and consequently not
jamming (the attacker hops in 3 time units but in one of them the radio is blocked because
it is hopping channels itself). In the remaining 2 time units (out of the 6 time units of the
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Attack
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Jamming-Free
Figure 14: The hyperperiod of length LCM of the periods of proactive defense and sweeping
attack.
hyperperiod length), both the radio and the jammer are not hopping and are residing on
some channel. Again, because both defense and attack radios select channels uniformly at
random, the probability that both the radio and the jammer reside on the same channel is
1
nh
, and thus, the radio is blocked for 2
nh
time units on average. So, there are 2 + 2
nh
blocked
time units on average out of the LCM = 6 time units, resulting in a blocking probability of
2+ 2
nh
6
.
Lemma 5.2. In single-radio networks, the blocking probability of proactive channel-hopping
against sweeping attack is
1
sd
+
1− 1
sd
− 1
sx
nh
≤ P proactive−sweepingb ≤
1
sd
+
1− 1
sd
− 1
sx
+ 1
LCM
nh
where sd is the channel-hopping period of the proactive defense, sx the period of the sweeping
jammer, and LCM the least common multiple of sd and sx, or the hyperperiod.
Proof. Let LCM be the hyperperiod length, that is, the least common multiple of defense
and attack periods. Let LCM = psd = qsx, for some integers p > 0 and q > 0. During any
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hyperperiod, there are p time units when the communication radio is hopping and q time
units when the attacker is hopping. Depending on the values of the defense and attack periods
and their phase shift, the channel-hopping times of the attack and the defense overlap (i.e.,
there exist time slots when both attack and defense radios hop channels simultaneously), or
the defense and attack hopping instances never intersect.
Consider first the case that there is intersection between the attack and defense hopping
instances and without loss of generality consider the hyperperiod that ends at one of the
intersections. By definition of the hyperperiod, exactly one of the q attack hopping instances
(specifically, the last hopping instance in the hyperperiod) coincides with a hopping instance
of the communication radio. Therefore, out of the LCM time units of a hyperperiod, the
radio is hopping in p time units and the jammer is hopping for q time units, but both are
hopping together for one time unit. Hence, both the communication radio and the attacker
are not hopping and are residing on some channel for (LCM − p− q + 1) time units.
The radio is blocked in the p hoppings. It is also blocked for 1
nh
· (LCM − p− q+1) time
units on average, where again 1
nh
is the probability that the jammer hits the channel used
by the radio. Hence, the expected number of blocked time units during each hyperperiod is
(p+ LCM−p−q+1
nh
), resulting in a blocking probability of
p+LCM−p−q+1
nh
LCM
.
Now, consider the case that the hopping instances of the defense and attack never inter-
sect. There are still p blocked time units in which the radio is hopping channels. However, the
number of time slots during which the radio and the jammer are not hopping is (LCM−p−q)
time units, one less than in the previous case, because there is no intersection between at-
tack and defense hopping instances. This results in an expected number of blocked time
units of (p + LCM−p−q
nh
) during each of the hyperperiods, and the blocking probability is
p+LCM−p−q
nh
LCM
.
The proof of the next theorem follows directly from comparing the blocking probabilities
in Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2.
Theorem 5.3. Against sweeping attack in single-radio networks, (a) when δd > sx − 1,
reactive channel-hopping achieves less or the same blocking probability as proactive channel-
hopping and (b) when δd ≤ sx−1, reactive channel-hopping achieves less blocking probability
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if δd < sx−1+((nh−1) sxsd−1) and proactive channel-hopping achieves less blocking probability
if δd > sx − 1− (1− sxLCM − (nh − 1) sxsd ).
Theorem 5.3 supports the intuition that the best defense against a jammer that sweeps
the channels very fast ((sx − 1) < δd) is to stay put. Indeed, the stay-put radio can be
viewed as a reactive radio with jamming detection delay (δd) longer than attack residence-
time (sx− 1) (the reactive radio would not detect jamming and would not switch channels).
Part (a) of the theorem states that the reactive radio achieves less or the same performance
as the proactive radio1.
Against a slow sweeping attacker, reactive channel-hopping is better than proactive as
long as the radio has some jamming-free time after it detects jamming and moves to a
different channel. The next corollary formalizes this condition.
Corollary 5.4. Against sweeping attack in single-radio networks, reactive channel-hopping
achieves less blocking probability than proactive if δd ≤ sx − 1 and (sx − 1)− δd > 1.
The corollary follows from part (b) in Theorem 5.3, where reactive achieves less blocking
probability when δd < sx − 1 + ((n − 1) sxsd − 1), or (sx − 1) − δd > (1 − (n − 1) sxsd ). Noting
that (n − 1) sx
sd
≥ 0, the condition is true if (sx − 1) − δd > 1. The following example
illustrates the above corollary. If sx = 10 time units, δd = 7 time units (as in 802.11
retransmission threshold), and nh = 12 channels (as in 802.11a), the blocking probability
of the reactive defense will be 1+7
12·10 (the first case in Lemma 5.1), and there is no value of
sd that makes proactive defense achieves less blocking probability (Fig. 15(a)); even when
sd =∞, the minimum blocking probability of the proactive defense is 912·10 (the lower bound
in Lemma 5.2). However, if sx = 8, the blocking probability of the reactive defense becomes
1+7
12·8 =
1
12
, and the proactive defense achieves less blocking probability for sd > 88 (Fig. 15(b)).
5.1.1.2 Scanning Attack The blocking probability under the scanning attack is now
considered. In what follows, for simplicity, time is assumed to be slotted, and the slot time
is assumed to be equal to the time it takes the attacker to detect lack of channel activity and
hop. That is, the slot time is δx + 1. Let α denote the ratio between the channel-hopping
1Same performance is achieved only when the proactive radio has a period sd =∞, that is, stay-put.
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(a) period of sweeping attack sx = 10 time units
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(b) period of sweeping attack sx = 8 time units
Figure 15: The blocking probability of the reactive and proactive channel-hopping strategies
against the sweeping attack in single-radio networks. 12 channels, jamming detection delay
δd = 7 time units.
delay and the slot time, that is, α = 1
δx+1
. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the time
it takes the radio to detect jamming and hop channels, that is, δd + 1, is a multiple of the
time slot length [100].
Expressions for the blocking probability of the reactive defense against the scanning
attack are then derived. To this end, the Markov model depicted in Fig. 16 is used, whereby
the state space is divided into two classes: in the B states the radio is blocked (or jammed)
and in the F states the radio is free from jamming. State Bi represents that the radio has
been jammed for i time slots, and state Fi represents that the jammer is still scanning for
the radio and has i channels yet to visit.
Once the radio is in the first B state (B1), it stays blocked for (δd+1) time units, which
is the time to detect jamming and hop to another channel. This time interval corresponds to
δd+1
δx+1
states, because of our assumption that the time is slotted into (δx+1)-sized time slots.
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Figure 16: Markovian Model for reactive defense against scanning attack.
Also, the transition probability from each state Bi to Bi+1 is 1 to represent the deterministic
jamming-detection and hopping delays.
After the radio hops to a different channel, it stays free from jamming for at least one time
slot (state Fnh−1) while the jammer senses lack of channel activity and hops channels. The
jammer selects its next channel uniformly at random from nh− 1 channels. The probability
that the jammer hits the channel used by the radio and drives the radio back into the first
blocked state is 1
nh−1 , which is the transition probability from state Fnh−1 to state B1. The
transition probability from state Fnh−1 to Fnh−2 is the probability that the jammer misses,
which is 1 − 1
nh−1 =
nh−2
nh−1 . Similarly, at state Fnh−i, the jammer chooses its next channel
out of nh − i channels, hitting the used channel with probability 1nh−i and missing with
probability nh−i−1
nh−i . This process may continue until the jammer scans all the channels but
one (state F1), in which case it hits the channel used by the radio with probability 1 in the
next time slot.
Lemma 5.5. In single-radio networks, the blocking probability of reactive channel-hopping
64
against a scanning attack is
P reactive−scanningb =
1
1 + nh(δx+1)
2(δd+1)
Proof. In the Markov model in Fig. 16, the transition probabilities yield the following equa-
tions: piB1 = piB1 = · · · = piB δd+1
δx+1
= piFnh−1 , where the pi’s are the steady-state probabilities of
the Markov model. Also, piFnh−2 =
nh−2
nh−1piFnh−1 and piFnh−3 =
nh−3
nh−2piFnh−2 =
nh−3
nh−2 ·
nh−2
nh−1piFnh−1 =
nh−3
nh−1piFnh−1 =
nh−3
nh−1piB1 . In general, piFnh−i =
nh−i
nh−1piB1 . Also, the sum of the steady-state prob-
abilities of all states is 1, that is,
∑ δd+1
δx+1
j=1 piBj +
∑nh−1
i=1 piFi = 1. Substituting in this equation
to solve for piB1 yields:
δd+1
δx+1
piB1 +nhpiB1 − nh2 piB1 = 1. Thus, piB1 = 1δd+1
δx+1
+
nh
2
. Noting that the
blocking probability is the summation of the steady-state probabilities of the B states, that
is,
∑ δd+1
δx+1
j=1 piBj =
δd+1
δx+1
piB1 =
1
1+
nh
2α(δd+1)
.
Lemma 5.6. In single-radio networks, the blocking probability of proactive channel-hopping
against a scanning attack is:
P proactive−scanningb =
2nh
δx+1
+ sd(sd − 1)
2nh(sd − 1 + 1δx+1)
Proof. In Eqn. 2 of [100], which uses the same assumptions as in Lemma 5.5, the throughput
of the proactive defense against the scanning attack is derived as 2nh(sd−1)−sd(sd−1)
2nh(sd−1+α) , where
α = 1
δx+1
. The throughput is defined as the fraction of time the communication is not
jammed. By definition, the blocking probability is 1 minus the throughput, resulting in the
formula presented in the lemma.
The proof of the next theorem follows directly from comparing the blocking probability
in Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6.
Theorem 5.7. In single-radio networks, reactive channel-hopping achieves less blocking
probability than proactive channel-hopping against scanning attack if and only if
1
1 + nh(δx+1)
2(δd+1)
<
2nh
δx+1
+ sd(sd − 1)
2nh(sd − 1 + 1δx+1)
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For example, when δx = δd = 1 and nh = 12 (the number of channels in 802.11a),
Theorem 5.7 reduces to that reactive achieves less blocking probability if and only if 7s2d −
31sd + 96 > 0 (Fig. 17(a)). This quadratic expression is > 0 for all values of sd, meaning
that reactive achieves less blocking probability than proactive for these parameter values.
However, the window over which proactive defense achieves better performance increases
with slower jamming detection. For instance, with the same example but with δd = 7,
proactive defense achieves less blocking probability than reactive for 1.9 < sd < 8.66 time
units. The bounds are the roots of the quadratic equation 5s2d − 53sd + 84 = 0, which is
graphed in Fig. 17(b).
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(a) jamming detection delay δd = 1 time unit
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(b) jamming detection delay δd = 7 time units
Figure 17: The blocking probability of the reactive and proactive channel-hopping strategies
against the scanning attack in single-radio networks. 12 channels; attack channel-sensing
time δx = 1 time unit.
In summary, reactive channel-hopping achieves better jamming resilience than proactive
channel-hopping for most of the spectrum of attack and system parameters against both
scanning and sweeping attacks in single-radio networks. The next subsection studies the
relative performance of reactive and proactive strategies in multi-radio networks. As will be
shown, the reactive strategy continues to outperform the proactive strategy in multi-radio
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networks.
5.1.2 Channel-hopping in Multi-radio Networks
This subsection analyzes the jamming problem in multi-radio networks. Due to intractability
of theoretical analysis in this case, simulation is used to compare proactive and reactive
channel-hopping against the two attack strategies. The goal is also to determine the best
defense strategy under a given system and attack scenario.
Table 3: Simulation parameters for comparing reactive and proactive channel-hopping strate-
gies (Bold face represents default values)
Parameter Values
Number of communication radios [1-9],3
Number of attack radios [3-11],3
Number of channels [4-24], 12
Channel-hopping delay 0,1,2,3,4,5
Period for proactive defense 10
Period for sweeping attack 1 (fast),10 (slow)
Jamming-detection threshold 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Attacker channel-sensing time 1
communication power 40mW
jamming power 40mW
Channel-hopping power [0-40], 0mW
To this end, a simulation-based study was conducted to analyze the interaction between
defense and attack strategies in multi-radio networks. Simulation time is divided into slots,
where each time slot represents the time to transmit one packet or packet fragment, or what
I call the packet-time.
The simulator models the multi-radio channel under jamming as a time sequence of deci-
sions (by jammers and defenders) regarding which channels to operate their radio interfaces.
67
Assume that there are nh channels so that the defense and attack decision vectors are mod-
eled as nh-bit vectors, each bit corresponding to whether the corresponding channel is used
by defense radios or jammers, respectively. Because the number of used channels on any
time slot cannot exceed the number of radio interfaces, the number of 1-bits in each vector is
at most the number of communication radios for defense and the number of jammer radios
for attack.
The space of defense and attack hopping strategies consists of all the feasible time se-
quences of decision vectors. Some sequences are not feasible, particularly those when a radio
switches channels in a time less than the hopping delay. Depending on the overlap of jammed
and communication channels, and the coding scheme used by the defenders, the probability
of the communication being blocked can be calculated. In the following experiments, the
blocking probability is the percentage of time all radios are jammed.
Table 3 summarizes the parameters used. The number of channels was varied from 4 as
in the 433MHz band of CC1000 radio up to 24 with a default value of 12 as in 802.11a. The
number of communication radios was varied from 1 to 9, and the number of communication
and attack radios was set to be the same unless otherwise specified.
The packet time was used as the unit for time-based parameters. The channel-hopping
delay was varied from 0 up to 5 packet-time with a default value of 1 packet-time. The period
of the proactive hopping strategy was set at 10 (corresponding to 10% hopping cycle). The
jamming-detection threshold was set to 7 packet-time (as in 802.11 retransmission threshold)
by default and varied in an experiment between 1 and 10 packet-time. The attack channel-
sensing time was set to 1 packet-time as a worst-case of a highly effective attacker. The
energy-related parameters will be discussed in §5.1.4.
In each experiment, the performance of all six combinations of attack (scanning, fast-
sweeping, and slow-sweeping) and defense (reactive and proactive) strategies was compared.
Each experiment run lasted for about one million packet-time and the average of 10 runs
is reported. The 90% confidence intervals were smaller than 2% of the average reported at
each data point and are not shown to improve presentation.
In the first set of experiments, the number of communication radios was varied, and
the number of attack radios matched the number of communication radios. As shown in
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Fig. 18, as more radios are used, the blocking probability decreases, except for scanning
attack against both proactive and reactive defenses. To explain, recall that both defense
and attack radios are increased simultaneously in this experiment and note that when the
number of radios exceeds half the total number of channels (a total of 12 channels is used
in the simulations), there are always (2× number of radios − number of channels) radios
that have no room to escape if they get jammed. However, only the scanning attackers can
make full usage of this situation; sweeping attackers are limited because they do not sense
channel activity and may hop away from an active channel. It can also be observed that the
blocking probability for proactive defense is always at least 10%. This is expected due to
the hopping cycle of 10%; every 10 packet-time, one packet-time is blocked during channel
hopping.
It was observed that with a single radio both proactive and reactive defense strategies
performed almost the same against the scanning attack. This observation may explain
the use of proactive defense in previous channel-hopping research (e.g., [54, 100]); proactive
defense is much simpler to implement and achieves the same performance as reactive. As
more radios are used, the reactive defense strategy achieved strictly less blocking probability
than the proactive strategy against all attack strategies. The simulation results (at nf = 1)
matched the models presented in the previous subsection, except for the scanning attack.
This difference is intentional and expected. Whereas the model assumes that the scanning
attacker keeps history of its visited channels and avoids them when selecting its next channel,
in the simulation it is assumed that the attacker selects its next channel without keeping
history (see §3.2 for more details).
In the second experiment, the total number of channels was varied while fixing the number
of radios and attackers at three. Fig. 19 shows that, as expected, with more channels the
blocking probability decreased. The reactive strategy achieved better performance than the
proactive strategy against all attack types.
Other experiments were conducted where the number of attack radios (with fixed num-
ber of defense radios), the channel-hopping overhead, the jamming-detection threshold, the
attack channel-sensing delay, and the period of proactive defense were varied. A similar inter-
action was observed between defense and attack strategies, that is, reactive channel-hopping
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Figure 18: Effect of number of radios of both defense and attack on the communication
blocking probability; 12 channels.
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Figure 19: Effect of number of channels on the communication blocking probability; 3 radios.
achieved less or the same blocking probability compared to proactive channel-hopping.
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5.1.3 The Defense-Attack Availability Game
The previous discussion addressed the question of which defense strategy is better given that
the attack strategy is known. This subsection addresses the case when the attack strategy is
not known. To this end, the jamming defense problem is modeled as a max-min game [106]
(refer to §2.4.5 for a brief background on max-min games) between defense and attack. Two
payoff functions are considered, communication availability (analyzed in this section) and
energy efficiency (analyzed in the next section). This subsection defines the availability game
and analyzes its outcome using simulation.
In the availability game, the main goal of the network is to deliver data. The attack on
the other hand aims at blocking communication for as much time as possible. The blocking
probability, Pb(d, a, S), in this game is the percentage of time communication is blocked,
whereby communication is blocked only when all radios are jammed. The blocking proba-
bility depends on the defense strategy (d), attack strategy (a), and system parameters (S),
such as the number of radios and the number of channels. The communication availability
is 1.0− Pb(d, a, S).
The maxminimizer defense strategy is the one that guarantees the maximum availability
knowing that the attack aims at minimizing it. It solves the problem:
arg maxd∈D mina∈A Pb(d, a, S)
whereD = {proactive, reactive} are the defense strategies andA = {scanning, fast-sweeping,
slow-sweeping} are the attack strategies.
To determine the solution of the availability game defined above, that is, to find the
maxminimizer defense strategy, recall that in Fig. 18 the reactive defense achieved better
performance than proactive except for the single-radio setting, whereby they both achieved
almost the same performance. Also, the scanning attack strategy achieved more damage
(higher blocking probability) than the sweeping attack (the bottom two curves in Fig. 18)
against reactive defense. It can be concluded that the best attack strategy in the availability
game is the scanning strategy, leading to the following observation under the studied system
parameters: The Nash equilibrium in the availability game is 〈reactive, scanning〉
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in multi-radio networks. In single-radio networks, there are two Nash equilibria
〈reactive, scanning〉 and 〈proactive, scanning〉.
5.1.4 Using Energy Efficiency as Performance Metric
Through the previous discussion, the focus was on communication availability. However,
wireless networks are usually limited in their energy resources, and thus, taking the energy
consumption into consideration is crucial to determine the best defense strategies. This
subsection analyzes the jamming problem as an energy-efficiency problem. In this context,
the question of which defense strategy is better is first answered. Then, a max-min game
is defined with energy efficiency as the payoff function, and its outcome is analyzed using
simulation.
5.1.4.1 Energy Model A metric that emphasizes energy efficiency is used. Specifically,
the used metric is the Jamming Defense Power Efficiency (JDPE), which represents the
communication availability achieved per unit energy, and the energy is defined relative to
the attack energy consumption.
JDPE(d, a, S) =
1.0− Pb(d, a, S)
defense power consumption
attack power consumption
(5.1)
In order to define the power consumption of defense and attack in Eqn. 5.1, an energy
model is incorporated into the simulator. A radio is either in stationary or channel-hopping
states. While in stationary state, a communication radio tries to send and receive data
whereas an attacker jams. Let the average power consumed by a radio while in stationary
state be PSd (PSa for attack), and the power consumed in channel-hopping state PCd (PCa
for attack). The average power consumed by the defense is a weighted sum of stationary
power and channel-hopping power: wsd ·PSd+wmd ·PCd, where the weights (wsd and wmd)
are the average over time of the number of defense radios in the stationary and hopping states,
respectively. Similarly, the average attack power is: wsa ·PSa+wma ·PCa, where the weights
(wsa and wma) are similarly defined.
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The attack and defense stationary power was set to 40mW [115]. Equal values of sta-
tionary power were selected for both defense and attack based on the feasibility of low-power
jamming attacks [82,104,153,156]. The power consumed while hopping was varied from 0mW
(i.e., channel hopping consumes negligible power compared to transmit/receive power [32])
to 40mW (similar to stationary power).
5.1.4.2 Simulation Results In the first experiment, the number of radios was varied
with a matching number of attackers. When a single radio is used, both proactive and
reactive strategies performed almost the same (Fig. 20), again explaining the adoption of
proactive defense in single-radio networks [54, 100]. With more radios, the JDPE improved
except for scanning attack against proactive defense (when number of radios exceeded half
the channels). This trend is similar to the proactive-scanning curve in Fig 18, which was
explained previously. It was also observed that the reactive strategy performed better (higher
JDPE) than proactive except against fast-sweeping attack, where they both achieved exactly
the same JDPE (the bottom two lines in Fig. 20). Whereas reactive defense achieved less
blocking probability against fast-sweeping attack (Fig. 18), this advantage was neutralized
as it also consumed more power because of spending more time in communication.
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Figure 20: Effect of number of radios on JDPE; 12 channels.
In the next experiment, the total number of channels was varied while fixing the number
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Figure 21: Effect of number of channels on JDPE; 3 radios.
of radios (for both defense and attack) at three. As shown in Fig. 21, against the sweeping
attack (both slow and fast), the JDPE increased at first and then saturated at six channels for
both reactive and proactive strategies. To explain, note that the relative energy consumption
of proactive defense vs. fast-sweeping attack is independent of the number of channels; in
the fast-sweeping attack, no matter how many channels there are, defenders (attackers) in
this combination transmitted (jammed) for 9 (1) packet-time and hopped for 1 packet-time.
Noting that the transmission and jamming energy consumption is the same and channel-
hopping energy is 0, the proactive defense consumed 9
5
more energy than fast-sweeping attack.
Thus, the saturation of JDPE is mainly due to the almost constant blocking probability after
6 channels (in Fig. 19).
The saturation of JDPE in the fast-sweeping vs. reactive case has a different reason. Be-
cause the blocking probability kept on decreasing after 6 channels (bottom curve in Fig. 19),
radios spent more time transmitting and receiving. Consuming more power, the relative
defense-to-power consumption increased resulting in almost constant JDPE (Eqn. 5.1).
The JDPE in proactive defense vs. slow-sweeping attack followed the trend of the block-
ing probability in Fig. 19: improving until around 10 channels then staying constant. A
slight decrease in JDPE after 6 channels in the reactive vs. slow-sweeping scenario was also
74
observed. This is because radios spent more time unjammed and thus consumed more power
in transmission/reception, while the sweeping attackers have constant power consumption.
Against the scanning attack, both reactive and proactive defenses failed to maintain the
improvement in JDPE after around 10 channels. With more channels, the radios have more
chance to escape, and the scanning attackers hop more often, because a scanning attacker
stays one packet-time at an idle channel before it hops to another, whereas it stays eight
packet-time at an active channel before the jammed radio detects jamming and hops away.
Thus, they spend more time in the zero-power channel-hopping state.
In the next experiment, the channel-hopping delay was varied. As channel-hopping delay
increased, the JDPE worsened for all defense-attack combinations as expected (Fig. 22). Re-
active defense was more efficient than proactive except against fast-sweeping attack, whereby
both achieved the same performance.
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Figure 22: Effect of channel-hopping delay on JDPE. 3 radios and 12 channels.
As can be observed from Fig. 23, increasing the channel-switching power (PCd and PCa in
§5.1.4.1) resulted in improving JDPE in all defense-attack combinations except for proactive
defense against slow-sweeping attack. The fast-sweeping attackers consume half of their
time hopping channels, and thus, they suffered the most from increasing the hopping energy
cost, resulting in the steepest increase in JDPE. On the other hand, slow-sweeping attackers
consume only 10% of their time hopping channels, and thus, are the least impacted by the
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Figure 23: Effect of channel-switching power on JDPE. 3 radios and 12 channels.
increasing hopping power. Because the hopping cycle is the same for slow-sweeping attackers
and proactive radios, the JDPE in their combination was not affected by the hopping power.
When the channel-switching power reached the communication (jamming) power of 40mW,
the effect of energy consumption on JDPE was neutralized, and JDPE was only affected
by the blocking probability; the relative order among the defense-attack combinations at
PCd = PCa = 40mW is the reverse of their order in Fig. 18 at nf = nx = 3;
The jamming-detection threshold affected only the reactive defense strategy as expected
(Fig. 24). Although it may be expected that faster reaction to jamming would result in
better performance for the reactive defense, its JDPE worsened at short jamming-detection
thresholds against scanning attack. The blocking probability indeed improved at shorter
thresholds. However, radios spent more time unjammed and consequently spent more power
in transmission/reception, and attackers spent more time channel-hopping, resulting in a
small JDPE. Other than this point in the curve, reactive was more or same energy-efficient
as proactive.
In the last experiment, the number of attack radios was varied while fixing the number
of defense radios (Fig. 25). Increasing the number of attackers had two effects: increased
blocking probability and increased attack power consumption. At first, blocking probability
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Figure 24: Effect of jamming-detection threshold on JDPE. 3 radios and 12 channels.
did not increase as fast as the attack power consumption resulting in improving JDPE.
However, the blocking probability kept on increasing until its effect took over and resulted in
a worsening JDPE. The turning point was different in different defense-attack combinations.
In all scenarios, reactive defense achieved better or same performance as proactive defense.
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Figure 25: Effect of number of attack radios on JDPE. 3 communication radios.
In summary, the reactive hopping strategy achieved the same or higher energy-efficiency
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than proactive hopping against the three attack strategies except against the scanning attack
and only when the jamming-detection threshold is very small.
5.1.4.3 Efficiency Game A max-min game between defense and attack is defined to
determine the most “reasonable” attack strategy to deplete network energy, in case the
attack strategy is not specified a priori. The efficiency game takes energy consumption of
both defense and attack into consideration. In this game, the network aims at delivering
as much data as possible while extending its lifetime. Attackers on the other hand aim at
incurring as much damage as possible with as low energy as possible.
Again, themaxminimizer defense strategy in this game is the one that solves the problem:
arg maxd∈D mina∈A JDPE(d, a, S)
The previous simulation analysis is used to determine the solution of the efficiency game.
From Fig. 20, it is best for attackers to use the fast-sweeping attack, to cause the least JDPE,
and in this case both reactive and proactive defenses perform the same.
This is confirmed at different numbers of channels. The fast-sweeping attack (bottom
two lines in Fig. 21) is still the best attack strategy causing the worst JDPE. Even with 4
channels, although scanning attackers caused less JDPE when proactive defense was used,
fast-sweeping attack achieved less JDPE when the best defense (reactive) was used.
From Fig. 22, when channel-hopping overhead is negligible (compared to packet-time),
the best attack strategy is scanning and the best defense strategy is reactive. For the other
delay values, fast-sweeping attack is best for attackers, and both reactive and proactive
defenses perform the same.
An important observation is that there is a turnover in the best attack strategy as the
number of jamming radios increased, as observed in Fig. 25. As the number of attack
radios is below 6 (half the channels), the best attack strategy is fast-sweeping; it is scanning
afterwards. The reason is that once attackers exceed half the channels, some of them do not
need to move and waste time in channel-hopping.
From the previous analysis, the following conclusion is reached: Under the studied
system parameters, if the channel-hopping overhead is negligible or the number
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of attack radios far exceeds the number of communication radios, the Nash
equilibria in the efficiency game in multi-radio networks is 〈reactive, scanning〉.
Otherwise, there are two Nash equilibria: 〈reactive, fast-sweeping〉 and 〈proactive,
fast-sweeping〉.
5.1.5 Summary
This section generalized the software-based channel-hopping jamming defense into multi-
radio wireless networks. Two defense strategies were compared, namely proactive and re-
active, against three attack strategies, namely scanning, slow-sweeping and fast-sweeping.
The jamming defense problem was modeled as a max-min game between defense and attack.
Two variations of this game differing in the payoff function were presented.
The results presented in this section show that the proactive defense achieves the same or
a little less jamming resiliency than the reactive defense in single-radio networks. The proac-
tive defense is also easier to implement, and thus, it is a more attractive option than reactive
in single-radio networks. This conclusion coincides with and supports the current research’s
focus on proactive channel-hopping [54,100,153]. However, for multi-radio networks, reactive
defense is more resilient to jamming. These conclusions are based on theoretical analysis for
single-radio networks and on simulation experiments for multi-radio networks, whereby all
defense-attack combinations were compared under varying system parameters.
The next section presents approximate models developed for the reactive defense and
scanning attack strategies, and use these models to adapt system behavior on-line.
5.2 HONEYBEES
This section considers the problem of maximizing network goodput under jamming attacks
in multi-radio networks by combining channel-hopping and (n,m) error-correcting codes
(ECC) (§2.4.3), such as the IDA algorithm [118]. Two factors affect goodput. First, high
redundancy in ECC reduces goodput. Second, jamming may result in data loss if the number
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of clear (unjammed) radios is smaller than the number necessary to recover transmitted data.
However, these two factors are interestingly interdependent. Increasing ECC redundancy
results in increased overhead but also in increased jamming resiliency. This interlocking
suggests the existence of optimal ECC redundancy that achieves maximum goodput. Noting
that such optimal redundancy depends as well on system and attack parameters and that
the attack strategy is not always known beforehand, an adaptive mechanism is needed to
discover attack parameters and tune the ECC accordingly.
A first step in devising such an adaptive mechanism is modeling defense and attack strate-
gies under different ECC parameters. Such model can be used to detect attack strategies
given the known system and defense parameters. This section develops and validates models
for reactive hopping strategies against scanning attack strategies, taking into consideration
that the data is encoded to correct errors.
Two variations of the reactive defense are modeled, namely straightforward and deceptive.
In the straightforward reactive defense, jammed radios select the next target channels ran-
domly from the set of unused channels, whereas in the deceptive reactive defense, jammed
radios select their next channels randomly from a set containing all channels (including
currently used channels).
Also, two variations of the scanning attack are modeled, namely exploratory and conser-
vative. In the exploratory-scanning attack, jammers at unused channels select the next target
channels randomly from the set of unjammed channels, whereas in the conservative-scanning
attack, jammers at unused channels select their next targets randomly from a set contain-
ing all channels (including the currently jammed channels) in anticipation of the deceptive
defense.
5.2.1 Maximizing Network Goodput
As mentioned in §3.2, and (nf ,m) ECC is used, where nf is the number of radios. This
ECC reduces the goodput by the code rate m
nf
(§2.4.3). Furthermore, jamming reduces
the goodput of an error-correction-encoded channel by blocking communication at more
than nf −m radios. The goodput (as a fraction of the maximum throughput achievable in
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absence of jamming) of the multi-radio channel can then be formulated in terms of the ECC
parameters and the jamming-induced blocking probability (Pb) as:
goodput =
m
nf
(1− Pb)
There is a relation between m, representing the amount of redundancy of the ECC, and
the blocking probability, Pb. Asm decreases, and correspondingly, the amount of redundancy
required in each encoded piece increases, it becomes harder for jammers to cause data loss,
and hence, the blocking probability decreases. The amount of decrease of the blocking
probability and the resulting net effect on goodput depend on the hopping and jamming
strategies as well as the number of channels.
Considering the problem of maximizing goodput, the solution space encompasses the
selection of the coding parameter m and the hopping strategy. Because the goodput also
depends on the adversarial attack strategy, which may not be always known beforehand, a
mechanism is needed to discover the attack parameters, particularly the attack strategy and
the number of attackers, and adjust the coding parameters and hopping strategy accord-
ingly. A main building block of such mechanism is a model that captures the interaction
between defense, attack, and system parameters. Building this model is the focus of the
next subsection.
5.2.2 Markovian Models
This subsection presents models to derive the blocking probability given defense, attack,
and system parameters. The main envisioned usage of this model is to drive an adaptive
mechanism that infers the otherwise unknown attack parameters and adjusts the defense
parameters to maximize goodput. To this end, Markov Chains are used to model reactive
defense and scanning attack in multi-radio networks. A Markov chain is represented by a set
of states and transition probabilities, pij, between these states. In these models, each state
represents the number of jammed radios, ranging from 0 to nf . Therefore, there are nf + 1
states.
From the steady-state probabilities pii, i = 0, 1, · · ·, nf , the blocking probability can
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be derived given the parameters of the ECC in effect. For an (nf ,m) ECC, the blocking
probability is the sum of the steady-state probabilities of states in which more than nf −m
radios are jammed. That is, Pb =
∑nf
i=nf−m+1 pii.
To solve the Markov model, the transition-probability matrix, [pij], is derived. The
steady state probabilities can then be derived using the standard matrix equations:
[pii][pij] = [pii] and
nf∑
i=0
pii = 1
The models assume instantaneous channel hopping, that is, the delay of switching chan-
nels is 0, and that the delay of detecting jamming (for defense) and sensing channel activity
(for attack) is one time slot. These assumptions are needed to keep the model analysis sim-
ple; without these assumptions, the state definition of the Markov chain has to include state
for each communication and attack radio, such as the number of remaining time slots for a
hopping radio to reach its next channel, the number of remaining time slots for a jammed
communication radio to detect jamming, and the number of remaining time slots for an
attack radio to detect channel inactivity.
The drawing without replacement formula is extensively used in the models, and hence a
shortcut is used:
DWR(a, b, c, d) =
 b
d
 a− b
c− d

 a
c

DWR(a, b, c, d) is the probability that c drawings (without replacing the drawn mem-
bers) from a population of size a, of them b are distinguished, yield exactly d distinguished
members.
 x
y
 is the binomial coefficient of x and y, also called “x choose y”.
In what follows, state i represents the state where i of the nf radios are jammed as
depicted in Fig. 26. All the jammed i radios hop channels in the next time-step. In the
straightforward defense, the i radios randomly select the next target channels from among
the unused nh− nf channels, whereas in the deceptive defense, the i radios select their next
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Figure 26: Communication and attack radios at state i (i jammed radios).
channels from both the unused channels as well as their current channels. It should be
noted, however, that in straightforward defense, if i is larger than nh−nf , then there are not
enough unused channels for all the i jammed radios to move to, and hence, ` = i− (nh−nf )
(randomly selected) of the i jammed radios are forced not to hop, while the remaining i− `
hop to new channels.
Similarly, when transitioning out of state i, all the nx − i attack radios that are not
successfully jamming active channels will move to new channels. In the exploratory attack,
the nx− i attack radios randomly select the next target channels from among the unjammed
nh − nx channels, while in the conservative attack, the nx − i attack radios select their next
channels from both the unjammed channels as well as their current channels. It should
be noted, however, that in exploratory attack, if nx − i is larger than nh − nx, then there
are not enough unjammed channels for all the nx − i attack radios to move to, and hence,
`x = (nx − i) − (nh − nx) (randomly selected) of the nx − i attack radios are forced not to
hop, while the remaining nx − i− `x hop to new targets.
The following four theorems present formula for the transition probabilities pij for the
four attack-defense combinations.
Theorem 5.8. For a straightforward reactive defense vs. conservative scanning attack with
no channel-hopping overhead, the transition probability pij is:
pij = DWR(nh − i, nf − `, nx − i, j − `)
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where nx is the number of attackers, nf the number of communication radios, nh the number
of channels, and ` = max(0, i− (nh − nf )).
Proof. At state i, all the jammed i radios hop channels in the next time-step. However,
` = max(0, i − (nh − nf )) radios have to stay put in their current channels if there are not
enough new channels to hop to, where ` is the difference between the i radios that need to
hop and the nh−nf available unused channels, that is, ` = max(0, i−(nh−nf )). Meanwhile,
nx− i attackers detect that their channels are unused and select new channels out of nh−nx
unjammed channels plus the previously-jammed nx − i for a total of nh − i channels in the
next time-step.
In the next time-step, ` radios are already jammed because they have to stay put in the
jammed channels. Thus, to jam a total of j radios, the nx − i hopping attackers have to
jam exactly j − ` radios. The probability of this event is derived using drawings-without-
replacement:
DWR(nh − i, nf − `, nx − i, j − `)
where the hopping attackers draw nx− i channels out of nh− i channels with nf − ` of them
used by communication radios.
Intuitively, the first component of the next formula represents deceptive-reactive commu-
nication radios selecting their next channels from the ones they currently use, and thus, stay
jammed. The second component represents the probability that attack radios jam enough
radios to cause exactly j jammed radios in the next time slot.
Theorem 5.9. For a deceptive reactive defense vs. conservative scanning attack with no
channel-hopping overhead, the transition probability pij is:
pij =
omax∑
o=omin
DWR(nh − (nf − i), i, i, o)·
DWR(nh − i, nf − o, nx − i, j − o)
where omin = max(0, j − (nx − i)), and omax = min(i, j).
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Proof. At state i, all the jammed i radios hop channels in the next time-step and select from
the nh−nf unused channels plus their current i channels. Let o radios hop to channels from
the previously-used i channels. The probability of this event is:
po = DWR(nh − (nf − i), i, i, o)
where radios draw i channels out of nh − nf + i channels, i of them active in the previous
time-step.
Meanwhile, nx − i attackers detect that their channels are unused and hop to channels
selected out of the nh − i unjammed channels.
In the next time-step, o radios are their jammed because they stay at already-jammed
channels. Thus, to jam a total of j radios, the nx − i hopping attackers have to jam exactly
j − o radios. The probability of this event is:
p = DWR(nh − i, nf − o, nx − i, j − o)
where the hopping attackers draw nx− i channels out of nh− i channels with nf − o of them
used by communication radios.
To compute the overall transition probability, note that the sample space is partitioned
based on o, the number of radios falling into the i channels. Therefore, the transition
probability is computed as follows: pij =
∑
o[po · p]. Substituting in this equation yields the
formula presented in the theorem. The summation limits omin and omax are computed by
solving the constraints for each combination x choose y: that both x and y are ≥ 0 and that
x ≥ y.
Intuitively, the first and second components of the next formula represent exploratory-
reactive communication radios escaping from their jammed channels but ending up selecting
their next channels where attack radios stay because they do not have enough unjammed
channels to move to. The third component represents the probability that attack radios end
up jamming j radios in the next time slot.
Theorem 5.10. For a straightforward reactive defense vs. exploratory scanning attack with
no channel hopping overhead, the transition probability pij is:
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pij =
kmax∑
k=kmin
DWR(nh − nf , nx − i, i, k)·
mmax∑
m=mmin
DWR(nx − i, `x, k,m)·
DWR(nh − nx, nf − `− k, nx − i− `x, j − `−m),
where `x = max(0, nx−i−(nh−nx)), kmin = max(0, nf+nx−nh−`), kmax = min(nx−i, i−`),
mmin = max(0, i − ` − nh + nf + `x, j − nf + k, i − nx + `x + j − `, k − nx + i + `x), and
mmax = min(k, `x, j − `, nh − 2nx − nf + k + i+ j + `x).
Proof. All the jammed i radios at state i hop channels in the next time-step. They select
new channels out of the unused nh − nf channels. However, it may be the case that there
are not enough new channels to accommodate all hopping radios, and ` of them have to stay
put in their current channels.
Also, some radios hop to channels in the nx − i channels that were occupied by the
rest of the attackers. The probability that k radios fall on these nx − i channels is: pk =
DWR(nh−nf , nx− i, i, k), where radios draw i channels out of nh−nf channels with nx− i
jammed in the previous time-step.
Meanwhile, nx−i attackers detect that their channels are unused and hop to new channels
(out of the nh−nx unjammed channels) in the next time-step. But, it may be the case that
there are not enough new channels to accommodate all hopping attackers. The number
of attackers that have to stay put is `x, where `x is the difference between the nx − i
attackers that need to hop and the nh − nx available unjammed channels, that is, `x =
max(0, nx − i− (nh − nx)).
In the next time-step, ` radios are already jammed because they have to stay put in the
jammed channels, and some of the k radios that hopped to the nx − i channels previously
occupied by attackers may be jammed as well if they coincide with the `x attackers that
have to stay put. Let the number of radios that fall into the `x channels be denoted as m.
The probability that m radios fall on the `x staying attackers given that k radios hop to
the previously-jammed nx − i channels is: pm = DWR(nx − i, `x, k,m), where radios draw
k channels out of nx − i channels with `x jammed by staying attackers. The rest of the k
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radios are not jammed, because there are no other attackers in the nx − i channels except
the `x attackers.
On the attack side, there are nx − i− `x attackers that hopped their channels in search
of used channels out of nh−nx channels. Because `+m radios are already jammed, all that
these attackers have to do now in order to jam a total of j radios is to jam j − `−m radios
from the rest of the radios (nf − ` − k). The probability that the hopping attackers jam
exactly j − `−m radios is: pkm = DWR(nh − nx, nf − `− k, nx − i− `x, j − `−m), where
the hopping attackers draw nx− i− `x channels out of nh−nx channels with nf − `−k used
by communication radios.
The sample space is partitioned based on k, the number of radios falling into the nx − i
channels. The space is partitioned further by m, the number of radios falling into the staying
attackers. Therefore, the transition probability is computed as follow: pij =
∑
k[pk ·
∑
m[pm ·
pkm]]. Substituting in this equation yields the formula presented in the theorem. Again, the
summation limits kmin, kmax, mmin, and mmax are computed by solving the constraints for
each choose combination.
Intuitively, the first component of the next formula represents jammed radios that stay
jammed because they end up staying at their current channels. The second and third com-
ponents represent jammed radios that stay jammed because they escape to channels jammed
by attack radios that do not have enough channels to move to. The fourth component repre-
sents the probability that attack radios jam enough radios to cause exactly j jammed radios
in the next time slot.
Theorem 5.11. Deceptive reactive defense vs. exploratory scanning attack. The transition
probability pij for deceptive reactive defense and exploratory scanning attack with no channel
hopping overhead is:
pij =
omax∑
o=omin
DWR(nh − (nf − i), i, i, o)·
kmax∑
k=kmin
DWR(nh − nf , nx − i, i− o, k)·
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mmax∑
m=mmin
DWR(nx − i, `x, k,m)·
DWR(nh − nx, nf − o− k, nx − i− `x, j − o−m)
where omin = max(0, i − (nh − nf ), nf − nh), omax = i, kmin = max(0, nf − nh + nx − o),
kmax = min(nx− i, i−o, nf−o), mmin = max(0, j−nf+k, k−nx+ i+`x, j−o+nx+ i+`x),
and mmax = min(k, `x, j − o, nh − 2nx − nf + i+ `x + j + k).
Proof. At state i, all the jammed i radios hop channels in the next time-step. Instead of
selecting all new channels, they hop to channels out of the unused nh−nf channels plus their
current i channels. Let o radios select their channels from the i channels previously used.
As previously discussed, the probability of this event is: po = DWR(nh − (nf − i), i, i, o).
Also, let k of the remaining i− o radios, which now select their channels out of only the
unused nh−nf channels, hop to channels from the nx−i channels occupied by the rest of the
attackers. The probability of this event is: p′k = DWR(nh−nf , nx− i, i−o, k), where radios
draw i− o channels out of nh − nf channels with nx − i jammed in the previous time-step.
On the other side, nx − i attackers detect that their channels are unused and hop to new
channels (out of the nh − nx unjammed channels) in the next time-step. Also, `x attackers
stay put because there is not enough new unjammed channels.
In the next time step, o radios are already jammed because they stay put at the jammed
i channels. Let m radios, out of the k that hop to the nx− i channels previously occupied by
attackers, coincide with the `x attackers that have to stay put. Thesem radios will be jammed
as well. As previously discussed, the probability of this event is: p′m = DWR(nx−i, `x, k,m).
The probability that the nx − i − `x hopping attackers jam exactly j − o − m radios is:
pokm = DWR(nh− nx, nf − o− k, nx− i− `x, j − o−m), where the hopping attackers draw
nx− i− `x channels out of nh− nx channels with nf − o− k used by communication radios.
The sample space is partitioned based on o, the number of radios falling into the i
channels. The space is partitioned further by k, the number of radios falling into the
previously-jammed nx − i channels, and further by m, the number of radios falling into
the `x staying attackers. Therefore, the transition probability is computed as follows:
pij =
∑
o[po[
∑
k[p
′
k ·
∑
m[p
′
m · pokm]]]]. Substituting in this equation yields the formula pre-
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sented in the theorem. The summation limits omin, omax, kmin, kmax, mmin, and mmax are
computed simply by solving the constraints for each choose combination.
5.2.3 Simulation Analysis and Model Validation
Table 4: Simulation parameters for validating the models of reactive channel-hopping against
scanning attack (Bold face represents default values)
Parameter Values
Number of pieces needed [1-3], 1 (full replication)
to correct errors (m)
Number of channels [4-20], 12
Number of radios [1-11],3
Number of attackers [1-11],3
Channel-hopping delay 1 packet-time
Jamming-detection threshold 10 packet-time
Attacker channel-sensing time 10 packet-time
A simulation study was conducted to validate the models presented in the previous
subsection. The simulator models the reactive defense and scanning attack strategies with
the same assumptions used in deriving the theoretical results except the negligible hopping
delay assumption. For simulator validation, the simulations were also run with the same
values as the model, and the simulation results exactly matched the model results; curves
are not shown because they would be redundant and not contribute to the presentation.
Simulation time is divided into slots, where each time slot represents the time to transmit one
piece of ECC-encoded packets, or the packet-time. The default ECC used in the simulation
is (nf , 1), that is, any piece of encoded data is enough to recover the original data, and
correspondingly, the blocking probability is the percentage of time all radios are jammed.
Table 4 summarizes the parameters used. The number of channels was varied from 4 up
to 20 with a default value of 12 as in 802.11a. The number of radios was varied from 1 to
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11 with a default value of 3, and the number of attack radios was set to be the same as the
number of defense radios unless otherwise specified. To examine the effect of the assumption
of negligible hopping delay, the channel-hopping delay was set to 1 packet-time (instead
of 0 packet-time in the model), and both the jamming-detection threshold and the attack
channel-sensing time were set to 10 packet-time (instead of 1 packet-time in the model).
Each experiment run lasted for about one million packet-time, and the average of 10 runs
is reported. The 90% confidence intervals were smaller than 2% of the average reported at
each data point.
For all the tests, as can be seen from the figures, the model matched the simulation
results almost exactly for most of the studied parameter range.
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Figure 27: Effect of number of communication and attack radios on blocking probability;
12 channels.
Effect of number of communication and attack radios. In the first set of experi-
ments, the number of radios per communication node was varied, and the number of attack
radios was changed to match the number of communication radios. As shown in Fig. 27,
as more radios per node are used, the blocking probability decreases. A notable difference
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between simulation results and the model occurred in the deceptive defense strategy against
both attack strategies (the bottom two graphs in Fig. 27) when the number of radios is
very close to the number of channels (12 channels in this experiment). I hypothesize that
this discrepancy occurs as channel hopping occurs more frequently (many radios with less
room to escape) and the effect of the non-zero hopping delay (compared to 0 delay in the
model) becomes more pronounced. In particular, the non-zero hopping delay results in de-
synchronization of the attack radios, so that they do not jam at the same time, and thus,
cannot block communication (i.e., the blocking probability is zero).
Another point where simulation results differed from the model prediction is the bump
in straightforward defense against exploratory attack (top-left graph in Fig. 27). In the
straightforward-exploratory combination, the blocking probability is predicted by the model
to increase to 0.5 at 6 radios2. This bump occurs at a number of radios exactly half of
the number of channels. The reason is that at this number the system alternates between
all radios being jammed in one time slot followed by all radios free in the next and so on.
This alternation happens because on each time slot, the only option for communication
(attack) radios is to hop to the other half of channels. I hypothesize that this bump did
not occur in the simulations because the non-zero hopping delay breaks this synchronized
alternation. This alternation is not predicted in conservative attack (and deceptive defense)
because conservative attack (deceptive defense) radios have the option of choosing their next
channels from the ones they currently use.
Effect of number of channels. In the second experiment, the total number of channels
was varied while fixing the number of radios and attackers at three. Fig. 28 shows that, as
expected, with more channels the blocking probability decreased except for the bump in
the straightforward defense (in the model only as explained above) at a number of channels
twice the number of radios. The straightforward defense exhibits superior performance at
low number of channels (except for the critical number of twice the number of radios).
Effect of number of attack radios. In the third experiment, the number of attack
radios was varied while fixing the number of communication radios at three and the number
2A similar bump can also be observed in Fig. 28 (top-left graph) at 6 channels; the number of radios per
node was 3 in that experiment.
91
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Number of channels
strtfwd. defense against expl. attack
sim.
model
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Number of channels
strtfwd. defense against cons. attack
sim.
model
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Number of channels
decpt. defense against expl. attack
sim.
model
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Number of channels
decpt. defense against cons. attack
sim.
model
Figure 28: Effect of number of channels on blocking probability; 3 radios.
of channels at 12. As expected, the blocking probability increases with increasing number
of attack radios. The straightforward defense achieves slightly better performance at high
number of attackers.
Simulation results differed significantly from model prediction at high number of at-
tackers in the deceptive defense. At high number of attackers, deceptive radios hop more
frequently, emphasizing the effect of the non-zero hopping delay. This discrepancy was not
as pronounced in the straightforward defense; straightforward radios escape from jamming
slightly better, and, thus, they experience less hopping. The model is otherwise a little more
conservative than the simulation results, predicting higher blocking probability in most cases.
In summary, the exploratory-scanning attack causes more damage in all cases, and the
straightforward-reactive defense is more effective than the deceptive defense.
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Figure 29: Effect of number of attack radios on blocking probability; 3 communication
radios and 12 channels.
5.2.4 The Honeybees Adaptive Algorithm
The number of attack radios cannot always be known beforehand. The honeybees algorithm
uses the models developed in §5.2.2 to discover the number of attack radios and adjust
the ECC parameters accordingly to achieve the best goodput. Periodically, the goodput
is measured and fed into the models to predict the number of attack radios. This can be
visualized as a horizontal line at the measured goodput value. The x-value of the intersection
of this line with the model curve of the currently used ECC parameters is used as an estimate
of the actual number of attack radios, which is then used in a feedback loop to adjust the
ECC parameters optimally.
To illustrate the operation of the algorithm, an experiment was conducted, whereby
the ECC parameters were varied, in particular the number of encoded data pieces required
to recover from errors. The straightforward-reactive defense and the exploratory-scanning
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attack were simulated, because the simulation results above indicate that these strategies
are superior for defense and attack, respectively.
Fig. 30 shows goodput results for 3 communication radios, 12 channels. The number of
attack radios was varied to examine the effect of attack parameters on the optimal ECC. It
can be observed that the best ECC depends on the number of attackers. This dependency
is predicted by the models in §5.2.2 and confirmed by simulation. Up to 6 attack radios,
(3, 2) ECC achieved the best goodput (as a ratio of the maximum throughput in absence
of jamming). With more than 6 radios, full-replication, or (3, 1) ECC, achieved the highest
goodput.
Consider that the ECC used is (3, 2), and the goodput is measured as 0.4 of the maximum
achievable throughput. Then, from the (3, 2) ECC (model) curve in Fig. 30, the number of
attack radios can be estimated as 5. Because the (3, 2) ECC is still optimal at 5 attack radios,
the algorithm causes no change in ECC parameters. However, if the goodput is measured as
< 0.2, the number of attack radios is estimated as > 7, and the algorithm changes the ECC
to (3, 1).
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Figure 30: The best ECC redundancy depends on the number of attack radios. 3 commu-
nication radios, 12 channels, straightforward defense against exploratory attack.
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5.2.5 Summary
This section presented the honeybees algorithm, which combines the software-based channel
hopping with error-correcting codes (ECC). The problem of maximizing network goodput is
defined, and the inter-dependency between ECC redundancy and jamming-induced blocking
probability is illustrated, suggesting the existence of an optimal ECC redundancy. The
optimal ECC depends not only on system parameters, such as the number of radio interfaces
and radio channels, but also on the defense hopping strategy, number of attackers, and attack
hopping strategy.
Models were developed for reactive defense strategies against scanning attack strategies
under varying ECC parameters. These models compute the blocking probability given the
attack and defense hopping strategies, the number of channels, communication radios, and
attack radios. The models were validated using simulation experiments. The honeybees
algorithm uses these models to detect attack parameters, if unknown, from measured block-
ing probability and known defense and system parameters and adaptively adjust the ECC
parameters on the fly as attack parameters change. The implementation and evaluation of
honeybees are subjects of future work.
5.3 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents the honeybees dodging algorithm, which integrates channel-hopping
and error-correcting codes (ECC) to mitigate the wireless jamming attack in multi-radio
networks.Two channel-hopping strategies, namely proactive and reactive, were compared:
analytically in the context of single-radio networks and using a combination of simulation
and game-theoretic analysis in the context of multi-radio networks. Results show that the
reactive strategy achieves better jamming resiliency for most of the space of system and
attack parameters. Results also show that the scanning attack causes more damage than
the sweeping attack. Therefore, the combination of reactive defense against scanning attack
is studied further, and an adaptive algorithm that is based on a Markov-Chain model is
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devised to detect the number of jammers and successfully adjust the redundancy of the ECC
to achieve efficient operation.
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6.0 IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICE-LEVEL DOS ATTACKERS
IN THE INTERNET
The dodging framework proposed in this dissertation provides tools and techniques to mit-
igate DoS attacks and to identify DoS attackers. In the previous chapter, the mitigation
component has been presented and studied in the context of wireless networks. In many
situations, mitigation is the only solution against a radio-interference DoS attack. Even if
attackers are identified, it is hard to prevent them from sending interfering radio signals
into the shared medium. On the other hand, Internet sites have more control over traffic
that enters their networks. For instance, they can employ packet filtering to stop traffic
from identified attackers. For this reason, attacker identification (the second component of
dodging) plays a more important role in DoS defense in the Internet than its role in wireless
networks. I thus devise and study attacker identification in the context of Internet services.
This chapter presents two algorithms to identify non-compliant and compliant attackers.
In §6.1, the roaming honeypots algorithm for identifying non-compliant attackers is pre-
sented and evaluated. Roaming honeypots defines the mapping between clients and physical
servers. Roaming honeypots provides attack mitigation as well. As was described in §4.3,
identification of compliant attackers needs much more resources than can be physically pro-
visioned, and thus, roaming honeypots is limited in this regard. §6.2 presents the live baiting
algorithm, which combines virtual resources and group-testing theory (§2.3) to identify com-
pliant attackers.
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Figure 31: The part of the DoS problem space addressed by the roaming honeypots al-
gorithm. Roaming honeypots provides identification of non-compliant attackers as well as
mitigation against compliant and non-compliant attackers.
6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF NON-COMPLIANT DOS ATTACKERS
As illustrated in Fig. 31, the roaming honeypots algorithm achieves identification of non-
compliant attackers and attack mitigation. The roaming honeypots algorithm defines the
mapping function µ between service users and servers such that the set of active servers
continuously changes in a pseudo-random way. More specifically, time is divided into epochs,
and during each epoch the algorithm ensures that some servers are active and some idle.
The active and idle servers at each time epoch are determined using a hash chain seeded by
a shared secret between servers and clients as will be described in more detail in §6.1.2.
The mapping function, µ, in roaming honeypots satisfies the properties of the non-
compliant identification component described in §4.3: (non-blocking) all client (except
non-compliant attackers) requests are always sent to the active servers, (uniform) clients
(except non-compliant attackers) distribute their request load evenly over the active servers,
(dynamic) the set of active servers changes from epoch to epoch, (loose) there are idle
servers at each epoch, and (unpredictable) the set of active servers is hard to predict by
non-compliant attackers.
The roaming honeypots algorithm provides an approximation of the function ∆ presented
in Definition 4.1. In roaming honeypots, ∆(σ, τ) returns under attack if resource σ is idle (i.e.,
σ ∈ RτI ) and is being accessed at time instant τ . Otherwise, ∆(σ, τ) returns not attacked.
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6.1.1 Roaming Honeypots Overview
The roaming honeypots algorithm enables the camouflaging of honeypots (see §2.2.2 for more
details about honeypots) as real servers by designating pseudo-randomly-selected, time-
varying subsets of servers to act as honeypots at different time epochs. Honeypots are
camouflaged in two ways. First, the pseudo-random selection makes their addresses highly
unpredictable to non-compliant attackers. Second, the idle servers, which act as honeypots,
respond to requests in a similar way as active servers, to increase the delay that an attacker
would incur to discover them.
Clients (except non-compliant attackers) direct their requests only to active servers away
from the honeypots. Therefore, any client that sends requests to a honeypot is considered
an attacker, and its address is added into a black-list. Requests from identified attackers are
filtered out during subsequent epochs.
Attack mitigation is achieved because roaming opens up windows of opportunity for
requests from clients to get serviced even under attack. These opportunity windows happen
at each roaming event when some servers switch from idle to active. These servers start
“fresh”, that is, with empty service queues, and hence attackers take some time to discover
and exhaust the resources of the newly-activated servers. During these transient intervals,
the compliant requests have a chance to get serviced.
In what follows, the components of the roaming honeypots algorithm are described. The
notation is summarized in Table 5.
6.1.2 Distributed honeypot selection
The first component of the roaming honeypots algorithm is the selection of the honeypots.
Honeypot selection is distributed, that is, it is run at both servers and clients. As noted
earlier, time is divided into epochs with each epoch containing one or more time slots, and
roaming occurs only at epoch boundaries. During each time epoch Ei, ks servers out of
a total of ns servers are pseudo-randomly selected to be active, and the remaining servers
are idle and act as honeypots. To increase unpredictability, epoch lengths are computed
pseudo-randomly as well. For each time epoch Ei, the algorithm uses hash chains to select
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Table 5: Notation of the Roaming Honeypots Algorithm
Symbol Description
S Set of servers
ns |S|
Ei Time epoch i
ri Length of Ei in time slots
m,m+ u Lower and upper bounds on ri
Hi Set of idle servers (honeypots) during Ei
Ai Set of active servers in Ei
ks |Ai|
Pks(S) Set of all subsets of S of size ks
np =
ns
ks
 |Pks(S)|
MSBx(y) The x most-significant bits of y
G,G′, G′′ One-way hash functions
the set of honeypots, Hi, the set of active servers, Ai, and epoch length, ri. A hash chain is
a sequence of pseudo-random numbers, whereby the first number is randomly selected, and
each subsequent number is generated from the previous one using a one-way hash function,
such as SHA-2 [45]. In the algorithm, a long hash chain is generated and used in reverse,
that is, the last number used first, similar to PayWord [121] and TESLA [113].
On the server-side of the algorithm, the first number in the hash chain (last number
to be used), K`, is randomly generated and used to compute a set of roaming keys, Ki =
G`−i(K`), (i < `), where G`−i is the application of the public one-way hash function G
(` − i) times. Then, the set of active servers, Ai, is selected as the subset with index
MSBblgnpc(G
′(Ki)) in Pks(S), where Pks(S) is the set of all subsets of size ks of servers,
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input : S, the server pool; ks, number of active servers
input : Server ID, s
input : One-way hash functions, G, G′, G′′
input : A lower bound, m, and upper bound, m+ u, on epoch length
input : Check-pointing period, Tcheckpoint
Compute Pks(S), set of all subsets of S with size ks;1
Generate a one-way hash chain, K`,K`−1, · · ·,K1 using the one-way hash function G ;2
for i = 1, 2, 3, · · · do3
ri ← m+MSBblg uc(G′′(Ki));4
Ai ← Pks(S)[MSBblg npc(G′(Ki))];5
(active servers) Hi ← S −Ai;6
(idle servers (honeypots)) while in time epoch Ei do7
if s ∈ Hi then8
foreach received request Reqatt do9
Insert into Blacklist the source address of Reqatt;10
Send to all servers the source address of Reqatt;11
Service Reqatt;12
else13
foreach received request Reqreceived do14
if source of Reqreceived ∈ Blacklist then15
Drop Reqreceived;16
else17
Service Reqreceived;18
Every Tcheckpoint seconds do19
foreach active request Reqactive do20
Encapsulate request state in state-update message;21
Send state-update message to the client of Reqactive;22
foreach attacker source address received from other servers do23
Insert the address into Blacklist ;24
if s ∈ Ai then purge all active requests from the received address;25
Algorithm 1: Roaming Honeypots Algorithm at Servers
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input : S, the server pool; ks, number of active servers
input : Service expiration epoch, t
input : One-way hash functions, G, G′, G′′
input : Kt, the key assigned to the client from the server hash chain
input : Start time of epoch p < t, startp
input : A lower bound, m, and upper bound, m+ u, on epoch length.
Compute Pks(S), set of all subsets of S with size ks;1
Generate the hash chain, Kt,Kt−1, · · ·,K1 using the assigned key Kt and the one-way hash2
function G ;
if client has no active requests then3
if new request Reqnew to be sent then4
CurrentEpoch ← arg mine {startp +
∑e
i=p(m+MSBblg uc(G
′′(Ki))) > current time};5
if CurrentEpoch > t then6
Service subscription expired;7
else8
e← CurrentEpoch;9
re ← m+MSBblg uc(G′′(Ke));10
Ae ← Pks(S)[MSBblgnpc(G′(Ke))];11
He ← S −Ae;12
Send Reqnew to a randomly-selected server in Ae;13
RequestStateTable [Reqnew] ← Reqnew;14
while client has active requests do15
for i = CurrentEpoch,CurrentEpoch+ 1, · · ·, t do16
ri ← m+MSBblg uc(G′′(Ki));17
Ai ← Pks(S)[MSBblgnpc(G′(Ki))];18
Hi ← S −Ai;19
foreach active request Reqactive with a server s ∈ Hi do20
Close Reqactive;21
Send RequestStateTable [Reqactive] to a randomly-selected server in Ai;22
while in time epoch Ei do23
foreach new request Reqnew do24
Send Reqnew to a randomly-selected server in Ai;25
RequestStateTable [Reqnew] ← Reqnew ;26
foreach received state-update message for an active request Reqactive do27
RequestStateTable [Reqactive] ← received message;28
Algorithm 2: Roaming Honeypots Algorithm at Clients
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np the cardinality of this set, that is, np = |Pks(S)| =
ns
ks
, G′ another public one-way
hash function, and MSBx(y) the x most significant bits of y. The epoch length is selected
uniformly in the interval [m,m+u] as follows: ri = m+MSBblg uc(G′′(Ki)), where G′′ is also
a one-way hash function, and m and m+u are lower and upper bounds on the epoch length.
These steps correspond to lines 1–6 in Algorithm 1.
On the client-side, clients send their requests only to active servers. To keep track of
active servers, each client is given a roaming key, Kt, from the hash chain and the start time,
startp, of an epoch p < t. When the client wants to send a request, it first determines the
current epoch as the minimum e that satisfies (startp +
∑e
i=p ri) > current time
1, where
each ri is computed using Ki, which is computed in turn from Kt. The client then uses Ke
to compute He, Ae, and re for the current epoch as described in the server-side algorithm.
These steps correspond to lines 1–19 in Algorithm 2.
In a complex distributed system whereby clients vary in their trust level, it may be
desired that a more trusted client controls and delegates service access of less trusted clients.
This trust hierarchy can be easily enforced through the distribution of roaming keys. As
can be noted from the previous discussion, the index of the roaming key assigned to each
client (i.e., t in Kt) determines the client’s subscription duration, because it represents the
last epoch up to which the client can correctly calculate the set of active servers and epoch
lengths. To implement a trust hierarchy, a more trusted client gets a roaming key with a
large key index (say Klarge), effectively granting it a long subscription duration. The trusted
client can then grant access to clients down in the trust hierarchy simply by sending them
roaming keys from its chain (K1 · · ·Kbig), effectively assigning them shorter durations. The
assignment of trust levels is beyond the scope of this work.
6.1.3 Request migration and filtering
When a server switches from active to idle (honeypot), requests from compliant clients are
migrated and resumed on other active servers. The states (e.g., TCP and application states)
1The running time of this procedure is very small compared to the epoch length, so it is possible to safely
assume that the procedure is instantaneous.
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of these requests are migrated from the old to the new server as well. Although more costly,
periodic state updates are preferred over lazy, on-demand updates (refer to §2.2.1 for more
details). This is because of two reasons. First, when the end of the epoch arrives, there is no
guarantee that the old server is alive and available to process state transfer (the server may
be under attack). Second, servers may not know which of their requests are from legitimate
clients, and hence may end up migrating state of requests from non-compliant attackers.
This allows the servers switching from idle to active to start with empty service queues,
creating time-windows for compliant requests to get some service before queue is filled up
with attack requests. Per-request state is pushed to clients using periodic (every Tcheckpoint
seconds) state-update messages (lines 19–22 in Algorithm 1 and lines 27–28 in Algorithm 2),
and clients in turn send the state to the new servers (lines 20–22 in Algorithm 2).
Request filtering. Because clients (except non-compliant attackers) direct their re-
quests only to active servers, a request received by a honeypot is considered malicious. The
requester’s IP address is added into a black-list (lines 8–12 in Algorithm 1) made available
to all servers so that no more requests are accepted from that source (lines 14–16 and lines
23–25 in Algorithm 1).
As common with many distributed systems, loose clock synchronization between clients
and servers is assumed [92]. To accommodate this loose clock synchronization and to ensure
proper handling of in-transit compliant requests, switching from idle to active and vice versa
is not done instantly but over a transitional period instead. In other words, each server
switching from idle to active starts accepting requests a little earlier than scheduled. Also,
each server switching from active to idle, starts assuming the role of a honeypot a little later
than scheduled to accommodate in-transit requests as well. During the transitional period,
all requests are serviced (except from previously blacklisted attackers).
6.1.4 Roaming Honeypots Evaluation
I have studied the performance and overhead of the roaming honeypots algorithm using both
a prototype implementation on a FreeBSD cluster and NS-2 [5] simulation2. The purpose
2The simulation study was conducted mainly by Chatree Sangpachatanaruk.
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of the study is to determine the efficacy of roaming honeypots in identifying non-compliant
attackers and mitigating attacks. The following describes the main results.
6.1.4.1 Results from Prototype System The first set of results is from a prototype
of a roaming file-transfer service that has been developed and tested in a FreeBSD network.
Fig. 32 depicts the topology used in the experiment reported below. Six PII machines
running FreeBSD 4.5 were used, and two of them were configured as routers. The server
machines (S1 and S2) ran a simplified version of Algorithm 1 with fixed-length epochs and
without request filtering. When an active server receives a roaming trigger, it drops all its
connections. A server does not accept incoming connections unless it is the current active
server. On the client machine C, client processes were launched, each running a simplified
version of Algorithm 2 also with fixed-length epochs. Each client process holds the number
of bytes received so far, and upon receiving a roaming trigger, each client drops current
connections and establishes new ones with the new server to resume the transfer.
R1 R2
C
A
S1
S2
2 Mbps
2 Mbps
2 Mbps
Figure 32: Network topology of an experiment using a roaming honeypots prototype.
The experiment compared plain replication, whereby request load is balanced over two
servers, with roaming honeypots with one active server and without request filtering. The
active server roamed every 60 seconds between two servers. The goal was to assess the level
of mitigation achieved by the algorithm and to show that roaming honeypots achieves better
attack mitigation than plain replication even without the request filtering component. The
performance metric was the average client response time, or the average time needed to
download a file. The overhead at peace (no-attack) time was also studied. Machine C issued
20 file requests with exponential inter-arrival times with a mean of 8 seconds. Each request
was for a file of size 1 MBytes, taking about 4 seconds in an unloaded network (the bottleneck
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Figure 33: Average response time for replication and roaming without attack.
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Figure 34: Average response time of individual requests against massive and follow attacks.
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Figure 35: Effect of follow delay on average response time for roaming against follow attack.
is the 2Mbps link between routers R1 and R2). Thus, the client load was about 50%. Machine
A, the attacker, issued file requests with exponential inter-arrival times with a mean of 1
second for a duration of 5 minutes. The attacker launched massive and follow attacks (see
Chapter 3) with the follow delay varied from 0 to 60 seconds. Because the active server
changed every 60 seconds, the 60-second follow delay resulted in that the attacker always
attacked the wrong server, whereas the zero follow delay represented a compliant attacker
(the attacker always attacked the active server).
Under no attack, roaming caused an increase of about 14% in average response time
over replication (Fig. 33). In Fig. 34, the average response time of individual requests is
plotted for replication and roaming against massive attack and for roaming against follow
attack. It shows that roaming managed to lower the average response time under attack,
as compared to plain replication. However, the massive attack caused more damaged than
the follow attack. Under follow attack (Fig. 35), roaming achieved an average response
time that ranged from about 50% (at zero follow delay) to about 10% (at 60-second follow
delay) of the average response time with replication under massive attack. That is, roaming
outperformed plain replication even with zero follow delay. Error bars in the figures represent
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90% confidence intervals.
Attack mitigation results from the fact that attack requests have a delay with each
roaming event until they congested the new server’s request-processing queue. During these
opportunity time-windows, compliant client requests got a higher share of the server com-
pared to load-balanced connections, which were stuck at congested servers. The length of
these time windows increases with increasing follow delay.
6.1.4.2 Simulation Results A simulation study using the NS-2 [5] simulator has been
conducted to assess the performance and overhead of the roaming honeypots algorithm [77,
78]. Three schemes were compared: Roaming Honeypots (RH), Server Roaming (SR), and
plain load-balancing (Replication). The SR scheme is the same as RH but without attacker
identification, and as such it shows the mitigation effectiveness of roaming honeypots. In
what follows, epoch length is fixed, and two honeypots (ns − ks = 2) out of five (ns = 5)
total servers are designated at each epoch.
Fig. 36 depicts the simulated network topology, which is generated using the GT-ITM
topology generator [27] and is composed of five servers, each on a separate stub network,
thirty-four legitimate clients, and ten attackers. The authenticator is responsible for sending
roaming keys to clients. The links are assigned the following capacities: 1 Mb/s for intra-
stub links (e.g., links incident on each server) and 10 Mb/s for all inter-stub links. The 1
and 10 Mb/s link speeds were chosen to model the relative speed of access and backbone
links.
In all experiments, clients and attackers request files of size 1 Mbits each. For each
request, a server is picked uniformly at random out of the five servers to receive the request.
The request inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed. Both client and attack loads
are measured in requested bits per second. For example, a load of 2.4 Mbps corresponds to
requesting 2.4 files per second on average. Attackers launch a massive attack (see §3.1) by
flooding all the five servers.
Effect of Attack Load. Fig. 37 shows that RH kept the Average client Response Time
(ART) stable with increasing Attack Loads (AL) for a fixed number of attack nodes (ten in
this experiment). This is because once the attack nodes were detected, their requests were
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Figure 36: Simulation topology for the roaming honeypots algorithm.
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Figure 37: Effect of attack load on average response time of the roaming honeypots algo-
rithm; two honeypots out of five servers and ten attackers.
filtered out, and the attack had no impact. The ART even slightly decreased with increasing
attack load because of faster attacker identification: the higher the load (with fixed number
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of attackers), the faster attack requests are issued and received by idle servers (honeypots),
which add the request sources to the blacklist. For Replication, distributing the load on all
the servers helped in the case of low attack loads, but ART steeply increased with increasing
attack load. For SR, ART increased with increasing attack load, because the length of the
opportunity windows that roaming created decreased with increasing attack load.
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Figure 38: Effect of epoch length on average response time of the roaming honeypots
algorithm; two honeypots out of five servers and ten attackers.
Effect of Epoch Length. As Fig. 38 shows, there is a critical value of epoch length
that struck a good balance between roaming benefit and overhead (30 seconds for RH, at
AL=2.7 Mb/s). For epoch lengths below the critical value, roaming overhead was dominant;
as the epoch length increased while still below the critical value, the frequency of connection
re-establishment and slow start decreased, resulting in a decreasing ART. As the epoch
length increased beyond the critical value, the ART increased. The reason is two-fold: First,
as roaming happened less frequently, less opportunity windows were opened. Second, the
larger the epoch length, the more client requests that were received during each epoch and
the more client requests that migrated into new servers, diluting the effect of opportunity
windows among them. Finally, the optimal value of epoch length depends on a combination
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of parameters, such as attack load, client load, and average service time.
6.1.5 Conclusions
Honeypots, proposed elsewhere, are deployed to trap attackers. However, honeypots can be
avoided by DoS attackers because of their fixed and detectable locations, and because they
are typically deployed on machines with no production value. Roaming honeypots is a novel
algorithm for mitigating DoS attacks and identifying the attackers, whereby honeypots are
disguised within the protected server pool. In a sense, the roaming honeypots algorithm
integrates plain service replication and honeypots in a defense mechanism that is more
effective than each of its components alone. At any point of time, a subset of servers is
active and provides service while the rest are acting as honeypots to capture attack requests,
record and distribute their source addresses, and filter attack requests issued from these
sources. A distributed, randomized algorithm has been developed for changing the active
servers and allowing only compliant clients to follow them.
Through NS-2 simulations and a prototype implementation, the effectiveness and feasi-
bility of roaming honeypots against service-level DoS attacks have been demonstrated. As
compared to plain replication, roaming honeypots shows a performance gain under the more
realistic scenarios of high attack loads. In another piece of work, I have extended roaming
honeypots to handle attacks with spoofed source addresses [71, 72].
A mechanism that adaptively changes the number of active servers depending on attack
and client loads is a fertile subject of future work. Also mechanisms to smooth out client
request arrivals on current active servers to reduce connection migrating and request flocking
into new servers are worth further investigation.
6.2 IDENTIFICATION OF COMPLIANT DOS ATTACKERS
The second scheme that achieves attacker identification within the dodging framework is
referred to as live baiting, which accurately and efficiently identifies service-level DoS at-
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Figure 39: The part of the DoS problem space addressed by the live baiting algorithm. Live
baiting provides identification of compliant attackers.
tackers among clients of a public service. Live baiting divides the service capacity into
virtual servers, called buckets, whereby each virtual server is isolated and individually mon-
itored. The algorithm employs group testing (refer to §2.3 for more details) to carefully
design client assignment to buckets to enable efficient pinpointing of DoS attackers with low
false positive and almost zero false negative probabilities.
As illustrated in Fig. 39, the live baiting algorithm achieves identification of compliant
attackers. The live baiting algorithm defines the mapping function µ between service users
and buckets, such that the set of active buckets continuously changes in a pseudo-random
way, and users are assigned to buckets in such a way to facilitate attacker identification.
The mapping function in live baiting satisfies the properties of the compliant identification
component (§4.3)3: (non-blocking) all client requests are always sent to active buckets,
(uniform) clients distribute their request load evenly over the active buckets, (dynamic)
the set of active buckets changes from epoch to epoch, (loose) there are always some idle
buckets at each epoch, (unpredictable) the set of active buckets is hard to predict by
non-compliant attackers, and (d-unique) the group-testing theory is used to achieve the
d-uniqueness property as will be described shortly.
The live baiting algorithm provides an approximation of the function ∆ presented in
3Against service-level attacks, the live baiting algorithm can be used instead of the roaming honeypots
algorithm (§6.1); live baiting identifies both compliant and non-compliant attackers and mitigates their
attacks. However, against attacks that bypass the “bucket-layer” and attack the physical servers directly
(e.g., link-level packet-flooding attacks studied in [72]), roaming honeypots provides protection that is not
available using live baiting alone.
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Definition 4.1. In live baiting, ∆(σ, τ) returns under attack if resource σ is active (i.e., σ ∈
RτA) and its incoming request load exceeds its request-processing capacity at τ
4. Otherwise,
∆(σ, τ) returns not attacked.
6.2.1 Live Baiting Overview
As mentioned earlier, the service capacity is divided into a number of virtual servers, or
buckets. Each client receives from the service a set of tokens that are valid to access only a
set of buckets assigned to the client. The client then sends its requests to the buckets assigned
to it. To prevent attackers from accessing buckets other than those assigned to them, the
tokens are securely generated and checked at the servers so that forged tokens/requests are
dropped.
The theory of group testing is used to decide the set of buckets assigned to each client
with the goal of identifying the DoS attackers amongst the service clients. The following
illustrates the mapping from the group-testing theory domain to the DoS-attacker detection
domain.
Service clients correspond to the population and DoS attackers are the defective members
that we seek to detect. As described in §2.3, a group testing design is represented as a binary
matrix with rows corresponding to tests and columns to population members. Buckets
are mapped to the tests or the matrix rows, and clients are mapped to matrix columns.
Each client is given tokens for each 1-bit in its column, allowing it to send requests to the
corresponding buckets. Clients piggyback a token on each request they send, so that requests
are credited to the corresponding buckets.
Periodically, the number of requests sent to each bucket is counted. If that number
exceeds a High Water Mark (HWM), the test result corresponding to the overflowed bucket
is labeled as positive, meaning that the clients assigned to the overflowed bucket contain at
least one DoS attacker. Another alternative is to count the number of requests dropped in
each bucket. This alternative is further explored in §6.2.5.2. The detection algorithm (in
§2.3) is then used to identify the attackers.
4This information is only available at the boundaries of the detection periods (see §6.2.1).
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Table 6: Live Baiting Terminology
Symbol Description
FP false positive probability
FN false negative probability
nt number of buckets
HWM high water mark of buckets
P length of detection interval
d initial estimate of the number of attackers
nx actual number of attackers
Battackers number of buckets attacked
6.2.2 Live Baiting at Servers and Clients
The building blocks of the live baiting algorithm at the servers and clients are described.
Buckets and Tokens. The algorithm virtually divides the service capacity, ρ, into nt
buckets, where each bucket is implemented as a virtual server (e.g., a sub-queue in a fair
queuing system [128]). Given an upper bound, nc, on the total number of clients and an
initial estimate of the number of attackers, d, a T ×N binary matrix is constructed in which
an entry is 1 with probability 1
d+1
and 0 otherwise. The matrix depth, T , is determined
based on the required false positive probability according to Eqn. 2.2.
Each client is assigned one column in the matrix and is given one token for each 1-bit
in its column. A token is a tuple 〈i, version, hash(i, version,Kserver)〉 that contains the row
index i, the matrix version (to allow for matrix updates as will be described in §6.2.3), and
a secure hash of length at least 160-bits computed using a secure hash function, such as
SHA-2 [45]. The input to the hash function is the row number, the matrix version, and a
server secret, Kserver, of length at least 80-bits, which is changed periodically (e.g., every
day) with the matrix version incremented correspondingly.
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input : An upper bound, nc, on total number of clients
input : An initial estimate, d, of number of attackers
input : The required false positive probability, FP
input : The server secret, Kserver
input : Detection period, P
Compute the number of tests, nt, needed to achieve FP using Eqn. 2.2 with p =
1
d+1
;1
Generate a nt × nc binary matrix, M , with Pr{Mij = 1} = 1d+1 ;2
Compute the High Water Mark for each bucket, HWM , using Eqn. 6.1.3
foreach matrix row i from 1 to nt do4
BucketCounter [i] ← 0;5
foreach matrix column j from 1 to N do6
ClientAddress [j] ← nil;7
MatrixVersion ← 0;8
foreach token-request message from client address c do9
if c ∈ ClientAddress then10
Find j such that ClientAddress [j]= c;11
else12
Find the first j s.t. ClientAddress [j]= nil;13
ClientAddress [j] ← c;14
foreach 1-bit Mij in column j do15
Token ← 〈i,MatrixVersion,SecureHash(i, MatrixVersion, Kserver) 〉;16
Send Token to client;17
foreach service-request from client c with token 〈i, version, hashi〉 do18
if c ∈ Block-list then19
Drop request;20
Continue;21
if version 6= MatrixVersion then22
Send a token-request message on behalf of client c;23
Continue;24
if SecureHash(i, version, Kserver) 6= hashi then25
Insert c into Block-list ;26
Continue;27
BucketCounter [i]++;28
if BucketCounter [i] > HWM then29
Service the request with low priority;30
else31
Service the request with high priority;32
Every P seconds do33
Set SuspectList ← all clients in ClientAddress ;34
foreach row i s.t. BucketCounter [i] ≤ HWM do35
foreach column j s.t. Mij = 1 do36
Remove ClientAddress [j] from SuspectList ;37
Insert SuspectList into Block-list ;38
foreach matrix row i from 1 to nt do39
BucketCounter [i] ← 0;40
Algorithm 3: Live Baiting at Servers
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The secure token generation described above prevents attackers from generating valid
tokens on their own. If they were to achieve that, they would have been able to attack
buckets other than the ones assigned to them, and the detection scheme would have failed to
detect them. The probability of successfully guessing a valid token value is nt
280
, where nt is
the number of valid tokens, and 80 is the server secret length. This probability is very low;
even in a matrix designed to identify one million attackers, the number of buckets is about
20 million ' 225, yielding a successful bucket guessing probability of 1
255
' 10−16.
Although tokens are available to all clients that request them (including attackers), each
client is limited to a single column in the matrix. Enforcing this limit can be done using
Bloom filters as in the Kill-Bots system [64] and the sample-and-hold algorithm [44]. Note
that these algorithms cannot be readily used to enforce usage limits in a general service,
which requires more complex models of legitimate or anomalous behavior [120].
High Water Mark (HWM). To decide whether or not a bucket is under attack, a
threshold on the number of received requests is used. This threshold is called the High
Water Mark (HWM) of a bucket. A bucket is assumed under attack if the number of
received requests exceeds its HWM . The HWM value is set to the number of requests each
bucket is expected to receive in a detection interval of length P seconds, assuming that all
its clients are legitimate. Each legitimate client is expected to send r · P requests every P
seconds, distributed uniformly over its assigned buckets (on average, nt
d+1
buckets per client).
Also, clients are distributed uniformly over the buckets; each bucket has on average nc
d+1
clients assigned to it. Thus, buckets are expected to receive the same number of requests
every P seconds. This number can be computed as follows: nc
d+1
· r · P · d+1
nt
= nc·r·P
nt
= ρ·P
nt
requests. Thus,
HWM =
ρ · P
nt
(6.1)
For each bucket, only HWM requests out of the received requests are serviced at a high
priority, and the rest are serviced at a lower priority. Low priority requests are dropped first
when the servers are overloaded. Note that, in the worst case, all the high-priority HWM
requests are attack requests.
Detection. Every P seconds, the following detection algorithm is run. If a bucket has
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received more than HWM requests in the previous P seconds, the corresponding test is
marked as positive. The detection algorithm starts with all clients in a suspects list, and
for each negative test, the clients assigned to the corresponding bucket are removed from
the list. The order in which the buckets (tests) are checked does not make a difference in
the algorithm outcome. According to the attack model, if these clients were attackers, they
would have caused all their assigned buckets to exceed theirHWM (in §6.2.4 this assumption
is relaxed). The rest of the suspects list are labeled as attackers and are added to a block-list
to drop their future requests.
Note that an orthogonal mechanism is needed to remove clients from the suspects list due
to false positives (if any) or due to node recovery from intrusion. However, such a mechanism
is orthogonal to this work and is not investigated further.
Request Filtering. When a request arrives at a server with a token 〈i, version, hashi〉,
the server drops the request if it is from an attacker already detected (in the block-list). The
server also checks whether the token has expired by checking its version against the current
matrix version. If the token has expired, the server drops the request and sends to the client
a new set of tokens. Otherwise, if the token is current, the server checks its validity by
comparing the secure hash of (i, version,Kserver) with the received hashi. If they differ, the
client sending the token is inserted into the block-list. Clearly, checking the token validity
is a quick operation and can be made even quicker by reducing the size of the secret key,
but with a higher probability of illegal token generation. Request filtering at the servers is
depicted in Fig. 40.
Mapping Buckets into Physical Servers. Each physical server maintains counters
for all the buckets, and it increments the corresponding counters for each request it processes.
These local counters contain partial counts because requests of a particular bucket may be
serviced by more than one server. Each server securely sends its bucket counters to a central
detection server at the ISP, which in turn runs the detection algorithm and updates the block-
list. Requests are mapped to the physical servers using a variety of mapping functions, such
as load-balancing and session-based routing (requests in the same session are routed to the
same server to maintain session integrity). Live baiting is orthogonal to the request-mapping
strategy, because its operation relies only on maintaining the bucket counters. Live baiting
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Figure 40: Request Filtering at the Servers in the Live Baiting Algorithm.
is also independent of the number of servers.
Live Baiting at Clients. Each client receives a set of tokens and piggybacks one token
on each request it sends to the server. The client uses its tokens in a round-robin fashion.
Attackers also use this algorithm to overflow all their assigned buckets; in §6.2.4, other attack
strategies are considered.
6.2.3 Adaptive Live Baiting
Live baiting relies on an estimate, d, of the number of attackers, which may be different than
the actual number of attackers, nx. Overestimation yields better FP but causes unnecessarily
high storage and computational overhead (see §6.2.5.1) when the actual attacker number is
much less than estimated. On the other hand, an underestimate causes FP to increase
beyond its target value. The live baiting algorithm can adapt to a number of attackers
different than the estimated one by detecting the discrepancy and changing its parameters
accordingly as follows.
When nx 6= d, the false positive probability from Eqn. 2.1 on Page 27 becomes:
FP = [1− 1
d+ 1
(1− 1
d+ 1
)nx ]nt (6.2)
where nt is the number of buckets. Eqn. 6.2 is plotted in Fig. 41(a), with the number
of buckets set using Eqn. 2.2 so that FP = 10−3. The actual number of attackers, nx,
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Figure 41: Effect of underestimating and overestimating the number of attackers in the
live baiting algorithm. (a) As the estimate of number of attackers increases, false positive
probability decreases. (b) An overestimate of the number of attackers improves the false
positive probability. However, an unnecessarily large estimate results in unnecessarily high
overhead. (c) An underestimate of the number of attackers is detected when a high per-
centage of buckets get attacked. d is the estimate of the # attackers used in generating the
matrix.
is varied for different values for the estimate d. For a fixed actual number of attackers,
corresponding to a vertical line in the figure, the false positive probability decreases as the
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estimate increases. This trend can also be seen in Fig. 41(b), which plots Eqn. 6.2 for values
of nx less than d. On the other hand, Fig. 41(c) (left y-axis) plots the same equation with
values of nx greater than d, in which case the target FP of 10
−3 is no longer maintained.
Detection of inaccurate estimate. An important observation is that the number of
attacked buckets reflects the discrepancy between actual and estimated number of attackers.
Indeed, the average number of buckets assigned to nx attackers is:
Battackers = nt(1− (1− 1
d+ 1
)nx)
' nt(1− 1
e
) as d = nx →∞
' 0.63nt (6.3)
In the above equation (1 − 1
d+1
)nx is the probability that a particular bucket has no
attackers assigned to it. Thus, 1 − (1 − 1
d+1
)nx is the fraction of buckets to which at least
one attacker is assigned, and thus, the bucket is “acquired” by attackers.
The mechanism that live baiting uses to adaptively set the estimate d as close to the
actual number of attackers nx as possible starts with an initial value for d. When an attack
is detected, the system calculates an estimate of the actual number of attackers from the
observed percentage of attacked buckets (tests with positive result), Battackers. Fortunately,
Battackers can be used to detect the case nx > d. To illustrate, Eqn. 6.3 is used to plot
the expected percentage of attacked buckets (right y-axis in Fig. 41(c)) against the actual
number of attackers. As derived in the equation, when nx = d, this percentage is 63%.
However, as nx increases beyond d, the fraction of attacked buckets increases. This is
because now 1
d+1
is constant relative to nx, the number 1− 1d+1 is < 1, and as nx increases,
(1− 1
d+1
)nx decreases and 1− (1− 1
d+1
)nx increases.
This increase triggers the system to increase the estimate of the number of attackers to
dˆ:
dˆ =
log(1− Battackers
nt
)
log(1− 1
d+1
)
, Battackers < nt (6.4)
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where Battackers is the observed number of attacked buckets. As shown in Fig. 41(c),
Battackers = nt when nx ≥ 5d. Thus, dˆ is set to 5d when all buckets are attacked. The
above formula is derived from Eqn. 6.3 by taking the logarithm of both sides and solving for
nx.
Matrix regeneration. Once a new estimate, dˆ, is calculated, if it is larger or much
smaller (d − dˆ >threshold5) than the current estimate (d), a new matrix is generated with
the new estimate, and the number of buckets is updated according to Eqn. 2.2 to maintain
the target FP . The matrix version is incremented every time the matrix is regenerated.
Tokens with versions older than the current version are dropped, and clients are assigned
new tokens as described in §6.2.2.
Extension to the general group-testing theory. This adaptive mechanism is readily
useful in the general group-testing domain, particularly when an estimate of the number of
defective members is not known. This can be illustrated by the following example. Consider
a population with 10, 000 defective members. One can start with a probing set of tests
to discover the number of defective members. Let’s start with a matrix that is designed
based on an estimate of 1, 000 defective members. Using Eqn. 2.2 with a target false positive
probability of 0.001, the number of tests needed for probing is 20, 000 roughly. From Eqn. 6.3,
all the tests will yield a negative result. This can be also observed in Fig. 41(c) at x = 10d.
Another set of probing tests is then conducted, but with an estimate of 5, 000 defective
members. The number of tests in this second set is roughly 100, 000, and about 87% of
the tests produce negative results. Using Eqn. 6.4 yields the actual number of defective
members.
6.2.4 Extensions to the Simple Service and Attack Models
In this subsection, extensions to the live baiting algorithm are presented to handle multiple
service classes and more intelligent attackers.
Handling Different Types of Services. In the previous discussion, the focus was
on a server providing one service class. The system capacity in handling this service, ρ, is
5Setting the matrix regeneration threshold is a trade-off between state overhead and matrix regeneration
overhead. Investigation of this trade-off is subject of future work.
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divided into virtual buckets which were assigned to clients based on the group testing theory.
The simple model of one service can be easily generalized to the case when the system is
supporting different types of services (e.g., HTML, CGI, video download, etc.) each with
a different service time. For each class i of service provided, the service has a certain
aggregate request-processing capacity, ρi requests per second. Each ρi is then divided into
virtual buckets and these are assigned to clients based on the client-token assignment matrix
for group testing.
In other words, to generalize the case of one service to multiple service classes, simply
repeat the same procedure for each service class. This can be simply implemented as follows.
(1) Use the live baiting algorithm (see §6.2.2) to assign to each client a list of tokens, the
same list of tokens that would have been assigned to that client for a single-class service.
(2) When a request arrives at the server, based on the service type, the color of the token
piggybacked with the request is determined (i.e., the server colors the request on the fly).
(3) Enqueue the request to the right virtual bucket based on the token and the token color.
By implementing this coloring scheme, attacks on the different service classes are isolated.
Relaxing the Maximum-Damage Attack Assumption. In the previous discus-
sion, a massive attack was assumed, that is, attackers attack all buckets assigned to them.
Although this attack scheme causes the maximum damage to the service (i.e., maximum
number of dropped requests), a more intelligent attacker might choose to attack only a sub-
set of the assigned buckets. In this case the attacker will be cleared (removed from the list
of suspects) for some of the buckets, and hence, evades detection (recall that the detection
algorithm removes a client from the suspects list when at least one bucket assigned to the
client is not attacked). To model this intelligent attack, assume that each attacker attacks
each assigned bucket with an attack probability (ρattack). The false negative probability is no
longer zero in this case:
FN = 1− [1− 1
d+ 1
(1− ρattack)(1− 1
d+ 1
· ρattack)d−1]nt
In the above equation, 1
d+1
(1.0 − ρattack)(1 − 1d+1 · ρattack)d−1 is the probability that a
particular bucket is assigned to a particular attacker and ends up attack free. Note that
using the above equation, FN = 0 when ρattack = 1 as expected. On the other hand, the
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number of attacked buckets, and hence, the damage caused by the attack, is reduced to:
Battackers = nt(1− (1− 1
d+ 1
· ρattack)d) (6.5)
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Figure 42: Effect of attack probability (ρattack) on the damage caused by the attack in live
baiting. d = 100.
Fig. 42 plots the fraction of attacked buckets (Battackers
nt
) at d = 100. It shows that this
fraction decreases, and hence, the amount of damage caused by the attack is reduced, with
decreasing attack probability.
This attack is feasible because attackers control which buckets receive their requests by
attaching particular tokens to requests. If the assignment of requests to buckets is controlled
solely by the servers, this attack is not possible. However, removing the client control requires
the servers to look up the matrix for each request to assign it to one of the requesting client’s
buckets. Although the matrix size may be manageable, it is still proportional to the number
of clients. Investigation of how to remove client control over bucket assignment is a subject
of future research.
Meanwhile, live baiting deals with this attack by clearing the client with a clearing
probability (ρalgo) for each of the client’s assigned buckets that is found to be not attacked.
In other words, the algorithm excludes a client from the suspects list if “enough” buckets
assigned to the client are not attacked, instead of just one bucket. The false positive (FP )
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Figure 43: Effect of clearing probability (ρalgo) on the false positive and false negative prob-
abilities in live baiting. d = 100.
and false negative (FN) probabilities in this case are as follows.
FP = [1− 1
d+ 1
(1− 1
d+ 1
· ρattack)d · ρalgo]nt (6.6)
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FN = 1.0− [1− 1
d+ 1
(1.0− ρattack)· (6.7)
(1− 1
d+ 1
· ρattack)d−1 · ρalgo]nt
The algorithm sets the clearing probability to a fixed value that achieves acceptable
false positive and false negative probabilities assuming a lower bound on ρattack. The lower
bound on ρattack is determined based on the amount of damage (number of attacked buckets)
that can be mitigated. Fig. 43 (note the two y-axes) shows the effect of changing ρalgo
when ρattack = 0.9 and 0.5, respectively. For comparison, the false positive rate at attack
probability of 1.0 is also plotted.
6.2.5 Live Baiting Evaluation
Theoretical and simulation analyses have been conducted to evaluate three aspects of live
baiting: (a) coverage; (b) effectiveness: detection time, false positive and false negative
probabilities; and (c) efficiency: memory, message, and computational complexities. The
theoretical results were compared with NS-2 simulations that are based on real Web traces
(details in §6.2.5.2).
6.2.5.1 Theoretical Evaluation Summary of Theoretical Results. A summary of the
theoretical results is first presented followed by the detailed analysis. First, the number
of buckets needed to achieve a specific false positive probability is linear in the number of
attackers. Second, the length of the detection interval is also linear in the number of attack-
ers. Third, the memory overhead of the matrix is O(nc). However, the matrix is accessed
only every P seconds and not for each service request. Fourth, per-request processing has
negligible (O(log(d))) overhead, and the detection algorithm is O(nc) but is invoked only
every P seconds. Finally, the message overhead caused by the tokens is small, and tokens
can be piggybacked on service requests, such as HTTP GET.
Effectiveness Analysis: False Positive and False Negative Probabilities. As discussed
in §2.3, the detection algorithm used in live baiting has a theoretical zero false negative
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probability. Its false positive probability is represented by Eqn. 2.1. The algorithm is
scalable in terms of the required number of tests or buckets, nt, as modeled by Eqn. 2.2.
Fig. 44 shows that the relationship between nt and d, the number of attackers, is linear,
and the slope increases with decreasing target false positive probabilities. For instance, the
number of buckets needed to detect a million attackers with 10−4 false positive probability
is about 25 million, which can be implemented using less than 10 MB of memory.
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Figure 44: Scalability of live baiting to number of clients. The number of buckets required
to get a target false positive probability is linear in the number of attackers and independent
of the number of clients.
However, in reality, extra false positives and false negatives may occur due to burstiness
in request arrivals and irregularities in service time distributions. This effect is studied in
the simulation analysis in the next subsection.
Detection Time. The detection time is the length of the detection period P plus the
running time of the detection algorithm. The detection time is set so that the HWM is a
positive integer. That is,
HWM ∈ {1, 2, · · ·}
Or,
ρP
nt
∈ {1, 2, · · ·}
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Equivalently,
P ∈ {nt
ρ
, 2
nt
ρ
, · · ·} (6.8)
Because nt is linear in the number of attackers, d, as shown in Fig. 44, and ρ is constant
with respect to the number of attackers, then P , the detection time, is linear in the number
of attackers.
Efficiency Analysis: Storage overhead. The storage overhead of the matrix is O(nt ·
nc) = O(d · nc), because nt is linear in d. However, this overhead can be greatly reduced by
storing only the 1-bits of this sparse matrix. The number of 1-bits is O( dnc
d+1
) = O(nc). The
servers also keep nt bucket counters each with size O(log(HWM)). Because HWM =
ρP
nt
is independent of the number of clients and attackers, the storage overhead of the bucket
counters is O(nt) = O(d).
Computational overhead. The server looks up the source address of each incoming re-
quest in the block-list of size O(d). The lookup is thus an O(log(d)) operation. The server
also applies a light-weight hash operation to check the validity of the request’s token and
increments the corresponding bucket counter. Both are O(1) operations. The detection al-
gorithm, which runs every P seconds, has a running time O(nc), because it has to check each
1-bit in the matrix to determine which clients to clear for each negative test. This relatively
high computation time can be mitigated by running the detection algorithm only when the
number of attacked buckets exceed a threshold, flagging a strong attack.
Message overhead. For a large matrix with millions of rows, the size of each token is
24 bytes, 4 bytes for row index and 20 bytes for the hash. This small-sized token can
easily be piggybacked in a service request, such as the HTTP GET message. Thus, no new
messages are introduced, and the extra overhead is only in message size. This overhead is
O(log(number of matrix rows)) = O(log(d)).
Coverage Analysis. Two conditions are necessary to achieve zero FN and the FP
of Eqn. 2.1 using the group-testing detection algorithm described in §2.3. These conditions
are:
C1. For all buckets to which zero attackers are assigned, the bucket counter every detection
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period is less than or equal to theHWM , that is, the corresponding test result is negative.
C2. For all buckets to which at least one attacker is assigned, the bucket counter every
detection period is more than theHWM , that is, the corresponding test result is positive.
C1 holds with high probability, noting that the number of clients assigned to each bucket
is a Binomial random variable, and, thus, its values are around the mean with high proba-
bility [97]. Since the HWM is set according to the mean number of clients assigned to each
bucket, each bucket receives ≤ HWM requests every detection period with high probability,
if no attackers are assigned to the bucket.
To cause denial of service each attacker has to send requests at a rate higher than a
legitimate client’s, that is, rattacker > r. Because the HWM is set assuming only legitimate
clients (sending at rate r) are assigned to buckets, and because each attacker distributes its
attack rate over its assigned buckets equally, each bucket that has an attacker assigned to it
will receive more requests than its HWM . As a result, condition C2 holds as well.
6.2.5.2 Simulation Results The purpose of the simulation study is to examine the
extent to which the above theoretical results apply in more complex system and attack
scenarios. In particular, the effect of burstiness in request arrivals and irregularities in
request processing times of real services is studied. The simulation results described below
show that live baiting is indeed effective under real service models.
To this end, a simulation model of live baiting was developed in NS-2 [5]. The model
extends the PackMime HTTP traffic generation module [28], which generates HTTP 1.1
sessions with session inter-arrival times, client waiting times, request sizes, and response
sizes derived from empirical traces. The PackMime module was modified to include separate
client and attacker distributions.
Instead of generating server delays independently from system load, the server CPU was
modeled as a link, called “CPU-link”, with a bandwidth equivalent to the service capacity.
The link is attached to a round-robin queue with sub-queues corresponding to the buckets.
The queue buffer is shared fairly among the buckets, so that each bucket has a guaranteed
share equal to total buffer size divided by number of buckets. Servicing a request is modeled
by transmitting a packet in the CPU-link with size equal to the response size. When the
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packet is received at the end of the CPU-link, a packet is sent with 0 delay back to the server,
who immediately sends the response to the client. If a packet is dropped from the CPU-link
queue, the client of the dropped request is notified, and in turn attempts a maximum of
three retransmissions with one second delay between attempts.
Attack sessions have similar request size, response size, and client waiting time distribu-
tions as legitimate sessions. The detection algorithm was slightly modified to count request
drops (more specifically, packet drops in the CPU-link’s buffer) in each bucket instead of
the number of requests. The number of request drops was found to be a better metric than
request count in this setting, because it is a more direct indicator of server overload; using
the number of requests would result in more false positives due to request burstiness of le-
gitimate clients. A sensitivity analysis of the effect of HWM was conducted, and a good
performance was reached with a HWM value of 10 dropped requests.
To evaluate live baiting, six metrics were used: average response time of legitimate re-
quests, throughput of legitimate requests (legitimate requests completed per second) and
legitimate sessions (legitimate sessions completed per second), false positive rate, false neg-
ative rate, and legitimate utilization; the latter is defined as the fraction of time the server’s
CPU was processing legitimate requests. Two performance baselines were considered, namely
no attack and no defense.
A total of 10, 000 legitimate clients was simulated with aggregate rate of 20 sessions per
second. The CPU-link was 100Kbps, zero propagation delay, and 100Kbit total buffer size in
one direction. The reverse direction was 100Mbps with zero propagation delay, provisioned
to introduce negligible delays and no drops. The simulation topology consisted of a client
node modeling a “client cloud” and a server node, connected by a 100Mbps link with 10ms
propagation delay. The simulation time of each run was 1, 000 seconds, the attack started
at 250s, and ended at 750s. The warm-up period was 100 seconds, after which statistics
were collected. The detection intervals started after the attack started, and the request-drop
counters were reset every detection interval.
Fig. 45 illustrates the effectiveness of live baiting in detecting attackers and reducing
the attack effect on response time. In this figure, requests were grouped every 10 seconds
based on their start time, and the average response time of each group was plotted. The
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Figure 45: Average response time for no attack, no defense, and live baiting vs. simulation
time. Attack time = [250s, 750s]; detection interval = 90s.
aggregate attack rate was 100 sessions per second, number of buckets nt = 1, 000, number
of attackers nx = 100, and the estimate d = 100 as well. The detection interval was 90
seconds. With no defense, the response time almost doubled after the attack started. With
live baiting, response time spiked after attack started, but quickly (at 340s, after the first
detection interval) went down, after the attackers were detected and added to the block-list.
After the attack, the response time with live baiting was slightly less than with no attack,
because a few legitimate clients were blocked (false positives), and consequently, the load on
the system was slightly reduced.
The first experiment explores the effect of the detection interval length (P ) on false
positives and false negatives. The detection interval length was varied from 10s to 200s.
Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
As Fig. 46(top) shows, the false positive rate increased with increasing values of P .
This effect is due to burstiness in request arrivals and irregularities in request processing
times, which caused some legitimate clients to accumulate drops in their buckets. Increasing
the detection interval allowed some of these accumulated drops to exceed the HWM . This
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Figure 46: Effect of detection interval length (P ) on the performance of live baiting.
effect of P on false positives did not show up in the theoretical results, which ignored request
burstiness of legitimate clients.
The same figure also shows that the false negative rate decreased and reached almost zero
at P = 90s, because increasing P gave more time for each attacker to overflow its assigned
buckets and get detected.
Fig. 46(bottom) shows that the throughput peaked at P = 90s at a value of about 88%
of the throughput under no attack. For detection interval lengths beyond this point, the
increase in false positives caused throughput to decrease.
The second experiment studied the false positive and false negative rates. First, to
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validate Eqn. 2.1, the number of attackers was increased with accurate estimation, that is,
d = nx.
As Fig. 47 shows, live baiting with 90s detection interval and 1, 000 buckets was successful
in detecting up to 50 attackers with a false positive probability of less than 0.005 and
almost zero false negatives. Simulation results matched Eqn. 2.1 when the detection interval
was 30 seconds (Fig. 47 (top)). However, 90s interval introduced more false positives than
predicted by the model. This difference was due to bucket overflows resulting from bursty
legitimate request arrivals. Although the model correctly predicted the trend of the false
positive probability increase with increasing d and fixed number of buckets, it needs further
enhancement to take the effect of the detection interval into consideration.
The false negative rate with P = 90s is almost zero (Fig. 47 (middle)), because 90
seconds is enough time for each attacker in this scenario to overflow all its assigned buckets.
On the other hand, the false negative rate with 30s interval was close to one and decreased
with increasing number of attackers. Although the rate per individual attacker decreased,
resulting in more time needed for the attacker to overflow its buckets, the number of these
buckets (= nt=1000
d+1
) decreased as well.
The effect of the number of attackers on the legitimate utilization depended on the
detection interval length, as shown in Fig. 47 (bottom). When the interval was short, the
decrease in false negatives and the small increase in false positives had two effects: the
legitimate utilization was much smaller than at large intervals, and the utilization slightly
increased. Conversely, when the interval was large, legitimate utilization slightly decreased
due to the increase in false positive rate while the false negative rate was constant.
6.2.5.3 Analysis of Adaptive Live Baiting To analyze the adaptive live baiting al-
gorithm, a simulation experiment was conducted where the number of attackers varied while
fixing the estimate d = 100. The purpose is to study the effect of underestimating and
overestimating the number of attackers and to validate Eqn. 6.2 and Eqn. 6.3. As Fig. 48
(top) shows, the false positive rate increased with increasing number of attackers. The 90s
setting has more false positives than predicted by Eqn. 6.2 because of the burstiness reason
previously mentioned. Moreover, the false negative rate was almost zero until the number
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of attackers exceeded the estimate (Fig. 48 (top)). The false negative rate then increased
because the rate per attacker decreased (fixed aggregate attack rate) and number of buckets
per attacker remained fixed (because d was fixed), so the time that each attacker needed to
overflow its buckets exceeded the 90s detection interval. The legitimate utilization (Fig. 48
(middle)) slightly dropped to about 0.93 until number of attackers exceeded the estimate,
then dropped steeply due to increasing false negatives and approached the no defense base-
line.
The maximum number of attacked buckets (buckets with more drops than HWM) was
measured over all detection intervals within each run. This number is plotted in Fig. 48
(bottom) together with Eqn. 6.3, which models the number of attacked buckets. With 90s
detection interval and HWM = 10, the number of attacked buckets exceeded the model
estimation. Thus, using Eqn. 6.3 to estimate the number of attackers would yield a larger
number than the actual number of attackers. For example, at 630 attacked buckets, the
model estimates the number of attackers as about 100, but the actual number of attackers
would be about 60 attackers (this can be shown by drawing a horizontal line at y = 630 in
Fig. 48 (bottom)).
Effectively, using Eqn. 6.3 would make the system over-estimate the number of attackers,
which would cause slightly more state but results in fewer false positives. For instance, at
an estimate of d = 100, the actual number of attackers would be about 60 (this can also
be shown by drawing a horizontal line at y = 630 in Fig. 48 (bottom) intersecting the two
curves at around nx = 60 and nx = 100, respectively). The false positive rate from Fig. 48
(top) would be 0.04 (at nx = 60) instead of 0.12 if the estimate was accurate (nx = d = 100).
6.2.6 Conclusions
Live baiting is a novel algorithm that efficiently identifies service-level DoS attackers. It is
based on a novel application of group testing theory. Live baiting is scalable and can effi-
ciently and quickly identify DoS attackers in a large service with millions of clients even when
attackers send service requests that are indistinguishable from legitimate requests. Theoret-
ical results using simple service and attack models confirm the algorithm effectiveness, in
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terms of false positive and false negative probabilities, and efficiency, in terms of memory,
message, and computational complexity. Moreover, adaptive live baiting contributes to the
general group-testing theory domain the mechanism that discovers the actual number of
attackers starting from an initial estimate. The effectiveness of live baiting to more com-
plex service and attack models was validated using NS-2 simulations, whereby techniques to
extend live baiting to these models were presented.
The investigation of how to tune the algorithm parameters, such as the detection interval,
the high water mark, and the clearing probability, is left for future work. Although live
baiting was presented in the context of attacks against servers (service-level attacks), it can
be applied to protecting network-level resources as well. The investigation of this application
is a subject of future work as well.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS
The last decade has witnessed growing interaction between physical and cyber worlds. Of
the main thrusts behind the cyber-physical convergence is the pervasiveness of computer
networks, which range from small-scale networks of home appliances to large-scale “eco-
systems”, such as the Internet and large-scale sensor networks that monitor physical infras-
tructure systems. Although computer networking has enabled a huge multitude of services
with many potentially useful services yet to be unleashed, full-scale adoption of these ser-
vices highly depends on the trustworthiness of the networking infrastructure. To be trusted,
a computer network has to be available, dependable, reliable, privacy-aware, and usable.
Many factors have contributed to a shaky image of network availability and reliability. For
instance, a denial-of-service (DoS) attack in 2002 caused a major Internet “blackout”. In the
wireless arena, radio jamming, malicious or benign, poses a major hurdle to the deployment
of mission- and life-critical wireless services.
The work in this dissertation aims at making today’s computer networks more trustwor-
thy by putting forward the following thesis: a hybrid of the three DoS protection approaches,
namely prevention, mitigation, and detection-and-recovery, provides better protection than
the individual approaches. The thesis is supported by presenting the dodging framework,
which relies on dynamic, unpredictable reconfigurations of the client-resource mapping to
allow a service under DoS attack to provide service to legitimate clients despite the attack
and to create hard-to-evade baits, or traps, to identify the attackers.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follow.
• In Chapter 4, the dodging framework is formalized and its two components, namely
attack mitigation and attacker identification, are defined in terms of the mapping function
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between resources and clients. Each of the two components relies on a set of properties
of the mapping function. These properties are formally defined, and their impact on
achieving the dodging components is described.
• §4.3 presents the Primary-Effect-based (PED) detection problem, which represents a
departure from traditional attacker identification approaches. In PED, DoS attackers
are identified based merely on the unavailability of the attacked resources, without the
need to develop models of legitimate behavior, keep track of attack signatures, or tightly
specify legitimate behavior.
• §5.1 presents an analytical study of the blocking probability for different attack and
defense combinations in single-radio networks. Closed-form equations are derived and
used to decide the best defense strategy (reactive or proactive) given the attack strategy
(scanning or sweeping) and values of system parameters.
• In §5.1, the jamming problem in multi-radio networks is formulated as two max-min
games (the availability game and the efficiency games) between defense and attack, and
through simulation the Nash equilibria of both games are determined.
• §5.2 formulates the problem of maximizing goodput under jamming in multi-radio net-
works using a combination of channel-hopping and error-correcting codes (ECC). It also
presents Markov-Chain-based models of the reactive channel-hopping against the scan-
ning attack.
• §5.2 also introduces the honeybees adaptive algorithm, which achieves energy-efficient
and bandwidth-efficient mitigation of jamming in multi-radio networks. The algorithm
used the Markov models to detect the number of jammers and adjust the ECC parameters
accordingly.
• §6.1 presents the roaming honeypots algorithm, which significantly improves the usage
of honeypots to identify service-level DoS attackers. The algorithm is evaluated via
simulation and experiments using a prototype.
• §6.2 presents the live baiting algorithm, which identifies service-level DoS attackers and
scales to large services with millions of clients. Live baiting requires low state overhead,
enabled by a novel leverage of the group-testing theory.
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• §6.2 also presents a novel mechanism to detect the actual number of attackers and adap-
tively adjust defense parameters, which is a contribution to group-testing theory.
7.1 GAINED INSIGHTS
In pursuing the work of this dissertation, I have gained a number of insights about DoS
defense and network security in general.
Predict future threats. Security is often described as an arms race between defense
and attack. New threats emerge as a response to deployed defense systems. To maintain an
edge, security research has to always anticipate future attacks and prepare effective defenses.
Along this line, in [77] I predicted the impact of service-level DoS attacks, or what is now
known as HTTP CyberSlam attacks, which emerged as a response to wide deployment of
ingress filtering and source-end monitoring of one-way network flows. Service-level DoS is
particularly challenging because it is easy to launch, hard to stop by current network-level
defense approaches, and overwhelming even for massively-resourced services and networks.
The roaming honeypots and live baiting defense systems provide efficient, accurate, and fast
identification and filtering of service-level DoS attackers.
New threats also emerge by exploiting new technologies that oversight security in their
design process. In [75], I was one of the first researchers to point to the vulnerability of sensor
networks and even the recent 802.11a and 802.11g wifi standards to radio jamming. The
jamming-tolerant frequency-hopping physical layer has been replaced by cheaper and broader
bandwidth physical layers that are vulnerable to jamming. Later papers have confirmed this
vulnerability and devised defense schemes in single-radio networks [54,100,153,155]. I have
proposed and evaluated software-based channel-hopping at the link layer coupled with error-
correcting coding over multiple radios.
Use simple detection signals. Many state-of-the-art defense systems go a long way
in tailoring very effective defense techniques against specific attack tools and vectors. These
solutions are unfortunately temporary and simply result in attackers shifting gears into dif-
ferent tactics. On the contrary, my defense systems assume the least about how attackers
139
perpetrate and execute their attacks. In both the roaming honeypots and live baiting sys-
tems, attacker identification and filtering relies merely on the fact that some resources (e.g.,
server queues) are overloaded by the attack. Attackers will have a hard time evading this
detection method; without resource overloading, there is actually no attack!
Borrow ideas from relevant fields. The network security field has its own characteris-
tics, but it can benefit from other fields. For instance, the problem of identifying “defective”
members within a large population with the minimum number of tests has been exten-
sively studied in combinatorics, particularly in the group-testing theory. I have adopted
techniques from group-testing to design the live baiting defense system. The borrowed ideas
enable live baiting to identify—with low memory overhead—DoS attackers within the clients
of a large service. Moreover, the concept of a “test tube” has lead to the use of virtualiza-
tion to create isolated, individually monitored virtual servers, whereby attacker identification
relies only on overload events in these virtual servers. Game theory has been used to un-
derstand and analyze anarchy situations. I have used game theory to analyze jamming and
defense strategies and determine the most reasonable combinations. To this end, I have
defined utility functions for both defense and attack and modeled jamming as a max-min
game.
Resource awareness. The defense systems that I have developed make efficient utiliza-
tion of resources, so as not to become attack targets themselves. For instance, as previously
mentioned, live baiting uses group testing to minimize the amount of state used to identify
DoS attackers. The algorithm utilizes state that grows with the number of attackers, as
compared to state-of-the-art systems that need to keep state in the order of the number of
users. Also, in the honeybees defense system, which defends wireless networks against jam-
ming, energy efficiency is used as a utility function in the game-theoretic analysis. One thing
to note is that efficiency does not imply using few resources. Indeed, using a single radio
interface to defend against jamming is sub-optimal when considering either communication
availability or energy efficiency as performance metrics.
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7.2 FORESEEN IMPACT AND FUTURE WORK
The dodging strategy is general and can be applied to both wired and wireless networks.
This work is thus poised as a starting point for a wider deployment of defense techniques
that use dodging as the underlying concept.
This work also introduced a new DoS detection paradigm, namely the Primary-Effect-
based Detection (PED), for identifying DoS attackers among service users. This paradigm
would invite new research in defining the detection function for other DoS attack instances,
such as those based on exploiting software and protocol bugs, and for the detection of
attackers in other security problems. The fact that the new detection approach does not
require thorough monitoring of individual client behavior makes it suitable in scenarios in
which client privacy is of particular importance, such as when the DoS defense is done by an
entity other than the protected service (e.g, the Internet Service Provider). This approach
would pioneer the concept of privacy preservation in on-line DoS defense systems.
Scalable identification of DoS attackers. With expected growth of network services,
client populations will keep on increasing in size and diversity. Additionally, with increasing
awareness and deployment of virus and worm defense mechanisms, the number of attack
hosts will decrease. Guided by these factors, I project that one of the main challenges in
DoS defense will be the scalable identification of attackers among service clients. I plan to
extend my live baiting defense, which addresses the scalability issue by using monitoring state
that depends on the number of attackers not the total number of clients. I will implement live
baiting as a service-independent middle-box that sits in front of the load balancer in a server
cluster. I will also investigate a methodology to monitor the virtual servers across server
boundaries. A technique based on distributed resource containers [17] is a good candidate
for this task.
Secure wireless communication in emerging wireless technologies. In my re-
search to defend against radio jamming, I have identified a number of research challenges in
applying channel-hopping to multi-radio wireless networks. I will investigate techniques to
assess the jamming threat and adaptively adjust data redundancy level and channel-hopping
strategy and frequency based on the threat level. I will also investigate the application of
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the channel-hopping defense in the newly-emerging cognitive radios [58], whereby channel
bandwidth and radio capabilities can be heterogeneous. Finally, I will investigate techniques
to coordinate channel-hopping across multiple network hops.
Virus and worm detection. I will apply the group-testing approach to detecting
viruses and worms. Current worm-detection techniques incur high overhead in monitoring
processes and threads to identify anomalous behavior. The premise of group testing, as
demonstrated in my live baiting algorithm, is to minimize the monitoring overhead by com-
bining tested elements into isolated “test tubes”. I will investigate techniques to employ the
virtual machine technology to test processes and threads. The main challenge will be how
to maintain program integrity across virtual machines.
Privacy-preserving DoS protection. A perfectly-secured network, if such a thing
really exists, will not be trusted if user privacy is not maintained. A basic requirement for
a DoS defense system to preserve privacy is to avoid monitoring of individual client traffic.
In my DoS defense systems, client traffic is not tapped into unless it is known to be attack
traffic (except for a few false positives). Moreover, because attacker identification depends
on signals over aggregate traffic, the defense system can be outsourced to specialized defense
entities. The design and research challenges to achieve DoS defense outsourcing are in my
long-term research plans.
DoS on the telephone network. The public telephone network has not suffered from
DoS attacks due in part to the difficulty and high-cost of deploying automated, remotely-
controlled dialers. I project that this situation is going to change soon with the wide deploy-
ment of VoIP clients. Being a piece of software, a VoIP client is vulnerable to compromise
and, thus, can act as a “zombie” to launch DoS attacks on the telephone network. This
threat is aggravated by the fact that many embedded systems used to monitor and control
critical infrastructure facilities are networked and controlled through dial-in interfaces.
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